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FOREWORD
This monograph is the third in the series of monographs stemming from the Strategic Studies InstituteU.S. State Department conference on Russia in January
2010. It is devoted to a consideration of Russia’s military doctrine. Russia had long before the conference
announced the impending release of a new defense or
military doctrine, but its release date was always being delayed, signifying a sharp political struggle over
its contents. Although the doctrine ultimately was released on February 5, 2010, after the conference, the
papers were nonetheless able to some degree to use
the new text in their analysis. As a result, these three
chapters provide an extremely revealing examination
of the struggles over defining the threats facing Russia
and the responses that the government should take to
meet them. These struggles, as delineated here, provide deep insight into the nature of Russian security
and military politics and the evolving views of key
military and governmental institutions. No understanding of contemporary Russian defense and overall security policy is truly complete without taking
into account the “backstage” politics described here.
Neither is the doctrine entirely comprehensible without the kind of analysis that is offered.
For these reasons we offer this monograph to our
readers so that they can benefit from the expert insights of the authors.
		
		
		
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
v

INTRODUCTION
On January 25-26, 2010, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) organized a conference entitled, “Contemporary Issues in International Security,” at the Finnish
Embassy in Washington, DC. This was the second in
what we hope will be annual conferences bringing together U.S., European, and Russian scholars and experts to discuss such issues in an open forum. The importance of such regular dialogues among experts is
well known, and the benefits of these discussions are
considerable. Just as we published the papers of the
2008 conference in 2009, (Stephen J. Blank, ed., Prospects for US-Russian Security Cooperation, Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
2009), we are doing so now. However, in this case, we
are publishing the papers on a panel by panel basis.
This monograph on Russia’s defense or military
doctrine represents the third of the five monographs
that we will be publishing. It consists of three deeply
probing essays into the genesis of the doctrine, the political struggle behind it, and the actual content of the
doctrine. They reveal a highly politicized minefield
of struggle comprising leading actors in the Russian
military, government, and security policy circles as
a whole. They duly illuminate the ongoing struggles
between and among these sets of military and civilian elites and therefore cast a shining light on critical
aspects of Russian policy that all too often are left in
the darkness.
In this context, it is fair to say that it would be
impossible to grasp fully the nature and direction of
current Russian security policies without such an examination of the struggle to formulate it and present it

vii

to the public. The question of what direction Russian
policy is following is of the utmost importance, given
Russia’s importance in world politics and the new
Russian policy of the Obama administration. Therefore, the clarification of otherwise murky and obscure
trends that are of great significance to the United States
will be of great value to our readers and audience.
		

		
		

STEPHEN J. BLANK
Editor
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CHAPTER 1
RUSSIA’S MILITARY DOCTRINE
DEVELOPMENT
(2000-10)
Marcel de Haas
In assessing Russia’s security policy, the analysis
of military doctrine plays an important role. Military
doctrine forms a part of the national security policy
and is a reflection of past and possibly future political-military policy. Therefore, to gain a good insight
into Russian security policy, a thorough analysis of
the development of Russian military doctrine is essential. This chapter concentrates on Russian doctrinal
thinking during the presidencies of Vladimir Putin
and Dmitry Medvedev since 2000. Furthermore, this
doctrinal review is generally limited to elements on
external security, with the exception of the use of military force against internal threats, e.g., the conflicts in
and around Chechnya. The introduction describes the
theoretical setting of military doctrine within Russian
security thinking and will also provide a brief overview of doctrinal developments in the 1990s. Next,
Putin’s first and only Military Doctrine of 2000 will be
explained. Subsequently, the paper of 2003, which I
depict as a “defense white paper,” was the following
major security document on doctrinal thinking. After
2003, no documents related to military doctrine have
been released. However, the security elite—politicians,
military, and academics—regularly made statements
on doctrinal thinking. As of December 2008, reports
on a forthcoming new military doctrine—replacing
the one of 2000—became stronger, accompanied with
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excerpts of this upcoming security document. Finally,
on February 5, 2010, the new military doctrine was released. This chapter ends with conclusions on Russia’s
doctrinal development since 2000.
INTRODUCTION
Military Doctrine as a Major Element of National
Security Policy.
The fact that a state lays down the safeguarding of
its continuation in a national security policy is a broadly accepted principle. The objective of this policy is to
ensure independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, welfare, and stability by taking political, economic,
social-cultural, and military measures. Each state has
specific interests. The use of armed forces is especially
determined by the perception to which degree these
interests are threatened. The conversion of interests
into objectives takes place at the highest decisionmaking level, the political or grand strategy. Russia’s political strategy—formerly National Security Concept
and now National Security Strategy—explains that
the Russian Federation (RF) has military, diplomatic,
international-legal, information, economic, and other
means at its disposal to meet its objectives. The political strategy enlightens Russia’s interests and the measures to deal with threats that could prevent meeting
its objectives. From the political strategy, as the principal security document, doctrines and concepts are
drawn. The most important documents for clarifying
Russia’s security policy are the Military Doctrine and
the Foreign Policy Concept (FPC). At the military strategic level, security policy is converted into the use of
military power by guidelines laid down in a military
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doctrine. Military doctrines can be divided into three
categories. The most detailed are service doctrines,
e.g., those of army, air force, and navy. On a national
level we find the joint armed forces or military doctrine, which includes all services. Finally, we can establish multinational or alliance doctrines, e.g., that of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This
chapter describes only the military doctrine at the national, Russian-state level.
Russia’s military doctrine is more abstract and has
more politics in it than is the case with doctrines of
Western states, which usually concentrate on guidelines for military action. As a result, the Russian doctrine is closely associated with the political-strategic
level. Russian military doctrine usually defines itself
as a set of officially approved state views concerning
war and its prevention, force generation, preparation
of the country and the armed forces for suppression of
aggression, and methods of warfare to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.1 The doctrine provides guidelines in two directions. First, it deals with
the needs of the armed forces in the field of organization, personnel, and equipment. Second, the doctrine
provides guidelines for waging wars/armed conflicts.
Russia’s military doctrine provides political guidelines for the direction of all armed forces and troops,
i.e., the armed forces of the Ministry of Defense (MoD),
as well as the other troops of the so-called power ministries, such as the troops of the security service (FSB)
and those of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).
DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1990S
After the break up of the Soviet Union, the Russian
military leadership was initially convinced that the
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Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) would
develop towards an organization similar to that of the
former Soviet Union, naturally under Russian rule.
This would allow the CIS to have combined armed
forces at its disposal. However, it did not take long
before a number of CIS states decided differently.
They created their own armed forces, independent of
Moscow’s desires. Subsequently, Russia was forced to
form separate RF Armed Forces. This also created the
need for a RF military doctrine, which was published
in May 1992. This draft Military Doctrine seemed to be
the start of a movement towards a more assertive confrontational Russian security policy, different from the
defensive and peaceful tone of the last Soviet doctrine.
In the 1990s, doctrinal development brought forward
this assertive policy direction in doctrinal entries on
adopting a leading role for the RF in conflict solution
and military cooperation within the CIS; granting itself the right to protect Russian minorities in other
CIS states, if necessary by using force; lowering of the
nuclear threshold by abandoning “no-first-use” statements; the return of terms such as “opponents/enemies”; (forward) deployment of RF Armed Forces and
Other Troops outside Russian territory; and a fierce
anti-Western threat perception. (See Table 1-1.)
Date
May 1992
November 2, 1993
September 29, 1999
April 21, 2000

Policy Document
Draft RF Military Doctrine published.
Military Doctrine ratified by Presidential decree.
Draft Military Doctrine endorsed by the Collegium
of the RF MoD.
Military Doctrine ratified by Presidental decree.

Table 1-1. Chronology of doctrinal documents in
the 1990s.
4

More specifically, doctrinal development in the
1990s included the following adjustments: A deteriorating relationship with the West was reflected in
doctrinal entries on interference in internal Russian
affairs, expansion of military blocs and alliances, attempts to ignore (or infringe on) RF interests in resolving international security problems, and language that
reflects the feeling of being surrounded by enemies.
Another illustration of the deteriorated relations was
expressed in the development of the doctrinal views
on international military cooperation. Cooperation
with NATO has gradually disappeared from the doctrines. As a residue of Soviet thinking that threats only
came from abroad, internal threats were not recognized at first. However, since 1993 experiences such as
Boris Yeltsin’s clash with the Duma, armed conflicts
within CIS states and, later, the conflicts in Chechnya, have caused internal threats to be included in the
doctrines. The growing importance of internal threats
generated entries in other areas as well; for instance,
regarding the type of conflicts. During the 1990s, the
order of conflicts changed, with local and internal
armed conflicts, rather than global and nuclear wars,
being listed as the most important conflicts. The threat
of a global war had diminished. The Russian militarypolitical leadership realized that the security apparatus would be increasingly faced with domestic and
regional armed conflicts. This shift from external to
internal conflicts was also reflected in changes in the
perception of the use of military force. The emphasis
changed from external large-scale warfare to operations within the CIS and joint operations of RF Armed
Forces and Other Troops in internal conflicts. Another
consequence of this change of warfare was expressed
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in doctrinal entries stating that the RF Armed Forces
(of the MoD) could also be employed for internal operations, and that cooperation between them and the
Other Troops (of the power ministries) was essential.
The leadership of the security apparatus, as laid
down in the command and control chain of the doctrine, became gradually concentrated in the hands of
the following institutions: the President, the Security
Council of the Russian Federation (SCRF), the MoD,
and the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces. Clearly,
the consecutive doctrines gave evidence of a power
play by the military. Since drafting the doctrines was
mainly left to the General Staff, the military leadership
was to a great extent responsible for the assertive tone
of the doctrines, as reflected in entries on the desire of
controlling former Soviet territory of the CIS and with
regard to a fierce threat perception with a corresponding framework of tasks for the military. This forceful
attitude was probably an attempt by the military to
regain their strong and influential position, which had
been diminished under Mikhail Gorbachev. Another
example of their aspirations for power and influence
was the fact that the SCRF, probably at the instigation
of the military, was left out of the command and control chain in the doctrine of 2000.2 Other entries aimed
at diminishing the status and influence of the Other
Troops. However, in doing so, the military found Putin in their way. Since the Constitution of 1993, the
President had had a dominating position in doctrinal
development and the Legislature no longer played a
role in drafting or passing the doctrine. In the course
of 2000, by removing the responsibility for military reforms from the General Staff to the SCRF, Putin made
it clear that he intended to strengthen the position of
the SCRF at the expense of the MoD and the General
Staff.
6

The Military Doctrine of 2000.
In 2000 Putin started his first term in office as
President by signing new editions of Russia’s major
security documents. Shortly after the publication of a
new National Security Concept (NSC) in January 2000,
the subordinate major security documents, i.e., the
Military Doctrine and the FPC, were also revisited. The
order of publication and the generally similar points
of view of the different concepts gave proof of a wellcoordinated and comprehensive approach to the foreign and security policies. The new military doctrine
was signed by President Putin in April 2000.3 This
paragraph proceeds with the contents of this doctrine
(SCRF 2000). Since the NSC (as of 2009 renamed National Security Strategy) has been the principal document in Russian security thinking since the 1990s, for
reasons of unity and clarity the main entries of the
Military Doctrine 2000 and of subsequent doctrinal
documents and statements are offered in the format of
the NSC, i.e., subsequently Russia in the world community, Russia’s national interests, threats to Russia’s
security, and ensuring Russia’s security.
RUSSIA IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY
The doctrine mentioned a number of destabilizing factors: Extremist national-ethnic and religious
separatism and terrorism; weakening of existing
mechanisms of international security; and unlawful
application of military force under the pretext of “humanitarian intervention.”
There was remarkably increased attention upon
internal conflicts, irregular warfare, and joint op-
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erations by MoD and other forces, which were the
experiences of the Chechen conflicts (1994-96 and
1999-2010). These conflicts were examples of internal
destabilizing factors listed as “extremist national-ethnic and religious separatism and terrorism.” A striking feature of external destabilizing factors was the
prominence of negative tendencies with reference to
Western security policy. NATO’s use of force in the
former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Kosovo) was seen as
a particularly clear example of its policy of ignoring
Russia, which claimed a decisive role in Europe, as
well as of disregarding the United Nations (UN) and
the standards of international law. Other concerns
were NATO’s new Strategic Concept of April 1999 and
its enlargement with new member states in the East,
adjacent to Russia’s borders. The doctrine rejected a
leading role for other institutions in international politics other than the UN Security Council (UNSC). This
provision was related to the objective of strengthening
Russia’s international position. In the UNSC, the RF
possessed the right of veto and was thus able to block
undesirable resolutions. Therefore, the objective of
reinforcing Russia’s international status could be promoted within the constellation of the UN. However, if
NATO dominated international politics, the situation
was different. In such an arrangement of the international system, the RF, without a veto right, would be
more or less “dependent” on NATO’s policies. This
explained the prominence of the UN and the UNSC
in the doctrinal entries. The doctrine unmistakably expressed that both internal (the Chechens) and external
(the West) “aggressors” had to realize that Russia was
not be trifled with anymore.
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Russia’s National Interests.
The national interests stated in the doctrine reflect
the military-political instrument that the state has at
its disposal to achieve the objectives of its grand strategy: Military cooperation through the CIS Collective
Security Treaty, creating a unified defense space and
ensuring collective military security; and creating a
common security and military policy with Belarus as
an element of the union between both states.
The Military Doctrine dealt exclusively with the international military-diplomatic dimensions of national interests. Apparently, the military did not desire to
mingle in or simply ignored the social-economic security interests of the state. This was a short-sighted
approach. Russian forces participated in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia (SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR)
in which social-economic aspects were of great importance in reaching a long-lasting settlement of the
conflict. Clearly, the Russian military leadership must
have been well posted on the concept of “broad security,” which nowadays is an accepted model in international (security) politics. Since the top level of the
General Staff was raised in the ideological background
of the Cold War, it might very well be possible that
hawkish generals stubbornly stuck to the outdated
and limited views of the military-diplomatic dimension of security. Furthermore, domestically, the first
Chechen conflict should have made clear to the RF
authorities that threats were not confined to the military dimension but also have their roots in political,
social, and economic dimensions. However, if the RF
authorities had taken this interdependence between
internal and external national interests seriously, this
should have brought them to the conclusion that the
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Chechen type of conflicts could not be solved by military means. Consequently, in the interest of preserving and strengthening the RF’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as of eliminating the causes
of extremism and ethno-separatism, not only military
and diplomatic means, but also social (human rights),
economic (development projects, building and maintenance of houses, schools and medical facilities), and
political (reform of the bureaucratic apparatus) activities are essential. However, these essential aspects
were not identified in the doctrine as consequences of
national interests. Furthermore, as a result of the Union Treaty of December 1999, Russia and Belarus had
intensified their cooperation. The military aspects of
the deepened relations were stated in the doctrine.
Threats to Russian Security.
The doctrine saw the fulfilment of the political-strategic objectives as well as Russian internal and external security threatened by a number of causes related
to the aforementioned destabilizing factors. These included: interference in RF internal affairs; attempts to
ignore RF interests in resolving international security
problems; attempts to oppose the increase of influence
of the RF on a global level; the expansion of military
blocs and alliances; the introduction of foreign troops
(without UNSC sanction) to the territory of contiguous states friendly with the RF; and the suppression of
the rights of RF citizens abroad.
Protecting Russians abroad is a recurring theme in
the doctrines. In the consecutive military doctrines of
the 1990s, a provision on the protection of Russians
abroad was included under the heading “External
threats.” In previous doctrines describing “abroad,”
the same expression was used as in the other two se10

curity documents: za rubezhyom. However, in the 2000
issue of the Military Doctrine, this term was changed
into inostrannyy. Inostrannyy means out of the country
in general, it has a neutral, dispassionate implication.
Based upon the changed connotation of the term for
abroad in the Military Doctrine of 2000, the assumption could be made that the General Staff/MoD had
become less willing to use force if necessary for the
protection of Russian minorities in a foreign country.
Ensuring Russia’s Security.
This part of the doctrine portrayed standpoints on
military deterrence, security, and the use of force, as
well as the deployment of forces and troops abroad,
for achieving objectives of foreign and security policies of Russia’s grand strategy. As main policy elements for ensuring Russia’s security, the doctrine listed: Suppression of aggression towards the RF and (or)
its allies; Retaining nuclear power status for deterring
aggression against the RF and (or) its allies; Maintaining the right to use nuclear weapons in response to
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and in response
to wide-scale aggression using conventional weapons
in situations critical for the RF; and Possible deployment of limited contingents of RF Armed Forces and
other troops in regions of strategic importance outside
RF territory.
The Military Doctrine of 2000 permitted the use of
nuclear weapons to counter aggression. It allowed for
the use of nuclear arms to repel a conventional attack
as well, under certain, not specified, critical circumstances for national security. This attitude was not unexpected, since the on-going decline in conventional
strength apparently had to be compensated with em-
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phasis on the nuclear deterrent. Furthermore, stress on
(the use of) nuclear weapons was also an instrument
to counter attempts to decrease Russia’s influence in
the international arena. The doctrine allotted a special
role to the Russian Navy in ensuring security. Since
previous doctrines did not reveal a specific role for
naval forces, this provision was possibly a new course
in security policy. The increased contribution of the
RF Navy to the implementation of the political strategy was possibly related to a purposive campaign of
the top level of this service to strengthen its position.
In 2000 President Putin had endorsed a document on
naval policy until 2010, which was further elaborated
into a maritime doctrine, published in 2001. In view of
the fact that Putin gave his backing to both documents,
he apparently was convinced of an essential role for
sea power in achieving political-strategic objectives.4
HIERARCHY OF SECURITY ORGANS
The doctrine presented a hierarchy of the institutions responsible for national security. The President
directs the agencies and forces that ensure RF national
security, is the supreme commander of the RF Armed
Forces, and, as the head of state, represents the RF in
international relations. The Government coordinates
the work of federal executive agencies and executive
agencies of RF constituent entities concerning national
security, provides the equipment of the RF Armed
Forces and Other Troops, and directs the preparation
of the RF for its defense. The MoD, the General Staff,
and staffs of the services and the arms of the armed
forces complete the hierarchy chain. According to
the Constitution, only the President had the power
to sanction the doctrine.5 Taking into account Putin’s
policy of centralization of power, it was not surprising
12

that the position of the RF President in the chain of
command of security policy was strengthened in this
doctrinal edition. However, the chain of command
listed in the doctrine revealed a number of deficiencies in relation to the control of the Executive and the
Legislative over military policy. Parliament and SCRF
were missing in the doctrinal enumeration of security
organs. Unmistakably, Parliament was set aside. This
was probably because the SCRF, theoretically the primary security organ according to the chain of command list in the doctrine, was not involved in controlling the military apparatus and so leaving it out of the
chain of command was most likely a purposive policy
of the military to reinforce their own power and influence in this policy dimension. The military regarded
the SCRF as a competitor, and it was probably for that
reason that it was left out of the chain of command.
However, in the course of 2000, Putin would make it
clear that he intended to strengthen the position of the
Security Council at the expense of the MoD and the
General Staff (IISS 2000: 109).
THE Defense WHITE PAPER OF 2003: THE
PRIORITY TASKS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES
On October 2, 2003, Russian Minister of Defense
Sergei Ivanov published The priority tasks of the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,
by its format not only a doctrine explaining military
operations, but also describing military capabilities—
and therefore here referred to as a defense white paper (DWP 2003) (Minoborony 2003).
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Russia in the World Community.
With regard to the West, the DWP 2003 showed
ambivalence. In dealing with the West in general
and NATO especially, the 2003 DWP posed a vision
of two minds. On the one hand, entries showed concern over the enlargement of the alliance and the possible deployment of NATO forces on the territory of
new NATO members. But it also mentioned that the
NATO-Russia partnership would be further deepened in spite of these major differences. Furthermore,
it stated that nuclear and large-scale wars with NATO
or other U.S.-led coalitions were no longer probable
armed conflicts and that Russia expected cooperation
with the United States and other industrialized countries to grow with consequent increased stability.
Analysis of the characteristics of current warfare
from the 1970s until 2003 led the Russian MoD to a
number of conclusions: a significant part of all conflict
has an asymmetrical nature; the outcome of a conflict
is more and more determined in its initial phase; the
party that takes the initiative has the advantage; not
only military forces but also political and military
command and control systems (economic) infrastructure, as well as the population, have become primary
targets; information and electronic warfare today
have a great impact on conflicts; the use of airborne,
air mobile, and special forces has increased; unified
command and control, joint warfare, and a thorough
cooperation between ground and air forces in particular, have become essential; a prominent role in modern warfare, as demonstrated in conflicts such as those
in Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2002), and Iraq (2003),
is taken by long-range precision-guided munitions
in combination with airpower, after air superiority
has been established; and massive use of tanks and
14

infantry has to a large extent been replaced by longrange guided weapon systems and massive air raids
(Minoborony 2003: 34-38). With standpoints stressing
the importance of information and electronic warfare,
unified command and control and joint warfare, and
asymmetric warfare, the 2003 DWP demonstrated a
realistic view of modern warfare. Correctly, the DWP
focused on asymmetric conflicts as being at the contemporary forefront, instead of large-scale conventional wars.
Russia’s National Interests.
In addition to commonly used national interests—
such as state sovereignty and territorial integrity—the
DWP 2003 emphasized the following interests of Russia: weakening of the UNSC and unilateral use of force
as a threat to RF political and military-political interests; legitimate interests of RF citizens abroad; growth
of the role of military power in ensuring RF political
and economic interests; and the possibility of preemptive use of military force if the interests of Russia or its
allied obligations require it.
The document clearly listed national interests especially in relation to the military-political dimension.
Entries mentioned under “Ensuring Russia’s security”
demonstrate that the DWP 2003 attached great value
to the armed forces in ensuring RF interests. This was
regarding political issues such as on the UN and on
protecting RF citizens, but also on economic issues,
which could even demand the preemptive use of
force. Since the DWP was a product of the MoD, it is
not surprising that the military is given such an essential position to the exclusion of other instruments for
ensuring national interests, such as those in the fields
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of economics (sanctions or boycotts) and diplomacy
(pressure or coalition).
Threats to Russia’s Security.
The DWP 2003 identified these as major external
threats: deployment of foreign troops in the territory
of new NATO members and countries that aspire to
join the bloc; armed force used by ad hoc coalitions;
persistence of Cold War stereotypes that aggravate
the international situation; reducing the role of the
UNSC is a dangerous tendency; demonstration of military power close to the borders of Russia; expansion
of military blocs; and Infringement on the rights and
interests of Russian citizens in foreign states.
The document demonstrated ambivalence towards
the West because, in addition to a positive attitude
as mentioned under “Russia in the world community,” the DWP 2003 also expressed an antagonistic
approach, underlining that Russia expected the antiRussian entries to be removed from NATO’s military
planning and political declarations. Even stronger, as
listed under “Ensuring Russia’s security,” the document stated that if NATO was preserved as a military
alliance with an offensive doctrine, cardinal changes
would be undertaken in Russia’s military planning
and development of the Russian Armed Forces, including its nuclear strategy. At the time of publication of the 2003 DWP, these entries caused considerable concern in circles within NATO. The ambivalent
character of the document clearly gave evidence that
it was written by multiple authors.
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Ensuring Russia’s Security.
The DWP 2003 stressed the importance of modern
and strong armed forces as an essential instrument
for ensuring the security of the state: preservation of
a strategic nuclear deterrent to prevent power politics
or aggression against Russia and its allies; and strong
RF Armed Forces with geopolitical significance for
conducting operations in regions of vital economic
and political interest of Russia.
Apparently, study of recent Western-led conflicts
and of their own experiences in Chechnya convinced
the Russian military-political leadership to concentrate on irregular warfare. Nonetheless, carrying out
this realistic approach towards modern warfare was
a concern. The observations that modern, specifically
irregular, warfare could only be fought with sophisticated weapon systems, as well as by improving the
training level of personnel, required financial means.
The Russian Armed Forces, massive in form, were
still aimed at conventional large-scale warfare and demanded a vast amount of money for upkeep. So far,
military reform plans had not offered a solution for
this dilemma. Unless the military-political leadership
decided to radically change the structure of the armed
forces towards one capable of conducting asymmetric warfare, the envisaged adaptation of the Russian
army was expected to be hampered.
DOCTRINAL THINKING BETWEEN 2003 AND
2008
In the aftermath of the “Nord Ost” terror attack
(hostage taking) in a theater in Moscow, Russia, in October 2002, President Putin ordered a revision of the
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National Security Concept (NSC) and subsequently
of the military doctrine and other security documents
subordinated to the NSC. Likewise, after a school in
Beslan, North Ossetia, RF, was taken hostage in September 2004, the Kremlin reiterated in its statements
the necessity of new editions of the major security documents, which dated from the year 2000. However, in
the following years no new developments in military
doctrine could be discerned. Not earlier than 2005,
Putin ordered a review of Russia’s military doctrine
(Solovyev 2007). In August 2006, reports appeared in
the Russian press on the draft of a new doctrine to be
completed in 2007 (Kirshin 2006). These reports, however, were immediately denied by Minister of Defense
Ivanov (“And denies” 2006). In the course of 2007,
with the announcement of the draft-in-process of a
new doctrine, it seemed that the news reports were
correct after all (Myasnikov 2006). On January 20,
2007, a conference of the Russian Academy of Military
Sciences took place in Moscow. At the conference, the
academy’s president, Army General Makhmut Gareyev, and the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) of the
Russian Armed Forces, Army General Yuri Baluyevsky, presented elements of a new military doctrine. The
revised doctrine—to be published at the end of summer 2007—was to replace the one that was ratified by
President Vladimir Putin in 2000. At the Moscow conference, it was stated that the doctrine then in force, of
2000—i.e., before the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terror
attacks in the United States—needed revision because
of the deterioration of the international security situation since then. Subsequently, in March 2007 the SCRF
declared that in developing a new military doctrine,
the growing role of force in the foreign policy of “leading states” would have to be taken into account (“Russia to revise” 2007).
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After the terror attacks of 2002 and 2004, Putin had
already ordered a revision of the NSC. However, after
a report of Secretary SCRF Igor Ivanov in February
2005 on the draft contents of the revised NSC, nothing was heard on the subject of that draft document.
At the conference of the Russian Academy of Military
Sciences of January 20, 2007, Gareyev explained that
the review of the NSC had been delayed and that the
adjustment of the military doctrine would be accomplished first. The development of the new military doctrine, its sequence with the NSC, and the provisional
contents of the doctrine clearly showed an attempt by
the military to increase their influence among Russia’s
security elite and thus on decisionmaking in this field.
Theoretically speaking, a country should first draft
a political strategy before a military doctrine, which
should be in line with and derived from this grand
strategy. Traditionally, Russia’s military had a fundamental influence on the state’s security policy. To
remain in the forefront of security policy, the military
in 1999 managed to avoid the SCRF and to bring out a
draft of the revised military doctrine before the draft
of the modified NSC was made public. After taking
over from President Boris Yeltsin, President Putin in
2000 returned order in the security documents by first
ratifying the final edition of the NSC and then that
of the military doctrine. In 2007 the development of
security documents seemed like a repetition of 1999.
For unknown reasons, the revised political strategy
was delayed but instead of waiting for this, the military were well underway in releasing a new doctrine,
which—according to the statements of Baluyevsky and
Gareyev—was likely to include nonmilitary threats
and measures as well, which actually belonged to the
NSC. Obviously, just as in 1999, the military leadership was eager to strengthen its position.
19

On May 7, 2007, CGS Baluyevsky formally announced that a new military doctrine was being drafted. Coordination of the doctrinal drafting in general
was in the hands of the SCRF and the technical structure was done by the MoD (“Minoborony razrabotalo”
2007). However, after Baluyevsky’s statement, further
news on a forthcoming doctrine was not released until
December 2008 (“Voyennaya doktrina ozhila” 2008).
In spite of the statements of Gareyev and Baluyevsky
in January and May 2007 respectively, neither a new
issue of the military doctrine, nor of the other major
security documents, was released before the end of
Putin’s presidency in May 2008. During the remainder
of Putin’s second term as President, no further significant terrorist attacks took place, which might explain
the absence of revised security documents. Other reasons might have been division among the different actors —such as the SCRF and the Ministries of Defense
and Foreign Affairs— in security policy decisionmaking or perhaps a lack of genuine interest on the part
of Putin. As with the aforementioned doctrinal documents, the main entries of the doctrinal development
from 2003 to 2008 are presented in the format of the
NSC, i.e., subsequently, Russia in the world community, national interests, threats, and ensuring security.
Russia in the World Community.
In the editions of the military doctrine of 1993 and
2000, military threats and measures were separated
from other dimensions, such as political, economic,
diplomatic, and other nonviolent means to prevent
wars and conflicts. These other spheres of security
traditionally belonged in the domain of the NSC, Russia’s political strategy. The development of the international security situation demonstrated that this
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division among threats and corresponding measures
was disappearing. This led to the conclusion that either all related dimensions—i.e., all military and nonmilitary security threats—were to be included in the
military doctrine, or that the doctrine and the national
security concept should be combined into one document, perhaps a so-called defense or security doctrine
(Gareyev 2007; Solovyev 2007). The recognition that
distinctions could no longer be made between internal and external security and between military and
nonmilitary threats and corresponding responses was
a noteworthy feature. As Western doctrinal experts
had done previously, their Russian counterparts now
also acknowledged that security is comprehensive
and comprises all dimensions. In line with this was
the call to strengthen the status of the SCRF, the organ to provide an all-inclusive and interdepartmental
response to internal and external security challenges.
These entries revealed that Russia’s military had an
open eye for international security developments and
for recognizing the value of related analyses of others.
Russia’s National Interests.
The statements on doctrinal changes focused
mainly on (capabilities of) ensuring security. Only on
the sideline were interests mentioned, such as guaranteeing the sovereignty of the state, protecting energy
resources and infrastructure, and maintaining a balance of forces near the borders of Russia.
Threats to Russia’s Security.
Russia’s defense white paper (DWP) of October
2003 discussed characteristics of current wars and
armed conflicts. Rightly, the DWP focused on asym21

metric conflicts as being at the forefront, instead of
large-scale conventional wars. On January 25, 2006,
CGS General Yuri Baluyevsky in the MoD’s Red Star
newspaper mentioned as modern day threats organized crime, drugs and arms trafficking, illegal immigration, extremism, separatism, and terrorism (Baluyevsky 2006). However, at the same time he repeated
the traditional “Cold War vestiges” of threat perception such as: the expansion of military blocs; military
presence in traditional regions of Russian interest;
ignoring Russia in international security politics; and
attempts against the strengthening of Russia as one of
the influential centers in the world. Hence, although
recognized as the primary warfare to prepare for,
asymmetric threats were not emphasized as the most
essential ones. This ambiguity in Russia’s threat perception—emphasis on large-scale conventional and/
or nuclear warfare and, conversely, on irregular conflicts—has been a constant factor in military thinking.
Russia’s military observed that security cooperation with the West had not brought a diminished
number of military threats. At the conference of the
Russian Academy of Military Sciences of January
2007, Baluyevsky stated that the existing threats came
from Washington: the course of America was toward
global leadership and a desire to get a foothold in
regions where Russia traditionally was present (Solovyev 2007). The next threat was the enlargement
of the NATO “bloc” to the east and the fact that this
alliance was involved in local conflicts near Russia’s
borders. Another threat was the increasing spread of
hostile information on Russia’s policies. Terrorism
and separatism were only mentioned further down
on his and Gareyev’s list of threats. Gareyev’s priority threats were those of specific international forces
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and leading states aiming to affect the sovereignty of
Russia, to damage Russia’s economic and other interests, as well as to execute political and information
pressure and undermining activities (Gareyev 2007).
The threat to energy security was also considered a
vital threat, since leading circles within NATO now
considered price changes of energy resources as a
form of aggression. The second threat on Gareyev’s
list was that of nuclear weapons—among others resulting from the construction of anti-missile defense
systems—and the proliferation of WMD (“Russia to
revise” 2007). According to Gareyev, in the end, nearly
all holders of nuclear arms had them aimed at Russia.
Third, he mentioned the start of armed conflicts and
even large-scale wars as an existing threat. This threat
derived from the motivations of great powers to reach
military superiority and the presence of large military
contingents near the borders of Russia, resulting in a
change of the military balance. Finally, the fact that
NATO had broadened its sphere of activities and was
striving to act on a global level was also regarded as a
threat by Russia. The entries on threats—mainly referring to the West in general, and the United States and
NATO in particular—corresponded with the deteriorating relationship between Russia and the West. Yet,
the anti-Western entries were not new and, therefore,
not alarming. Similar phrases were used in the military doctrine of 2000.
HIERARCHY OF SECURITY ORGANS
According to Baluyevsky and Gareyev, in addition
to advancing the strength of the armed forces, the position of the Minister of Defense was also to be reinforced (Gareyev 2007; Solovyev 2007). The draft doc-
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trine suggested enhancing the status of the Minister
of Defense by promoting him to deputy commanderin-chief of the armed forces. Considering that Russia’s
President is the commander-in-chief, this proposal
included granting the Minister of Defense de-facto the
position of Vice President. Furthermore, the draft stated that the SCRF should be the all-compassing security organ of the Russian state, which had not been the
case in preceding years. To raise its standard to this
level, the SCRF was to be under administrative command of the Vice President (Gareyev 2007; Solovyev
2007). The call to make the Minister of Defense deputy
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, as well as
(de-facto) Vice President looked like another effort to
increase the leverage of the military in security-related
decisionmaking. With supervision not only over the
military, but also over the troops of the other so-called
power ministries—such as the FSB and the Ministry
of Internal Affairs—the extension of the position of
the Minister of Defense with that of the newly to-beestablished deputy commander-in-chief of the armed
forces, and consequently that of Vice President, would
mean a heavy concentration of power in the hands
of one person, possibly giving preference to military
power at the expense of other security organs.
Military Cooperation.
Gareyev called for a comparison with military doctrines of other key players in international security—
such as China, the United States, and NATO—in order
to include entries of their common threats, for instance
on terrorism, into Russia’s revised military doctrine.
Moreover, to counter threats, Gareyev pleaded for a
“division of labor” among East and West, by deter-
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mining areas of responsibility between NATO and
the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),
the Russian-led CIS military alliance (Gareyev 2007).
The demand for a comparison of threat perceptions
with doctrines of other important actors—China, the
United States, and NATO—demonstrated Russia’s
willingness to learn from others and not to consider
itself in an isolated position. Related to this was the
proposal to construct a division in areas of responsibility between NATO and the CSTO. Although this
was to be unacceptable to the Western alliance, which,
according to its 1999 Strategic Concept, regarded itself
responsible for the unspecified Euro-Atlantic region,
the fact that Russia encouraged cooperation between
both military partnerships could possibly be valuable
in the near future but, more importantly, also showed
that Russia wished to continue security teamwork
with the West in spite of the differences, as emphasized in entries on threats from the West.
Priority Dilemma between Conventional
or Nuclear Forces.
Although President Putin, Minister of Defense
Ivanov, parliamentarians, and academics regularly
stated that radical modernization of the armed forces
was necessary to cope with modern day warfare and
contemporary threats, corresponding measures could
hardly be traced. The status of material and personnel,
as well as plans for the future, did not coincide with
the perceived interest in acquiring capabilities for
modern warfare. A large part of Russia’s weaponry
was becoming obsolete. However, the level of investments made for buying new hardware was too low.
The number of arms and equipment becoming out-
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dated grew faster than the number of arms and equipment meant to replace them. Around 2006 the share of
modern military hardware was only some 20 percent
of the total, whereas the weaponry of the armed forces
of NATO countries was more than 70 percent modern
(“Russian forces” 2006). To counter the threats, according to the excerpts of the draft doctrine of 2007,
Russia’s military organization was to be strengthened,
both financially and politically. The size of the armed
forces—more than one million—demanded a lot of
money, not only for (low level) salaries, but also for
other facilities to keep the forces going, thus preventing modernization of arms. Furthermore, a large share
of the actual investment was not going to conventional
but to nuclear forces, which became a vital reason for
lack of investment in conventional forces. However,
the provisional entries of the doctrine also emphasized the reinforcement of Russia’s nuclear capabilities (Yasmann 2007). The political and military elite
recognized the necessity of introducing modern arms
to replace the majority of obsolete ones. However,
the aforementioned ambiguity between nuclear and
conventional arms was also visible in the State Programme of Armaments, Gosudarstvennaya Programma
razvitiya Vooruzheniy (GPV). The GPV is a classified
document covering domestic arms procurement, military related research and development (R&D), and the
repair and modernization of arms and other military
equipment, describing a 10-year period, of which the
first 5 years are described in detail (IISS 2009: 214-215).
A central point in the GPV-2015 was emphasis on the
nuclear deterrent (FTsP 2008). Russia’s strategic deterrent had shrunk from 1,398 intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) in 1991 to 430 missiles in 2008 (IISS
2009: 214). According to the GPV-2015, by 2020 Russia
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was to be equipped with a modern nuclear force by
acquiring Topol-M land-based and Bulava submarinelaunched ICBMs, as well as a number of new strategic
bombers and (nuclear) submarines equipped with
the Bulava. Conventional procurement would entail
weapons such as tanks, armored personnel carriers,
fighter aircraft, helicopters, and air defense missile
systems. Apparently, the political leadership could or
would not decide in which way military reforms were
to go, either towards smaller, conventional, professional, high-tech, expeditionary forces—the direction
Western armed forces moved to—or to continue with
large but old-fashioned conventional forces together
with modernized nuclear strategic-deterrent forces,
to emphasize Russia’s vital status in the international
arena.
Large-Scale Static Conscript Forces versus
Professional Expeditionary Forces.
In the DWP 2003, Russia rightly focused on modern high-tech warfare and on asymmetric conflicts instead of large-scale conventional wars. However, the
traditional large-scale structure of the armed forces
was not changed, which obstructed the adaptation of
the armed forces to modern warfare. There were no
indications that Russia was moving towards a model
of Western-style modern forces. According to future
plans, a large military force largely composed of conscripts was to be maintained. Russian military reforms were limited to reduction of manpower and an
organizational change from a five-services (including
strategic missile and air defense forces) into a threeservices structure (air, ground, and naval forces).
Military exercises—such as the (mainly) Russian-Sino
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military manoeuvers of 2005 and 2007—demonstrated that Russia was capable of handling conventional
warfare (Haas 2005; 2007). However, this applied to a
large extent to deploying forces in a traditional way.
Moreover, there were no indications that the armed
forces were trained and equipped for wide-ranging,
complex military operations abroad, as had become
the core business of Western armed forces in that decade. During Putin’s presidency, Russia refrained from
radically changing the structure of the armed forces
towards one that was capable of addressing the challenges of modern warfare and current threats. Russia’s global ambitions, resulting from its endeavors
to restore its superpower status, demanded the capability of power projection by highly skilled, modern
equipped, expeditionary military forces that could
be deployed at short notice anywhere in the world.
However, instead of conventional modernization, the
nuclear deterrent received priority. At the same time,
protracted conflicts in the North Caucasus—Russia’s
Achilles heel—demanded armed forces capable of
conducting asymmetric warfare against an irregular
opponent. During Putin’s presidency, neither the status of Russia’s armed forces, nor future plans lived up
to these two demands on the military.
Reorganization of the Military Administrative
Structure.
Since the end of 2005, more and more details were
made public on a change of thinking towards the
organization of the armed forces. Traditionally, Russia’s military had been administratively organized in
military districts, for instance those of Moscow, North
Caucasus, and the Far East. New Russian military
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thinking, as stated in the DWP 2003, that a large-scale
conflict was highly unlikely meant that centralized
command and control should be changed. Aiming at
decentralization, from 2006 until 2010, the organizational structure was to be changed from military districts into interdepartmental and interservice or joint
regional operational groupings and strategic directions (Babakin 2006). In the 1990s, another attempt—
though in vain—was already made to restructure the
military districts system into operational-strategic
commands. As a result of the Chechen conflict, a joint
and interdepartmental command comprised of the
different services of the RF Armed Forces, as well
as the Other Troops, and military formations of the
other power ministries, such as the FSB, existed in
the North Caucasus for some years. Allegedly, Russia
had planned to construct a second command of defense forces and internal and security troops in its Far
East region. The reform of the administrative military
organization would be aimed at changing all military
districts into operational-strategic commands. Joint
control and command of defense and other security
forces was a justified initiative, considering that Russia had to cope with internal unrest and conflicts.
However, the proposed reorganization from a structure of military districts to one of regional operational
groupings or commands would not be realized during
Putin’s period in office.
Doctrinal Consequences of the Georgian
Conflict of August 2008.
The Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008 was
part of a consistent assertive stance in Moscow’s foreign and security policy, of which military power is
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one of the major instruments. Around the military
campaign in Georgia, President Medvedev launched
new policy concepts, emphasizing Russia’s return to
a position of strength. However, this assertive stance
in external security policy was not matched with a
military apparatus capable of executing these political ambitions. Although a victory for the Kremlin, the
Georgian conflict clearly demonstrated shortcomings in the capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces.
A large part of Russia’s weaponry was obsolete, and
the operations were conducted in a traditional way
of massive artillery barrages, counter to the high-tech
warfare of the West. After the conflict, the Kremlin
concluded that the military should be brought in line
with Russia’s (regained) status as an important power
in the international arena. Thus, ambitious procurement and military reform plans were announced.
Enhancing Rearmament While Continuing Focus
on Nuclear Deterrence.
Under Putin’s presidency, the State Programme
of Armaments GPV-2015 covering the period 2007-15
was developed. After the Georgia conflict, President
Medvedev ordered an acceleration of the modernization plans for the armed forces. Although this was already well known, the conflict once again confirmed
that a large part of the weaponry of the Russian
Armed Forces was obsolete, which hampered successful conduct of operations. According to the GPV-2015,
as of 2011-12 the military would receive new weapon
systems on a large scale. The Georgia conflict revealed
that the level of the existing arms was even worse than
previously assumed. This convinced the political and
military elite that the pace of modernization should
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be enhanced, i.e., new weapon systems were soon to
be introduced. As underlined in the statements on the
GPV under Putin, after the Georgia conflict—in spite
of its purely conventional warfare nature—remarkably, emphasis was again laid on the nuclear forces
as the guarantee for Russia’s national security. Prioritization of the nuclear deterrence was clarified by
the assumption that no state would dare to attack a
nuclear power. In October 2008, the Kremlin intended to allocate extra financial means for the enhanced
modernization of the military (Denisov 2008). This
line of policy was still formally valid in March 2009,
stressing that the GPV-2015 would not be affected by
the financial crisis. Again, priority for procurement of
nuclear weapons—amounting to 25 percent of the expenditures on armament—was stressed.
Reorganization of Units and Structures.
Soon after the Georgian conflict, in September
2008 President Medvedev made a first statement on
the necessity of modernizing the weapon systems of
the armed forces, as well as their organizational structures and personnel. After this first announcement,
a number of detailed military reform plans were to
follow at a rapid pace, provided not only by President Medvedev, but also by First Vice-Premier Sergei
Ivanov, Defense Minister Serdyukov, and Chief of
the General Staff General Nikolai Makarov. The DWP
2003 had been the first Russian security document to
express the need for restructuring the armed forces
into Western-type expeditionary forces, comprising
well-equipped and well-trained troops with strategic
air and sea lift capacities, which could be deployed in
irregular operations rapidly and far away from the
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motherland. However, under Putin no structural modernization plans were undertaken, except for preparing for the large-scale introduction of modern weapons. The military reform plans of Medvedev provided
a realistic attitude toward the present problems of the
armed forces, sound measures to solve them, and ambitious plans to develop a modern military apparatus.
The main objectives of the reorganization plans were
the following. The combat readiness of the armed
forces would be improved by deleting the unit levels
of division and regiment and by creating permanent
combat ready brigades. With regard to the structure
of the military, in 2008 only 20 percent of the military
units were in permanent readiness status. According
to the reform plans, most largely unfilled framework
units would be dissolved in favor of establishing permanent ready units. The restructuring measures dictated that in 2011 all (remaining) units should be permanently ready for deployment. Related to this was
that the number of military units would be reduced
from 1,890 in 2008 to 172 units in 2012. The total of 172
units would consist of 80 brigades, all permanently
ready. These self-contained modular brigades would
be capable of conducting operations independent of
other units. The reorganization to a brigade-based
structure was executed at a fast pace; in June 2009 50
brigades were already formed, and in December 2009
the establishment of the full number of some 80 brigades was to be accomplished (“Brigadnomu” 2009).
Furthermore, if Moscow was to apply power projection more successfully than in the Georgian conflict,
rapid reaction forces capable of conducting operations
at short notice would be required. For this purpose,
airborne brigades would be formed in each military
district. Also, the number of available troops would be
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raised by reducing the number of senior officers and
increasing the number of junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). This was intended to end
the discrepancy of the overload of officers compared
to soldiers (until now officers filled between a third
and half of the armed forces) and to organize a professional NCO corps. This would not only enhance
the number of troops but also strengthen the combat
readiness of the armed forces.
Assessment on Modernization and Reorganization
Plans for the Military.
Fewer staff levels and reduced burden of command
and control, more troops available for combat action,
as well as the concentration on modern-equipped
permanent ready and rapid reaction units would
improve decisionmaking and usability of the military and provide the Kremlin with power projection
capabilities in support of its foreign security policy.
This must have been President Medvedev’s objective
for getting actively involved in modernizing Russia’s
military power. However, for a number of reasons,
it is uncertain whether these plans will be fully carried out and successful in enhancing the capabilities
of the military. For many years, the armed forces have
been faced with military reforms that were not carried out because of obstruction by the military leadership and a lack of will on the part of the security
elite. Furthermore, although Russia’s defense budget
had risen rapidly under Putin, there was no considerable improvement visible in the combat readiness
of the forces. Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, a
former tax official, was appointed to this post by former President Putin especially to counter corruption
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and obstruction by the military leadership. He faced a
lot of opposition from the military leadership against
his reform plans due to the intended deep cuts in the
officer corps and central staff. Next, Russia was suffering heavily from the international financial crises
to the extent that the financial reserves built up by oil
and natural gas revenues were fading away rapidly,
with consequences for rearmament.
Around December 2008, the reform plans still called
for raising the number of modern weapons and equipment to 80-100 percent of the total by 2020. However,
in March 2009, the modernization aim was lowered
to 70 percent advanced weapons in 2020 (“Russia to
downsize” 2008; Naumov 2008; “Russian military to
be fully rearmed” 2008; Kremlin 2008a/b, 2009; “Russia announces” 2009). In addition, although aiming to
reform its military into Western-style expeditionary
forces, Russia’s security elite continued to consider
combat readiness and modernization of nuclear arms
as its first priority, which was not consistent with the
overall reform plans and could prove to be counterproductive to conventional arms reforms. Moreover,
due to the inefficiency of the military industrial complex (MIC) and its contracts for arms export—meaning crucial revenues for the upkeep of the MIC—the
output capability of the military industries was likely
to be insufficient to deliver the requested amount of
modern weapons for the RF Armed Forces. Hence,
due to a number of developments, it was uncertain
that Moscow was going to acquire fully modernized
armed forces, skilled for power projection, to accomplish the political-strategic objectives of the foreign
security policy of the Kremlin. However, what would
be the use of a revised military doctrine without correspondingly updated armed forces?
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Preparation of a New Military Doctrine.
After many years of discussion on a revised military doctrine and reiterated announcements on the
publication of such a document, at the end of 2008
signals became stronger that this time the process of
launching a new military doctrine had to be taken
seriously. Probably the proceeding military reforms
and the aftermath of the Georgian conflict had convinced Russia’s security elite that an updated military
doctrine was now inevitable. In December 2008, the
Kremlin announced plans for a new military doctrine.
At the SCRF, an interdepartmental working group was
formed, consisting of delegates of federal state organs,
the Duma, the Federation Council, the regional presidential representatives, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Academy of Military Sciences, as well
of scientific and civil organizations (Borisov 2009). The
working group drafting the new doctrine under the
auspices of the SCRF was led by Deputy Secretary of
the SCRF Baluyevsky. Deputy CGS General Anatoly
Nogovitsyn was head of the working group on the development of military doctrine of the MoD (“Voyennaya doktrina ozhila” 2008; “Genshtab” 2009; Litovkin
2009). General Gareyev, president of the Academy of
Military Sciences and member of the scientific council
of the SCRF, was also involved in drafting the new
doctrine (Nikolskiy 2009). On October 8, 2009, Nikolai
Patrushev, Secretary of the SCRF and former Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), announced
that Russia would soon adopt a new military doctrine.
The upcoming doctrine was expected to be presented
to President Medvedev before the end of 2009 (“Russia may revise” 2009). In spite of the restated pro-
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nouncements that a new military doctrine would be
approved by President Medvedev before the end of
2009, this was not the case. Not until February 5, 2010,
did Medvedev release the new doctrine in a session of
the SCRF. The timing of publication was probably related to the publication of the U.S. Quadrennial Defense
Review and the annual security conference in Munich,
Germany (Giles 2010).
Statements on the Assumed Contents.
Chief of the General Staff (CGS) Makarov stated in
December 2008 that in the new doctrine some provisions of the old one would be more precise. Former
CGS and current Deputy Secretary of the SCRF Army
General Yuri Baluyevsky pointed out that statements
on the use of nuclear weapons would be adjusted
(“V Rossii” 2009). However, also in December 2008,
Deputy CGS Anatoly Nogovitsyn, declared that the
part of the document regulating the use of nuclear
weapons would not be released (Krainova 2009;
“Doktrinal”naya” 2009). In August 2009, it was announced that the new doctrine would consist of two
parts, a public part on military-political aspects, and
a secret part on the application of the armed forces,
including nuclear weapons (Litovkin 2009). Nonetheless, SCRF Secretary Nikolai Patrushev stated that
the new doctrine would be a public document. In
interviews for Izvestiya (October 14) and Rossiyskaya
Gazeta (November 20), Patrushev further elaborated
on the contents of the forthcoming military doctrine.
In spite of the alleged secret part on the use of nuclear arms as stated by Nogovitsyn, Patrushev also
revealed planned doctrinal changes on the use of
nuclear weapons (Mamontov 2009; Borisov 2009). In
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the Izvestiya interview of October 14, 2009, Patrushev,
with regard to doctrinal entries on guaranteeing security, stressed that in the foreseeable future, nuclear
weapons would remain the most important priority.
The doctrine would list adjustments in the conditions
of using nuclear weapons in repelling aggression with
conventional arms, not only in large-scale, but also in
regional and even in local wars. Furthermore, doctrinal entries were to provide a variance of options for
using nuclear weapons, depending on the situation
and the intentions of the adversary. Patrushev also remarked that in situations critical to national security,
the use of nuclear arms, including preemptive (preventive) nuclear strikes against the aggressor, would
be possible (Mamontov 2009).
Because of the uproar, especially in the West, due
to Patrushev’s statements on the use of nuclear arms,
Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov was swift in
underlining that these entries of the new doctrine were
not meant as a threat, only to warn actors intending
to attack Russia (“Russia moves to ease concerns over
new doctrine” 2009). Regarding Russia’s threat perception, in spite of the rapprochement of the United
States and NATO towards Russia, in September 2009
Patrushev explained that traditional threats coming
from NATO and America were still valid and thus to
be mentioned in the doctrine.6 Newly listed as a doctrinal threat would be the escalating struggle for energy and other raw materials, increasing the potential
for conflict at Russia’s borders, including the Arctic
region (Mamontov 2009; Borisov 2009). Another serious threat would be at stake when a more developed
neighbor, not a member of a NATO-type military alliance, would use force against Russia to settle a territorial dispute. Theoretically, such a conflict would
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be possible with Japan concerning the Kuril Islands
(Kramnik 2009; Borisov 2009). According to Patrushev, the final chapter of the doctrine would discuss
military-economic and military-technical conditions
of defense, prioritizing improvement of the militaryindustrial complex. Sound functioning of enterprises
and organizations of the defense industry and organizations would not only solve military challenges, but
also entail an important social function by raising the
living standards of the people (Mamontov 2009; Borisov 2009).
Assessment of the Drafting Process of the New
Military Doctrine.
Formally, Patrushev’s SCRF was in command of
drafting the new doctrine. However, it seemed that
the contents were also highly influenced by the military, considering the involvement of principal “doctrinal” generals, such as former CGS Baluyevsky, Deputy CGS Nogovitsyn, and president of the Academy
of Military Sciences Gareyev. Nevertheless, the battle
between the MoD and the SCRF on primacy over the
major security documents seemed to have been won
by the latter. After an earlier attempt in 1999-2000 by
the MoD to overrule the SCRF, Putin restored order
by considering the SCRF as the principal supervisor
of security documents and by approving the National
Security Concept to which the subsequent Military
Doctrine of 2000 was subjected. Another effort by the
military to bypass the SCRF occurred in 2007, when
the delay of a new political strategy apparently was
considered by the military as an opportunity to launch
a new doctrine before the political strategy was published. In the end, neither of these security documents
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was released. This time, in 2009, by revealing details of
the forthcoming doctrine, Patrushev probably wanted
to make it clear that the SCRF—and not the MoD—
was responsible for supervision of the new military
doctrine.
THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF 2010
The text of the new doctrine, published on February 5, 2010, was divided into four chapters: general
provisions; military dangers and military threats to
the Russian Federation; military policy of the Russian Federation; and military-economic support for
defense (SCRF 2010). The first chapter on general provisions merely unfolded the doctrine’s relationship
with other primary security documents and explained
military-technical terms used in the text. The second
chapter on military dangers and military threats also
contained characteristics of modern warfare. The third
chapter on military policy explained the objectives of
Moscow’s course of action and its instruments, the use
of the RF Armed Forces in particular. The fourth and
final chapter, on military-economic support for defense, elaborated on the importance of the economic
situation and military industries as guarantors for adequate armed forces. Additionally, this chapter dealt
with international military cooperation. The following analysis of the 2010 Military Doctrine will be conducted not according to the aforementioned chapters
of this text, but—in light of the previously discussed
security documents and statements—in line with the
format of the National Security Concept/Strategy (see
Table 1-2).
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• Basic national interests: state sovereignty,
territorial integrity, socio-political stability, constitutional regime, stability in the
international arena, free access to vital
economic- zones and communications.
• Reducing the role of the UNSC and unilateral use of force is a threat to RF political
and military-political interests.
• Legitimate interests of RF citizens in foreign
states.
• Strong RF Armed Forces have a geopolitical
significance.
• The structure of the RF Nuclear Forces is
guided by national security interests.
• The possibility of pre-emptive use of
military force if the interests of Russia or its
allied obligations require it.

• The current stage of global development is
noted for acute socio-economic conflicts
and political contradictions.
• Security is shifting from questions of war
and peace to complicated political, financialeconomic, ethnic-national, demographic,
and other problems.
• The significance of military power in the
post-bipolar world has not diminished,
since a number of international security
institutions are in grave crisis.

Defense White Paper
October 2003

• The sovereignty of the Russian Federation.
• Energy security.
• Maintaining the military balance near the
borders of Russia.

• The development of the international security
situation has ended the distinction between military threats and measures from those of other
dimensions, such as in the political, economic,
and diplomatic fields.
• Other spheres of security that traditionally
belonged to the competence of the NSC, now
are also applicable to the doctrine.
• Distinction between internal and external security has also vanished; security is comprehensive and comprises all dimensions.

Statements on military doctrine
2003-2008

• Utilization of political, diplomatic, legal, economic, environmental, informational, military,
and other instruments to protect RF national
interests and those of its allies.
• Protection of the vitally important interests of
the individual, society, and the state against
external and internal military threats.
• Expansion of the circle of partner states on
the basis of common interests in strengthening international security.
• To protect interests of Russia and its citizens
and to maintain international peace and security, formations of the RF Armed Forces may
be used operationally outside Russia.
• Special formations of RF Armed Forces and
Other Troops for use in the interests of Russia’s economy.

• The global development shows a weakening
of ideological confrontation, a lowering of
influence of certain states and alliances; and
an increase in the influence of other states in
domination, multipolarity, and globalization.
• There is a continuing tendency towards a
strong-arm resolution of conflicts, including
in regions near RF.
• The existing international security architecture (system) does not ensure equal security
for all states.
• Despite the decline in the likelihood of a
large-scale war involving conventional arms
and nuclear weapons against Russia, in some
areas military dangers are intensifying.

Military Doctrine
February 2010

Table 1-2. Main External Security Entries in Military Doctrine Documents (2000-10).7

Sources: SCRF (2000): Minoborony (2003); Baluyevsky (2006); Gareyev (2007); Solovyev (2007); SCRF (2010).

• The RF attaches priority importance to the development of military cooperation with parties
to the CIS Collective Security Treaty because of
the necessity to consolidate forces towards the
creation of a unified defense space and ensure
collective military security.
• The RF executes a common defense policy
with Belarus in the field of military organisation
and the development of the armed forces of
the member states of the Union.

RUSSIA’S NATIONAL INTERESTS

• Extremist national-ethnic, religious separatist,
and terrorist movements, organisations and
structures.
• Attempts to weaken (ignore) existing mechanism for ensuring international security, above
all the UN and OSCE.
• Applying military force as a means of
“humanitarian intervention” without UN
Security Council sanction, in circumvention of
international law.
• Expansion of the scale of organized crime, terrorism, and illegal trade of arms and narcotics.

RUSSIA IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY
Destabilizing factors for the military-political situation

Military Doctrine
April 2000
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• Ensuring the security of RF citizens in
armed conflicts and situations of instability.
• Fight against international terrorism, political extremism, and separatism.
• Preservation of a strategic deterrence force
against power politics or aggression against
Russia and its allies
• The RF Armed Forces can conduct operations in regions of vital economic and political interest of Russia.

• Reducing the role of the UNSC is seen as a
dangerous tendency.
• Unilateral use of military power without
UNSC mandate encourages greater demand
for weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
• Deployment of foreign troops in the territory
of new NATO members and countries that
aspire to join the bloc.
• Cold war stereotypes continue to exist, aggravating the international situation.
• Proliferation of mass destruction weapons.
• Armed force is increasingly used for
protecting economic interests, which
enlarges foreign policy requirements for
using violence.
• Interference in internal RF affairs.
• Demonstration of military power close to
RF borders.
• Expansion of military blocs.
• Strengthening of Islamic extremism close
to RF borders.
• Infringement on the rights and interests of
Russian citizens in foreign states.

Defense White Paper
October 2003

• Ambiguity on choice between conventional versus nuclear forces and a large conscript army
versus professional expeditionary forces.
• Reorganization of the military administrative
structure from military districts to joint operational groupings.

• Expansion of military blocs.
• Military presence in traditional regions of Russian interest.
• Ignoring Russia in international security politics.
• Attempts against the strengthening of Russia as
one of the influential centers in the world.
• Course of the USA towards global leadership
and a desire to get a foothold in Russia’s sphere
of influence.
• NATO enlargement to the east and its involvement in conflicts near Russia's borders.
• NATO’s broadened actions strive to act on a
global level
• International forces and leading states aiming to
affect the sovereignty of Russia and to damage
Russia's economic and other interests.
• The West considering price changes of energy
resources as a form of aggression.
• The construction of anti-missile defense
systems.
• Proliferation of WMD.
• Desire of great powers to reach military
superiority.

Statements on military doctrine
2003-2008

• Military-political cooperation has priority with
Belarus, CSTO, CIS, SCO, and UN.
• Ensure the protection of Russian citizens
abroad.
• An armed attack on a Union State member
is regarded as an act of aggression and will
cause retaliatory measures.
• Russia regards an armed attack on a CSTO
member state as aggression against all CSTO
member states.
• To ensure the technological independence of
Russia in production of strategic and other
armaments.

Main external military dangers:
• Desire to endow NATO’s force potential with
global functions and to move its military
infrastructure closer to RF borders, expanding the bloc.
• Attempts to destabilize the situation in
individual states/regions and to undermine
strategic stability.
• Build-up of foreign troops on territories of
states contiguous with Russia and its allies.
• Deployment of strategic missile defense
systems undermining global stability.
• Territorial claims against Russia and its allies
and interference in internal affairs.
• Proliferation of WMD.
• Non-compliance with previously concluded
international treaties in arms limitation and
reduction.
• Use of military force on territories of states
contiguous with Russia in violation of the UN
Charter / international law.
• Presence of armed conflict on territories of
states contiguous with Russia and its allies.

Military Doctrine
February 2010

Table 1- 2. Main External Security Entries in Military Doctrine Documents (2000-10).7 (Cont.)

• Limited contingents of RF Armed Forces and
Other Troops may be deployed in regions of
strategic importance outside RF territory as
combined or national task forces and bases.

ENSURING RUSSIA’S SECURITY

• Interference in RF internal affairs.
• Attempts to ignore (or infringe on) RF interests
in resolving international security problems.
• Attempts to oppose the increase of influence of
the RF on a global level.
• The expansion of military blocs and alliances.
• The introduction of foreign troops (without
UNSC sanction) to the territory of contiguous
states friendly with the RF.
• Suppression of the rights of RF citizens
abroad.

THREATS TO RUSSIA’S SECURITY

Military Doctrine
April 2000

Russia in the World Community.
In this doctrine, Russian security thinking on global developments provided a mixed view; on the one
hand, reduced political and military threats, but on
the other, pointing at the use of military force to solve
conflicts and the intensification of military dangers in
some areas. The second chapter on dangers and threats
started with the remark that the existing architecture
of global security did not ensure the equal security of
all nations. This seemed to correspond with President
Medvedev’s stance for a new European security architecture in which the “Cold War vestiges” of the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
NATO, and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)
Treaty would be replaced by an all-European security
treaty and conference, preventing the use of force by
individual states or organizations.
Russia’s National Interests.
With respect to national interests, three aspects
in particular came to the fore. First, the desire to expand the circle of partner states on the basis of common interests in strengthening international security.
This was probably especially related to Belarus and
the member states of the CSTO and of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), cooperation with
whom was explained later in the doctrine. Secondly,
the provision that for the protection of the interests of
Russia and its citizens and maintaining international
peace and security, formations of the RF Armed Forces might be used operationally outside Russia. The
protection of Russians abroad was mentioned three
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times in the doctrine. Consequently, as laid down in
the Law on Defense after the 2008 Georgian conflict,
Moscow entitled itself to use military force abroad.
The third aspect comprised the creation and training
of special formations of armed forces and other troops
for use in the interests of Russia’s economy. This was
probably related to protecting energy infrastructure
and possibly also with an outlook on future resources,
such as those in the Arctic region.
Threats to Russia’s Security.
Previous doctrines only mentioned threats. This
time the doctrine also referred to dangers. Actually,
the threats seemed to be of less importance. They only
appeared after the dangers. Furthermore, only the
dangers were concrete, the (external) threats were of
a very general nature: the drastic deterioration in the
military-political situation (interstate relations); the
impeding of the operation of systems of state and military command and control; the show of military force
with provocative objectives on territories of states contiguous with Russia or its allies; and the stepping up of
the activity of the armies of states involving partial or
complete mobilization. The listed dangers were specific and referred to a great extent to the West. First of
all, the doctrine stated the danger of NATO globalizing its endeavors, attempting to expand its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders, and expanding
by adding new members. Clearly, this referred to the
intended enlargement of NATO by including Georgia
and—until the 2010 Presidential elections— Ukraine.
The next doctrinal danger abroad was the deployment
(or expansion) of foreign military contingents on territories neighboring Russia or its allies. This probably pointed at the American military contingents
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deployed in Romania and Bulgaria. Another listed
foreign danger was the development and deployment of missile defense systems. Although not specifically mentioned, this provision presumably meant
the global U.S. missile defense network of which the
annulled one in Poland and the Czech Republic was
a part. Next, territorial claims against Russia and its
allies were mentioned. In earlier public statements on
the forthcoming doctrine, reference was made to Japan concerning the Kuril Islands. Finally, the doctrine
pronounced the danger of the use of military force on
territories neighboring Russia in violation of the UN
Charter and other norms of international law. This
entry possibly addressed NATO’s attack on Serbia in
the Kosovo conflict in 1999, but even more, Georgia’s
attack on South Ossetia in August 2008.
This chapter in the doctrine not only discussed
dangers and threats but also characteristics of modern warfare, such as integrated use of military force
and nonmilitary means; the use of highly effective
conventional arms; increased military use of airspace
and outer space; intensification of the role of information warfare; reduced preparation time to conduct
military operations; increase in high-tech, networked
command and control; and continuity of military operations. Moreover, the doctrine set forth the features
of contemporary military conflicts: unpredictability
of outbreak; a broad range of military-political, economic, strategic, and other objectives; increased role
of modern highly effective weapons systems; speed;
selectivity; a high level of target destruction; rapid
maneuvering; firepower; mobility; initiative; the preservation of sustainable state and military command
and control; supremacy on land, at sea, in the air, and
and in outer space; increasing significance of precision, electromagnetic, laser, and infrasound weap44

onry; computer-controlled systems and drones; and
nuclear weapons remaining an important factor for
preventing the outbreak of military conflicts.
Ensuring Russia’s Security.
In response to dangers and threats, the doctrine
explained that Russia retained the right to use nuclear
weapons in response to a WMD attack against itself or
against its allies and also against an attack with conventional weapons when the very existence of the state
was under threat. Furthermore, Moscow would ensure
the protection of Russian citizens abroad. Other provisions to ensure RF security related to the strengthening of collective security within the framework of the
CSTO, CIS, OSCE, and SCO; as well as to develop relations in this field with the European Union (EU) and
NATO. Next, the main priorities of military-political
cooperation were with Belarus, CSTO, CIS, SCO, and
the UN. More specifically, on international security
cooperation, an armed attack on a (Russia-Belarus)
Union State member or a member state of the CSTO
would be regarded as an act of aggression causing retaliatory measures. In addition to the aforementioned
(CSTO Treaty) military assistance article, the doctrine
also underlined Moscow’s willingness to assign troop
contingents to CSTO peacekeeping forces. Moreover,
Russia would assign forces to the CSTO Collective
Rapid-Response forces for the purpose of responding
promptly to military threats.
Assessment.
The contents of the doctrine did not quite live up
to the earlier statements related to it, nor to the realities of the RF Armed Forces. For instance, the expect45

ed emphasis on energy security was completely left
out. The only reference to energy was in relation to the
threat of disruption of the functioning of nuclear energy facilities. Furthermore, the repeatedly announced
provision on preventive/preemptive nuclear strikes
was also missing in the published text of the 2010 Military Doctrine. Moreover, the on-going deep reforms
of the RF Armed Forces and the intended huge influx
of modern weapons before 2020 were also absent from
the doctrine.
Concerning Russia in the world community, the
doctrine stated a plea for a new European security
architecture, preventing the use of force by individual states or organizations. However, would the proposed European security treaty and conference also
imply the type of force Russia used against Georgia
in 2008? And if Russia prioritized international law
and institutions, why did it veto the prolongation of
the UN and OSCE missions in the Georgian separatist
regions, and not allow EU observers to enter these regions? If Russia demanded a different security architecture, this would only come closer if Moscow itself
would be the role model of adherence to international
law. The facts showed a different picture.
Pertaining to Russia’s national interests, the doctrine mentioned that the Kremlin could send troops
abroad to protect its national interests or its citizens.
The use of military force to protect Russian minorities—also by first creating such a minority as was the
case in Abkhazia and South Ossetia by submitting
Russian passports—was applied in the 2008 Georgian
conflict. Countries with Russian minorities, such as
the Baltic States, were worried, since they might be the
next victim of this provision. This damaged international stability.
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Regarding threats to Russian security, the 2010
Military Doctrine considered NATO as a danger.
However, if international law was of crucial importance for Moscow as repeatedly stated in the doctrine,
why did it not also recognize the right of self-determination of states to align themselves with international organizations as they like? Russia’s frequently
declared privileged interests in the former Soviet Union area did not entitle the Kremlin to decide what the
countries in this region were allowed to do. With regard to foreign troops deployed close to Russian borders, U.S. military contingents deployed in Romania
and Bulgaria were in other security documents mixed
up with those of NATO. However, if U.S. and NATO
policy were the same, Georgia and Ukraine would
already have been NATO members. Considering the
West as the primary adversary was a disappointing
continuation of old thinking. However, by listing the
West under “dangers” instead of “threats,” damage
to the relationship with NATO and the United States
was less than otherwise. In that respect, the term
“dangers” may have been introduced in order to not
complicate the on-going negotiations with America
for a new START Treaty on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms. Nevertheless, the thinking in terms
of opponents was counterproductive to the course of
rapprochement as initiated in autumn 2009 by U.S.
President Barack Obama by annulling the European
missile defense shield, and by NATO Secretary General Anders Rasmussen focusing his first major speech
on improvement of relations with Russia. However, to
a certain extent the West itself was also to blame for
the prolongation of antagonistic views by the Kremlin, for example, by recognizing the independence of
Kosovo—thus encouraging Russia to recognize the
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Georgian separatist regions—and NATO extending
air defense to the Baltic States, hence fulfilling Moscow’s claim that NATO deploys its forces at Russia’s
borders.
With regard to ensuring Russia’s security, in autumn 2009 it was mentioned that the new doctrine
would entitle Russia to also use nuclear weapons in
preventive (preemptive) strikes. At the time, this remark caused a lot of turmoil and criticism in the West.
Perhaps because of that, this provision was absent in
the doctrinal text of 2010. It is doubtful that this provision was totally deleted. On February 5, 2010, together
with the Military Doctrine, President Medvedev announced his approval of the “Principles of State Nuclear Deterrence Policy to 2020” (Kremlin 2010). During the process of drafting the doctrine, Deputy Chief
of the General Staff Anatoly Nogovitsyn had already
remarked that the doctrinal part on the use of nuclear
arms would not be made public. On February 5, only
the doctrine was published on the websites of the
Kremlin and of the SCRF. It is not unlikely that the
not-publicly-released document, “Principles of State
Nuclear Deterrence Policy to 2020,” would contain
this secret nuclear part of the doctrine, including provisions on preventive (preemptive) nuclear strikes.
Another striking feature of ensuring security was the
choice of “friends” for enhancing collective security
and military-political cooperation. Considering the
enumeration of the CSTO, the main actors to cooperate with were found to be Belarus and SCO. The mentioning of a military assistance entry—derived from
the CSTO Treaty—together with doctrinal provisions
on Russian troop assignments to CSTO peacekeeping
as well as rapid reaction forces, unmistakably marked
the CSTO as the primary security partner for Moscow.
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The Union Treaty of Russia with Belarus was silenced
for many years but now returned, just like the CSTO,
in the format of a military assistance article. This was
remarkable in light of the frequent problems between
Russia and Belarus, i.e., on the further development of
the CSTO. The SCO, the other international organization in which Moscow played a leading role, was also
given a priority status of cooperation. However, different from other recent security documents, the special relationship with China and India was not listed
in the doctrine. Perhaps by keeping silent about China, the Russian military thus avoided this taboo and
made it clear that China could develop into a threat
to Russia. Finally, the EU and NATO were mentioned
in the sphere of collective security, as evidenced by
RF military contingents participating in operations of
both Western organizations. However, they were excluded from the list of military-political cooperation,
underlining that these actors did not belong to the category of favored military partners.
CONCLUSIONS ON RUSSIA’S DOCTRINAL
DEVELOPMENT SINCE 2000
A comparison of Moscow’s documents dealing
with military doctrine between 2000 and 2010 leads to
the following conclusions (see Table 1-2).
Perception of Security.
During Putin’s first term as President—one of economic weakness and subsequent more dependence on
the West—the Kremlin in its DWP 2003 noticed a shift
in security challenges from military to other socioeconomic problems. Gradually, in concurrence with
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Western military thinking, Russia’s security elite also
recognized that broad security had become the general concept, i.e., considering all dimensions of security
and accepting that internal and external security are
connected. However, this attitude changed in Putin’s
second term when excerpts of the forthcoming new
military doctrine underlined an alleged global tendency of solving political problems by military force.
Incidentally, Russia itself had also become more active in the military field, e.g., by boosting its efforts in
the Russian-led CSTO military alliance and the Russo-Chinese-led SCO by frequently conducting largescale exercises with China and by resuming strategic
bomber flights close to Western countries. The revenues from the increased prices of energy resources,
strengthening Russia’s economic and political power,
and its decreasing dependence on the West allowed
for an assertive stance that was also expressed in the
doctrinal documents.
Energy: The New Vital Factor?
In Putin’s second term, energy was introduced as a
doctrinal factor in statements made in 2007 and 2008.
In 2009, the alleged excerpts of the upcoming doctrine
mentioned energy even more strongly. In his November 2009 interview, Patrushev mentioned energy
(security) three times as an issue in the new military
doctrine: the struggle for acquiring energy as a factor for armed conflict near Russia (e.g., the Arctic); the
quest for energy as a military danger causing the use
of armed forces; and energy as a grounds for escalation towards a large-scale conflict (Borisov 2009). In
line with other security documents of recent years of
Putin and Medvedev, e.g., Medvedev’s National Se-
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curity Strategy (NSS) of May 2009, energy security for
the first time would now enter the military doctrine.
Given the importance that the Kremlin attached to
its energy resources as witnessed by the release of an
Arctic Strategy in September 2008, and by openly admitting in the 2009 NSS the use of energy as an instrument of power, energy (security) was expected to be
part of Moscow’s doctrinal threat perception. However, in spite of strong expectations, energy security was
missing completely in the 2010 Military Doctrine. The
only indirect references to energy were the following:
•	To ensure the security of the economic activities of the Russian Federation on the high seas;
•	To create and train special formations intended
for transfer to the RF Armed Forces and Other
Troops . . . for use . . . in the interests of the
economy of the Russian Federation.
The first entry could be related to the transport of
oil and gas, the second one possibly for the protection
of domestic energy facilities, perhaps also of future
energy sites in the Arctic region. Nevertheless, the
indirect mentioning, if at all, of energy meant a deviation from the tendency of growing attention for energy (instruments of power, security, and interests) in
each security document since 2007. The question was
if this breach had to be considered as an exception to
the rule or as an indication that Russia’s security elite
had changed its mind on the importance of energy.
The former would be more self-evident.
Constant Threats from the West.
In all the doctrinal documents since 2000, NATO
and the United States have continuously been considered as threats to Russia’s national security. The
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Alliance was mainly condemned for its increasing
range and breadth of activities and members, U.S.
global dominance, nuclear deterrence, and missile defense plans and capabilities, all of which annoyed the
Kremlin. This line of policy did not cease when these
two Western actors started a policy of rapprochement towards Moscow in September 2009. A reset of
the Western attitude would not automatically lead to
a similar reply from the Kremlin. Possibly, Moscow
needed such an adversary perception to justify aspects
of its foreign and security policy. Therefore, this threat
perception was to be prolonged.
Forceful Protection of Russians Abroad.
The interests and rights of Russian citizens abroad,
or rather in the former Soviet Union area—Russia’s socalled “near abroad”—has been another recurring factor in doctrinal thinking of this decade, as mentioned
in the documents reviewed. In the Georgian conflict of
August 2008, this doctrinal provision was brought into
practice for the first time. After including this entry in
the Law on Defense, it has become likely that military
operations abroad allegedly aimed at protecting (the
interests of) Russian minorities might be conducted
more often. Related to this is the provision of using
the Russian Armed Forces abroad in areas of strategic
importance. Both doctrinal entries are probably connected to the common thinking of the Russian security
elite that the region of the former Soviet Union is still
Russia’s legitimate sphere of influence. Conversely,
and related to this thinking, NATO’s expansion to the
east and encouragement to former Soviet republics—
Georgia and Ukraine—to join the Alliance, has been
relentlessly rejected in the different doctrinal documents.
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Nuclear Weapons.
By extending the types of conflict that could result in a nuclear response, including local wars, in
interviews prior to the release of the 2010 Military
Doctrine, Patrushev indicated a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Considering the nuclear paragraph of
Russia’s doctrinal documents since 1993, this would
not be a watershed in security thinking but a continuation of thought. Gradually, new doctrines have
moved away from a “no-first use” statement towards
the possibility of using nuclear arms in smaller sized
conflicts, including conventional ones. Most likely
this development has occurred as a result of increasing weakness of Russia’s conventional military power
(Fenenko 2009). The 2000 Military Doctrine included
the first-use of nuclear arms also in response to widescale aggression against Russia with conventional
weapons (“Doktrinal”naya” 2009). In that respect, the
alleged provisions on nuclear arms in the forthcoming military doctrine were—with the exception of the
introduction of a provision on the preemptive use of
nuclear weapons—not very different from the 2000
version, as was acknowledged by Gareyev (Nikolskiy
2009; Fenenko 2009).
Patrushev’s statements in October 2009, during
on-going military reforms, possibly reflected the feelings of the Kremlin that it needed to rely on nuclear
deterrence even more in a time of military transition.
Another reason for the expected emphasis on nuclear
deterrence in the new doctrine was that only major
powers possess such weapons. In other words, by
demonstrating its nuclear force, the Kremlin demanded to be recognized as a great power. Such a status
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was time after time claimed in recent major security
documents and in public statements, even though this
nuclear component carried the sound of Cold War
during a time of endeavors of rapprochement by the
United States and NATO towards Russia. The doctrinal emphasis on nuclear deterrence was also in line
with statements of Medvedev and others of the security elite in autumn 2008 declaring the modernization
of the nuclear force as a priority of the then started
military reforms. However, in the actual text of the
2010 Military Doctrine, the stress on nuclear arms was
much less than expected from Patrushev’s statements.
Probably because of the on-going U.S.-Russian negotiations on an agreement for a new bilateral pact cutting
stocks of strategic nuclear weapons (START), as well
as because of the strong condemnation of the West of
the alleged provisions on preventive nuclear strikes,
the latter statements were withdrawn and the overall
emphasis on nuclear arms was strongly reduced in
the published text of the doctrine. However, since the
more harsh statements on the use of nuclear weapons
could have been laid down in the nonreleased document, “Principles of State Nuclear Deterrence Policy
to 2020,” it is unlikely that the policy tendency of increasing attention for nuclear arms has been broken.
No Modern Doctrinal Concept of Warfare.
In none of the reviewed doctrinal documents and
statements could a concept of modern warfare be
discerned. No reference is made to a concept of security thought, nor of political-strategic objectives of
using modernized forces in conflicts of contemporary
warfare, such as the West is conducting in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The 2010 Military Doctrine completely
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ignored the on-going far-reaching restructuring of
the RF Armed Forces. Furthermore, this new doctrine
repeatedly referred to mobilization, whereas the current structural reforms envisaged a nonmobilization
permanent-ready type of forces. Consequently, the
2010 doctrine also refrained from stating what use the
new “Western-type” brigade-structured and modern
equipped troops would have. And this is perhaps
more than anything else the reason for which a military
doctrine is written. The policy of acquiring (French)
helicopter carriers in relation to the Russian-Georgian
conflict of 2008 gave the impression that traditional
warfare “around the corner” in Russia’s near abroad
would continue to be the main stream of Russian military thinking (Kipp 2009). The 2010 Military Doctrine
demonstrated ambiguity in military thinking. On the
one hand, it stated characteristics of modern warfare,
but on the other stressed mobilization capabilities,
thus leaning on old-style large-scale warfare of the
NATO-Warsaw Pact type. Similarly, it pointed at the
necessity of acquiring modern conventional arms, but
at the same time underlined the importance of an upto-date nuclear deterrent force. Hence, the doctrinal
development of the last decade demonstrated uncertainty in the direction of the security elite. The 2003
DWP gave the first recognition of modern warfare, of
which the military reforms since 2008 have been the
application. But the next step—establishing objectives
for modernized armed forces—has apparently as yet
not been reached: in the meantime Moscow is likely to
stick to military adventures in its near abroad.
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CHAPTER 2
RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE:
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
Jacob W. Kipp
On February 5, 2010, President Dmitri Medvedev
signed Russia’s long-awaited new military doctrine,
which is supposed to guide defense policy over the
next decade. In the presence of the senior civilian leadership of the government and legislative branches,
President Medvedev announced that he had signed
both the “Military Doctrine” and “The Foundations
of State Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence to
2020.”1
The new Military Doctrine describes the threat environment facing Russia as complex and dynamic, but
not dominated by the imminent threat of war:
In the new Military Doctrine, world development today is characterized by the weakening of ideological
confrontation; the reduction in the level of economic,
political, and military influence of certain individual
states and alliances; and the rising influence of other
states that seek all-embracing domination; multipolarity; and globalization of various process.
Many regional conflicts remain unresolved. The tendencies toward violent solutions of these conflicts,
including those bordering the Russian Federation, remains. The existing structure (system) of international
security, including international legal mechanisms
does not provide for the equal security of all states.
However, in spite of the lowering of the probability of
the unleashing against the Russian Federation of large
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scale warfare with the employment of conventional
means and nuclear weapons, in a number of directions military dangers to the Russian Federation have
increased.2

The document lists both internal and external dangers, with primary emphasis on those posed by actions
of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the periphery of Russia. But
the doctrine also recognizes a sliding scale of military
conflicts that Russia might face. It also addresses the
characteristic feature of contemporary military conflicts, relating to what Russian authors have called the
sixth generation of warfare and an extension of what
Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov labeled “the revolution in
military affairs [RMA], involving precision-strike systems” and “the mass employment of weapons systems
and weapons technology, based upon new physical
principles and approaching in effectiveness that of
nuclear weapons.”3 On the issue of the role of nuclear
weapons in Russian strategy, the Military Doctrine
speaks of the use of nuclear weapons as a means of
deterrence against nuclear and conventional attacks
upon Russia and its allies, but does not explicitly proclaim a doctrine of preemptive attack, which had been
part of much of the debate on the draft military doctrine. The Military Doctrine states: “The decision on
the use of nuclear weapons is taken by the President
of the Russian Federation.”4
Given the content of press reporting on the draft
military doctrine, which had promised presidential
approval many months ago and included the concept
of “preemptive or defensive nuclear strike,” one can
assume that there was some struggle within Russia’s
national security elite over the final content of the doc-
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trine. As late as February 5, 2010, Nikolai Patrushev,
the Secretary of the Security Council, had once again
announced that the military doctrine would be signed
shortly. He clarified this statement by saying that the
Security Council had already met and approved the
doctrine and sent it on to the President. The same article stressed the point that the doctrine would focus
on the role of nuclear weapons in the defense of Russia. The article did not, however, repeat reports on the
inclusion of preemptive nuclear strike in the doctrine.5
This announcement of the new Military Doctrine
has come at a time when the strategic situation before
Russia has begun to clarify. Both Washington and
Moscow are talking about significant progress on the
START 2 agreement, with commentators speaking of a
signing of the treaty during an April 2010 summit. At
the same time, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
issued its congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to the public. Russian commentators have been quick to focus on the fact that this
QDR does not focus on Russia as a threat to the United
States and seems more focused upon the current conflicts and the global struggle against terrorism than
upon preparing to fight major regional wars by conventional means. Russian commentators judged this
to be a potential development of significance for Russia’s security interests. In conjunction with the newly
published budget proposal for FY 2011, Russian observers see the Pentagon focused on maintaining the
high quality of military personnel and on improving
benefits for veterans. Comments on weapons acquisitions, especially missile defense capabilities, did not
identify these developments as an explicit threat to
Russia. The authors noted, however, that the United
States will seek to retain the capacity to intervene in
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all regions of the globe in defense of U.S. interests.6
Another article on the QDR put the shift in U.S. military posture as a more profound change: “The new
doctrine has changed the strategy which has guided
the American Army since the moment of the collapse
of the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] and
the end of the Cold War.” The new QDR profoundly
shifted the primary threat to the United States: “the
main threat is insurgents.”7 In the context of these press
reports, the content of Russia’s new military doctrine
underscored the basic asymmetry between U.S. and
Russian doctrine as they seem to be evolving. Russia
still sees the United States and NATO as the source
of the primary dangers confronting Russia, but not
as imminent threats to Russia. Both the United States
and Russia now openly share a recognition of terrorism, proliferation, and local insurgencies as sources of
international instability, even as the powers cooperate
to deal with the insurgency in Afghanistan.
This shift did not come about without a political
struggle. Until recently, the comments from members of the Security Council all put first priority on
the inclusion of Russia’s articulation of a posture of
“preemptive nuclear first strike” to protect Russian
interests, allies, and the survival of Russian statehood
at the core of the new military doctrine.8 Patrushev explained the emphasis on preemptive strike as based
upon U.S. and NATO actions: “Continuation of NATO’s expansion, military activization of the Alliance,
intensive exercises of the American strategic forces
involving strategic arms deployment drills cannot
help disturbing Russia.” Patrushev later went on to
list more general trends in the international situation
contributing to “destabilization” and affecting the formulation of Russian military doctrine. These included:

66

“the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and germ warfare technologies, continuing production of weapons
of mass destruction, battles for energy and other resources.”9 Another article on the same theme of the expected signature of the new doctrine by the President
cited earlier comments by General Iurii Baluevsky,
Russian Army (Retired) on the imminent threat from
the United States. Baluevsky, who served as Chief of
the General Staff from 2004-08 and now serves as the
Assistant Secretary of the Security Council, pointed
to the U.S. articulation of a doctrine of “instant global
strike,” which would include both conventional precision strike and nuclear weapons as a justification for
Russia’s adopting a doctrine of preemptive nuclear
first-strike.10 An article from Trud on the same day
suggested a political struggle within the walls of the
Kremlin with outside experts defending and attacking the concept of preemptive nuclear strike. In this
regard, the comments of Colonel-General Viktor Esin,
Russian Army (Retired), deserve note. Esin, the former chief of staff of Strategic Rocket Forces and now a
leading analyst of strategic issues, stated that the concept was ill-formulated: “It is impossible to forecast
the moment when it is high time to be the first to attack a weapon with nuclear weapons in response just
to a threat of aggression accurately.” He went on to
say that he doubted that President Medvedev would
accept the doctrinal formulation of preemptive nuclear first-strike.11
One notable silence in all these discussions of
doctrine was the absence of comments from General
Nikolai Makarov, the Chief of the General Staff. Given
the emphasis he has placed upon the modernization
and transformation of Russian conventional forces,
one might understand why he would favor a policy of

67

nuclear deterrence over nuclear preemption. Makarov
has acted more as the agent of his civilian boss, Minister Serduikov, than as an autonomous actor representing the views of the Russian military elite. He and
Serduikov have over the last 3 years been involved
in fundamental changes in Russia’s conventional
military toward a more flexible brigade-based ground
force capable of conducting network-centric operations.12 While the Kremlin has published the new military doctrine, no copy of “The Foundations of State
Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence to 2020” have
appeared in the press. Its content would reveal what
Russian policymakers understand nuclear deterrence
to mean in the second decade of the 21st century. In
the absence of access to this document, one is left to
speculate on just why the published Military Doctrine
does not contain any reference to Russia’s right to a
“preemptive strike” with “nuclear weapons” and why
the published doctrine treats the deterrent function of
nuclear weapons in the fashion that it does.
MILITARY DOCTRINE IN RUSSIA’S PAST
In this context, past military doctrine, both Soviet
and Russian, takes on special importance. The legal
basis for the publication of Russia’s military doctrine
can be found in the Yeltsin Constitution, which was
ratified by popular vote in December 1993. Chapter
IV, Article 83 enumerates the duties of the President
and, regarding the role as Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces, states that the President shall: “form
and head the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the status of which is determined by the federal
law; h. approve the military doctrine of the Russian
Federation.”13 This constitutional provision does not
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explain the origins of the requirement for a published
military doctrine. Indeed, more than 1 month prior to
the ratification of constitution, President Boris Yeltsin
had presented a draft military doctrine to the Federal
Assembly of Russia and received its endorsement for
“The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the
Russian Federation,” which he signed on November
2, 1993. 14 In the difficult political situation confronting
Yeltsin that fall as he battled with the opposition in
the Supreme Soviet, the President had relied upon the
Security Council to plan his course of action in case
the governmental crisis required the use of force. To
secure the loyalty of senior commanders, about which
Yeltsin and his allies were concerned, he pushed certain actions that were designed to win the loyalty of
the officer corps and undercut efforts by Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi to get support within the military and prevent the political crisis from becoming a
civil war.15 In this context, post-Soviet Russia received
its first published military doctrine, not as a result of
open debate but through a concealed power struggle
between the Security Council and the Ministry of Defense (MoD), in which Minister of Defense, General
Pavel Grachev got what he wanted as a result of his
support for his president during the assault on the
White House on October 4, 2010.16 The actual content
of the military doctrine of 1993 reflected the Yeltsin
administration’s hopes for a strategic partnership with
the West and presented a relatively benign picture of
the external security environment confronting Russia.
The doctrine stated:
At the contemporary stage of development of the international situation—when confrontation generated
by ideological antagonism is being overcome, part-

69

nership and all-around cooperation are expanding,
confidence in the military sphere is strengthening, and
nuclear and conventional armaments are being reduced—political-diplomatic, international legal, economic, and other nonmilitary methods and collective
actions by the world community regarding threats to
peace, violations of peace, and acts of aggression assume paramount importance in preventing wars and
armed conflicts.17

Outside observers had little reason to express
concern over the provisions of the doctrine that addressed nuclear weapons: “The aim of the Russian
Federation’s policy in the sphere of nuclear weapons
is to eliminate the danger of nuclear war by deterring
the launching of aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies.”18 The document did contain an
explicit statement on “no first use,” but in this case,
it applied to nonnuclear signatory states to the 1968
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Regarding other
nuclear powers the doctrine was silent. Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev emphasized this silence and then
declined any further comment on the topic. Western
observers had never taken the Soviet proclamation
of no-first-use by Brezhnev in 1982 as anything more
than a propaganda statement without any strategic or
operational consequences. Russia was no longer an
enemy; its government was committed to reducing its
arsenal of nuclear weapons; and its armed forces were
in a state of chaos and decline and being drawn into
civil unrest and ethnic clashes within Russia and on
its periphery.19
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THE ROAD TO RUSSIA’S FIRST MILITARY
DOCTRINE
The Ministry of Defense promoted the articulation of a military doctrine for Russia for a number of
sound reasons. The events of 1991 had brought about
the end of the Soviet Union, and Russia found itself
in the process of taking over and making its own the
military instrument it inherited from the USSR. This
was a period when the other successor states were creating their own national militaries, and the expectation in Moscow was that the Russian military would
be the model and the mentor to the other emerging
armed forces among the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Internal reforms,
especially the dismantling of the command economy,
required significant reductions in defense spending
and the number of men under arms.20 Moreover, the
era of glasnost had inaugurated a wave of criticism of
the Army as an institution with disclosures of abuse
of recruits and dedovshchina (hazing) undermining
the military’s own self-image as defender of the rodina (motherland). At the same time, the professional
military wanted guidance from the new state with
regard to the role of the armed forces. Such agitation
had begun almost as soon as the decision was taken in
March 1992, when Yeltsin himself assumed the post
of acting defense minister to create a Russian MoD.
The appointment of General Grachev as Minister on
May 18 accelerated the process. The MoD published
a special issue of Voennaia mysl’ devoted to the topic
of military doctrine. On May 27-30, the General Staff
Academy hosted a scientific conference devoted to the
topic. General Grachev provided the opening remarks
to the assembled “comrades.” Noting the many tasks
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that Russia’s MoD and government faced in the areas
of defense and security policy, Grachev emphasized
the importance of a new military doctrine for the Russian Federation. “The development of Russia’s military doctrine is especially urgent in this connection. A
concept of a Russian Federation Armed Forces force
generation must be formed and practical measures for
upgrading them must be carried out on its basis.”21
Just how the professional military viewed military
doctrine is quite important if we are to understand the
content of the document issued in November 1993.
Mastery of the art and science of war was the most sacred charge of the General Staff, and its officers firmly
believed in military doctrine as the critical foundation
of the state’s approach to preparations for and conduct
of war. Through all the instability of late 1991 and early 1992, the desire for a new military doctrine runs like
a red thread through discussions about the fate of the
Soviet Armed Forces. General Vladimir Lobov, who
became Minister of Defense after the August Putsch,
struggled to maintain the unity of the armed forces as
the separate republics moved to leave the union. In
October 1991, he published an article on a new force
structure. Lobov, who had been a friend and ally of
Larionov and Kokoshin, spoke of a new military doctrine as a key aspect of transforming the military to fit
a democratic state and “destatified” economy.
The victory by democratic forces in the country accelerated society’s political, economic and legal reform
processes, which also affected the sphere of defense,
necessitating a fundamental revision of the principles
of military force generation and a change in military
doctrine with retention of its defensive character. An
entire set of fundamentally new factors, conditions,
and trends arose which cannot fail to be considered.22
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Lobov noted the need for the Armed Forces to address interethnic tensions and to escape from the ideological control that the Communist Party had imposed
upon the military. His struggle to maintain the unity
of the Armed Forces led to his dismissal in December 1991, when President Yeltsin engineered the official break-up of the Soviet Union and the creation
of the CIS. Yeltsin had ridden Russian nationalism to
secure the end of the Soviet state. Now he had to accept the logic of the forces he had unleashed as other
states sought to leave the Union. For Yeltsin, the Commonwealth was supposed to be the substitute for the
Union; other leaders, notably those in the Baltic States,
wanted no part of the commonwealth. Ukraine’s leaders viewed the Commonwealth as the path towards
complete independence. The end of the Soviet Union
created further chaos in the military and raised serious questions as to who would inherit the nuclear arsenal of the USSR.
In the early months of 1992, the discussion of military doctrine took place in the context of the Commonwealth. Colonel Anatolii Klimenko of the General
Staff discussed the content of such a doctrine. Repeating much of what Lobov had said but now speaking in
the context of the Commonwealth, he looked to a consultative doctrine based on compromises among the
member republics with the General Staff maintaining
its coordinating function.23 Within 2 months, it was
apparent that there would not be an MoD or General
Staff for the Commonwealth, and talk turned to the
development of a Russian military doctrine. Opinion
among officers polled might support the maintenance
of both a unified armed forces and a unified military
doctrine, but political developments were pushing
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towards the creation of a Russian military doctrine
and Armed Forces.24 An important voice for Russian
military doctrine came from General of the Army
Makhmut Gareev. He asked the simple question of
whether Russia had its own national interests, and he
answered in the affirmative. Gareev saw little prospect in the maintenance of a unified military for the
Commonwealth and pointed toward the need for Russia to articulate its own military doctrine reflecting its
national interests and capabilities. Military strategy
would be at the very heart of this new doctrine.25 Gareev did not see the need for a single document that
would express the major tenets of military strategy.
Gareev’s article set off a response among readers of
Krasnaia zvezda. The editors noted the number of letters the article produced and also noted that many
readers expressed the opinion that a democratic Russia should, indeed, have a single legislative document
reflecting the state’s official views on the most important issue of military-political strategy and militarytechnical policy. Without such a document, reform of
the armed forces would lack the basic orientation to
guide the process.26 In April the Russian government
created a commission under the chairmanship of Dmitri Volkogonov with the task of creating an MoD and
of working out a military doctrine. Colonel-General V.
Miruk, a member of the State Commission on the Creation of the Ministry of Defense, Army, and Navy of
the Russian Federation, addressed the methodological issues involved in articulating a military doctrine.
Miruk emphasized the need for input from all the
state agencies involved in defense and security issues
and called for the doctrine’s approval to be by legislative action. Recognizing the new security environment that had emerged from the end of the Cold War,
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Miruk named no specific threat facing Russia but he
identified dangers that military doctrine should address:
It is well known that potential danger as a category
exists objectively. Because of:
— the peacetime deployment of groupings of armed
forces with high mobilization capabilities of a state
continue to exist;
— territorial disputes between states, as well as ethnonational, economic, religious, and ideological contradictions exist, and can be sources of wars and regional
conflicts;
— the pretensions of individual states for a dominant
position on a global and regional scale remain;
— the change of leadership, internal political [and]
economic crises can exercise real influence on the foreign policy of individual states.27

The security focus was not, however, global security problems but instability in what Russian commentators were now calling “the near abroad.” By May, it
was clear that tensions between Russia and Ukraine
were pushing the Yeltsin government towards the
creation of a Russian Ministry of Defense and Armed
Forces.28
In June 1992, shortly after the establishment of the
Russian MoD, Colonel Anatoli Klimenko, the Head of
the Center for Operational and Strategic Studies of the
General Staff argued for the articulation of a military
doctrine for the Russian Federation as a statement
of “the main military-political goal of the Russian
state.”29 In this, Russian military culture was distinctly
different from its Western counterparts, the military
of which used the term “doctrine” loosely and without rigor, and avoided any reference to the political
dimension of strategy, which was to be left to elected
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officials.30 At the May conference, General Igor Rodionov, the Chief of the General Staff Academy, made it
clear that the MoD had the leading role in developing
military doctrine: “One task of the Russian Federation
Ministry of Defense is to develop the fundamentals of
a Russian military doctrine, to determine its overall
direction and to substantiate the ways, means and
mechanisms for protecting the homeland’s vitally important interests.” He went on to say that such doctrine when approved by the President would: “serve
as it were as the aims of supreme political and military
authority on national defense questions.”31
Between the seminar in May 1992 and the signing of the Military Doctrine in November 1993, it
appeared for a time that Russia’s military doctrine
would be subordinated to a conception of national
security that was to be formulated first by the Security Council, which had been created in April 1992.
But this institution, which was to coordinate the activities of all the ministries involved in all matters of
external and internal security, proved too weak to
provide leadership. In the absence of that leadership,
President Yeltsin might declare that Russia had a national security concept, but there was no document
that expressed that concept.32 But the Minister of Defense gave content to Russia’s “new military policy,”
speaking to various foreign governments and institutions about its content and the relationship between
that policy with military doctrine and reform of the
armed forces. In London, Grachev spoke at the Royal
United Service institute (RUSI), declaring the primary
point of the new policy was the prevention of wars
and cooperation with other states to achieve peace.33
In October Grachev spoke to the Spanish General Staff
about Russian military reform and military doctrine.

76

He called for a smaller, more mobile armed force,
and laid out the stages of military reform for the rest
of the decade. On military doctrine, Grachev stated:
“As a result of the realization of the provisions of [its]
military doctrine, Russia will have an armed forces,
numerically smaller force but sufficient for the reliable defense of the country without creating a military threat to neighboring states.”34 Minister Grachev
left the impression at home and abroad that military
doctrine was a matter within the competence of the
MoD, which was working towards its formulation at
deliberate speed.
By December 1992, it was quite clear what place
military doctrine would have in Russian national security policy. According to one of the leading experts,
Major General Viktor Riabchuk, a senior professor
in the Department of Operational Art at the Frunze
Combined Arms Academy, Russia would have foreign and military policy set by the national leadership in each of these areas. They would provide the
basis for Russia’s military doctrine, which was to be
infused with the insights from military science.35 This
view was not shared by civilian experts on international security. They warned that the approach taken
in the past in the Soviet Union had, in fact, militarized
national security. Yuri Gaidukov argued that international practice in this area demanded the articulation
of a national security concept, followed by a national
security strategy, and only then by a military doctrine.
The soldiers were putting the cart before the horse.
Gaidukov suggested that a good point of departure
for contemporary Russian specialists, soldiers, and
civilians was to read with care Aleksandr Svechin’s
classic Strategy, which had just appeared in English
translation. Svechin had called strategy the collective
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responsibility of the political, military and economic
leadership of the state.36 Svechin had, however, been
repressed by the Soviet regime, and his book was only
available to selected readers who had permission to
access closed collections. No Russian edition had been
published since 1927. Grachev and the other senior
Russian generals were not embracing Svechin’s concept of the “integral commander composed of the political, military and economic leadership of the state,”
but were harking back to a distinctly military vision
of military doctrine, which had emerged in the early
20th century in conjunction with Russia’s wars and
revolutions. That concept had led to the enthronement
of operational art once a strategy of annihilation had
been selected. Svechin had warned that such a choice
reduced the political content of strategy and gave preeminence to planning for short, decisive campaigns.37
Influence of the Tsarist and Soviet Past on Russian
Doctrine.
The term military doctrine was not a new one
among Russian soldiers. In the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, Russian military reformers were
concerned that the Russian Army meet and master
the challenges of “modern war,” which is what they
thought they had seen on the plains of Manchuria. Because of the increasing complexity of warfare and the
need to shape a common understanding of modern
war among military leaders, these reformers within
the Russian General Staff advocated the articulation
of an official understanding of what was involved in
preparing for and conducting war, which went well
beyond the existing field regulations with their tactical
focus. It spoke to the problems of both strategic vision
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and effective operational command and control. Tsar
Nicholas II put an end to such discussions by claiming
that he as autocrat was the one source of doctrine. In
the aftermath of war and revolution, tsarist officers in
Soviet military service, known under the new regime
as voenspetsy (military specialists), to reflect both their
professional competence and their questionable class
origins, brought the issue of military doctrine into the
debates of the Red Army. Mikhail Frunze, a Bolshevik who had proven an effective field commander and
went on to lead the Red Army as Narkomob (People’s
Commissar of Defense), embraced the idea and called
for the articulation of a “unified military doctrine” for
the Soviet state. Here the political and military content were explicitly expressed in ideological terms
befitting a revolutionary regime surrounded by a hostile capitalist world plotting its destruction. The Red
Army was to be the trusted arm of the Bolshevik state
and the defender of the proletariat’s revolution.38 General Makhmut Gareev, the Chief of the Directorate of
Military Science of the Soviet General Staff, in his intellectual biography of Frunze, expressed the opinion
that Frunze’s conceptualization of a unified military
doctrine was a major contribution to military theory
since he embraced the idea that doctrine would, by its
nature, be incomplete and always subject to the dialectical tension between theory and praxis. It would
always be subject to change, depending on developments in the environment.39 In these terms, military
doctrine expressed the official views of the state on
preparation for and conduct of war, but it was not to
be considered a final statement since life demanded
that such views evolve in response to changing internal and external conditions. Gareev, like Frunze, saw
military doctrine as the domain where the Party and
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state leadership called upon the professional military
serving the Soviet state to address the technical aspects
of military doctrine. In a review of Gareev’s book, Colonel-General Adrian A. Danilevich credited him with
the first systemic exposition of Frunze’s contribution
to military theory, called attention to the relationship
between military forecasting (prognozirovanie) and the
articulation of military doctrine, and emphasized their
contemporary relevance.40
In the first decade following the Bolshevik Revolution and Civil War, there was a wide-ranging debate within the Soviet military elite over all aspects
of military doctrine. The disputes led to repression
against those who were seen as insufficiently rooted
in Bolshevik ideology. In the end, however, a new autocrat imposed his own standard on military doctrine
and became its sole repository, having purged the Red
Army of much of its intellectual leadership. The General Staff might claim to be the brain of the army, but
it was subject to the power of vodzh (boss) and Stalin
kept that monopoly in his hands throughout the Great
Patriotic War and into the Cold War. Stalin did not
publish a military doctrine but did provide guidance
concerning the changing Soviet view of the outside
world. His election speech in early 1946, with its proclamation of capitalism’s continued hostility toward
the Soviet Union, provided the basis for George Kennan’s Long Telegram devoted to the sources of Soviet
conduct. Stalin’s own military writing hardly went
beyond explaining the sources of Soviet victory in the
Great Patriotic War as a result of the Party and Soviet
state mastering the “five permanently operating factors” (the stability of the rear, the morale of the army,.
the quantity and quality of divisions, the armament of
the army, and the organizing ability of the command
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personnel) as the keys to success and by which he cast
into the shadows the initial defeats of the Red Army.41
Under Stalin’s regime, there was no published
military doctrine. Indeed, secrecy shrouded everything connected to defense and security. Even field
regulations were classified documents. Not until after
the dictator’s death did any overarching need appear
for such a document, even with the onset of Cold War.
The post-Stalin leadership engaged in its effort to reshape the Soviet military in keeping with the advent
of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Under Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet General Staff articulated a
military strategy for the nuclear age and published it
in three editions in the 1960s under the general editorship of Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky. The third edition
of this book appeared as part of the Officer’s Library
and gave expression to the military-political content
of strategy, including operational art and tactics.42 The
three editions in 6 years reflected major changes in the
military balance during the period in question. Marshal Sokolovsky, who served as Chief of the General
Staff from 1952 to 1960, had nominally overseen the
authors’ collective that had actually written the volume. In the 1960s, the USSR went from a position of
distinct inferiority in strategic nuclear weapons and
delivery system in comparison with the United States
to one of rough parity.43 At the same time, the Soviet Armed Forces maintained massive conventional
forces deployed in Europe against NATO, and by the
end of the decade, in the Far East against the People’s
Republic of China (PRC). The maintenance of both
nuclear forces and conventional forces imposed upon
the USSR an overwhelming burden beyond the capacity of the Soviet economy to maintain, especially in the
context of a renewed arms race in the 1980s, when in-
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novations in advanced technologies were creating an
RMA.
By the late 1950s under the leadership of Khrushchev, the Soviet Union embarked upon the MilitaryTechnical Revolution in which nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles were seen as the new definition of
national power. Since the Soviet Union was undergoing a demographic crisis because of the low birth rate
during the war, this revolution was supposed to provide security while the ground, air, and naval forces
were cut. The strategic concept for such a military
posture was laid out in the three editions of Marshal
V. D. Sokolovsky’s Military Strategy between 1962 and
1968 and focused upon nuclear warfighting as the
dominant characteristic of modern war.44 The second
edition of Voennaia strategiia, which appeared after the
Cuban Missile Crisis, contained a chilling explanation
of this exposition by then Minister of Defense, Marshall R. Ia. Malinovsky:
. . . we are not supporters of the well-known aphorism —the best defense is attack. It does not fit socialist
states, which are peace-loving by their very nature. We
are motivated by another [aphorism]: the best method
of defense is to warn the enemy of our strength and
readiness to smash him at his very first attempt to
commit an act of aggression.45

During this period, operational art made its reappearance as a relevant part of military art during the
initial period of war. However, it was still nucleararmed missile forces that fundamentally shaped the
nature of future war and expanded the effects that
could be achieved. The deployment of forces under
the conditions of the possible employment of nuclear
weapons demanded greater mobility and protective
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systems against radiation for armor combat systems.
The forces developed for this operational environment
were designed to conduct operations for which there
was no practical experience. Troops could exercise the
doctrine and operations research professionals might
find ways to simulate the conduct of operations, but
there was no way to estimate the actual impact of nuclear weapons on the conduct of operations. Modeling
a NATO-World Trade Organization (WTO) conflict
including the prospect of linkage of conventional, theater-nuclear, and strategic forces posed a profoundly
difficult problem.
In the 1970s Soviet military specialists, led by
Colonel-General Andrian Danilevich, Senior Special
Assistant to the Chief of the Operations Directorate of the Soviet General Staff, began to examine the
possibility of an extended conventional phase of a
NATO-WTO war.46 This was undertaken in the context of strategic nuclear parity and modernized theater nuclear arsenals, particularly the solid-fuel SS-20
intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). By the
end of the decade, instead of estimating that 5-6 days
would pass before the conflict became nuclear, the
Soviets assumed that conventional operations would
last long enough to carry their forces all the way to
France. They believed that the use of nuclear weapons
would be catastrophic and operationally counterproductive.47 They used as their model the Manchurian
Strategic Offensive of 1945. In other words, in case
of a NATO-WTO war, a theater-strategic offensive
would be based upon a modernized concept of deep
operations aimed at encircling and annihilating large
portions of NATO forces and advancing to the Rhine.
Crossing the river, the Soviets believed, would trigger
NATO tactical nuclear use.48
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In 1977, the Soviet Military Encyclopedia carried a
long article on military doctrine, stressing its class nature, the guiding role of the Marxist-Leninist ideology
in its formulation, and the struggle between the socialist and capitalist worlds. The article defined military
doctrine as “a system of views regarding the goals and
nature of possible war,” adopted by a government at
a particular time.49 The article went on to address the
differences between Soviet military doctrine and that
of the states composing the capitalist world, which
were depicted as bent upon promoting imperialist
wars. From 1979 onward, the General Staff also began
to examine the possibility of escalation control after
nuclear use and addressed the idea of intrawar termination of nuclear use. To be decisive, the Soviet conventional strategic operation depended upon quantitative advantages in men and material. As Danilevich
admitted, “the Soviets did not win the Great Patriotic
War because Soviet generalship and fighting skills
were superior to those of the Germans. The Soviet
Armed Forces simply overwhelmed the Germans
with superior numbers of airplanes, men, tanks, and
artillery.”50 In a general conventional offensive, Soviet
forces might commit 40,000 tanks in multiple echelons
and end the war with just 5,000 left. In this context,
strategy had been reduced to annihilation of the opposing force, leaving little room for the political dimension of conflict.
By the early 1980s, the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) was aware of qualitative improvements in
U.S. theater-nuclear forces (ground launched cruise
missiles [GLCMs] and Pershing IIs). It also recognized
emerging enhanced conventional capabilities associated with better command and control and precision strike, by which the United States was seeking
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to counter Soviet quantity with qualitatively superior
conventional weapons systems. What was reemerging was the necessity for reflection (razmyshlenie) upon
strategic choices based on an assessment of the probable war confronting the state and the economic means
available to prepare for and conduct such a war. Chief
of the General Staff Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov cast
an unblinking look at the future evolution of warfare. He began to call attention to an emerging RMA
that affected conventional forces through automated
command and control, informationization, precision,
and weapons based on new physical principles.51 He
championed the professionalization of the military,
greater control by the General Staff over weapons development, and force structure changes, including the
abolition of National Air Defense Forces (PVO Strany).
All of this took place at a time when the Soviet Union
found itself fighting a war of attrition in Afghanistan
against mujahadeen insurgents enjoying external support from the United States and other states through
Pakistan. The Soviet national economy could not sustain the military effort demanded by a new round of
cold war tensions.
To counter NATO’s emerging theater-nuclear and
conventional capabilities, Ogarkov embraced a new
organizational concept proposed by Colonel-General Gareev. It focused on the Operational Maneuver
Group as a countermeasure to NATO’s emerging capabilities. Specially designed, highly maneuverable,
brigades would permit penetration and raiding on an
operational scale, making enemy counterstrikes more
difficult.52 Soviet military literature began to discuss
the impact of reconnaissance strike and reconnaissance fire complexes upon the conduct of operations
in the initial period of war.53
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These trends posed a profound challenge to the
dominant concept regarding the desirability and even
necessity of seizing the strategic initiative and mounting offensive operations early in the war. Orgakov’s
call for an RMA that would lead to a profound transformation of the Soviet military because of the appearance of new weapon systems based on automated
command and control, electronic warfare, and “weapons based on new physical principles, which were
reshaping conventional warfare” was not favorably
received by the Dimitry Ustinov as minister of defense
and representative of the arms industry. In the end, it
was Ustinov who, as a member of the Politburo, won
the struggle; Orgakov was fired, and the dominance
of strategy over operational art, which Orgakov had
sought to endow with some degree of independence,
was reaffirmed.
At this time, Soviet analysts, including those in the
GRU, were trying to assess the implications of a profound shift in the articulated strategy of the United
States. The Reagan administration had begun to speak
of an “early victory in a protracted conventional war.”
This was to be achieved by a shift away from the mass
production of conventional weapon systems, i.e., artillery and tanks, toward “precision-strike systems.”
Masses of precision-strike weapons might destroy
forward-deployed conventional forces and disrupt
their operations in the initial period of war. They thus
called into question the mobilization for mass industrial war, which the Soviet Union built in the 1930s,
perfected during the Great Patriotic War, and sustained throughout the Cold War, even when nuclear
weapons had become the core of both nations’ strategic postures.54
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Perestroika, Glasnost, and Military Doctrine.
With the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev
and the articulation of perestroika and glasnost, the
content of the strategic debate underwent profound
changes in both form and content. The new leadership
began a process of strategic disengagement and domestic reform and made the issues of military strategy
and doctrine topics of open debate for a far broader
portion of the Soviet elite. Disengagement was supposed to lead to breathing space for internal reform
and embraced not only the withdrawal of Soviet forces
from Afghanistan, but sweeping approaches to disarmament and even military disengagement in Eastern
Europe. One of the first indicators of this change came
in May 1987 with the adoption by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization of new “defensive military doctrine,” which was
intended to promote “the development dialogue between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO and confidence
building in Europe.”55 Dialogue in this case became
more complex than Minister of Defense Dmitri Yazov
expected, since it soon took on an internal character
over military strategy and the possibility of a posture
based upon defensive sufficiency.
As part of that debate, General-Major V. V. Larionov and A. A. Kokoshin championed a doctrine of
sufficient defense. They used the Battle of Kursk to
support the possibility of an asymmetric response to
the threat of an opponent’s offensive operations. At
Kursk, the Soviet Stavka had made a conscious choice
to stand on the defense to meet and defeat the German
summer offensive against the Kursk bulge in order to
drain German mechanized forces, set conditions for a
Soviet offensive towards Belgorod-Kharkov, and pre-
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pare for the liberation of the Ukraine to the Dnieper
River.56
Meanwhile, within the Soviet Union, glasnost was
making it possible to address the “blank pages” of Soviet history in a more systemic fashion. This included
discussing the costs of the Soviet victory in the Great
Patriotic War and calling into question the rationality
of offensive warfighting based upon mass industrial
war in the context of nuclear parity and the emerging revolution in conventional capabilities. Such criticism undermined the legitimacy of the Soviet Armed
Forces by putting into question the ideology, the institutions, and the values of the Soviet system. In 1990,
in the aftermath of the “velvet revolutions” in Eastern
Europe, Kokoshin and Larionov published an article
directly addressing the need to transform Soviet military doctrine into one based on defensive sufficiency
and the abandonment of military strategy based upon
offensive operations. The article called for the end of
the ideological content of doctrine.57 Within a year
of its publication, the internal crisis with the Soviet
Union had called into question the very existence of
the Soviet state. In the aftermath of the August putsch,
during which the military refused to support the plotters, the state itself collapsed and the successor republics set about the creation of their own militaries.58
This was the context that gave birth to the search for a
military doctrine for the Russian state. The disconnect
between the Soviet past, the era of perestroika, and the
new situation facing the Russian state with the breakup of the Soviet Union could not have been greater.
The military sought to resist change by clinging to the
past and in this fashion gave prominence to military
doctrine that it should not have had. Russia needed a
national security concept and a national security strategy, but none was forthcoming.
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In August 1993, Sergei Stepashin, a Yeltsin loyalist and the Chair of the Committee on Defense and
Security of the Supreme Soviet, had stated the need
for a national security concept and then had outlined a
number of reasons connected with the unstable political process that had made its legislation impossible. In
the face of the charges and countercharges flung about
over the security situation, Stepashin stated that no
concept could be approved at that time. He painted
a picture of a country in crisis—economic collapse,
grinding poverty, political instability, ethnic challenges to central government authority, and soldiers who
distrusted politicians. The struggle between the President and parliament had assumed the character of a
confrontation that could only be answered by constitutional reform. In the meantime, people and parties
were taking up sides. For Stepashin, the core concern
was the survival of the Russian state and the revival of
Russia’s past power.59 In the absence of a published security concept, the Ministry of Defense moved ahead
with its military doctrine, which Yeltsin approved
on November 2, 1993. The Security Council took no
leading role in its formulation because it lacked any
apparatus to support such oversight. On November
1, 1993, a day before the approval of the military doctrine, Yeltsin issued Decree No. 1807, which created
“the Scientific Council” to support the operations of
the Security Council. The head of the Scientific Council was retired Rear Admiral V. S. Pirumov, who over
the next 5 years would transform the support apparatus of the Security Council into a functioning entity
capable of supporting the articulation of national security policy. 60
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From Grachev’s to Putin’s Military Doctrine,
1993-2000.
The Military Doctrine signed by President Yeltsin in November 1993 was the high point of General
Grachev’s tenure as Minister of Defense. Grachev had
supported Yeltsin during the October crisis, and for
that support the military received the doctrine that it
said it needed. Unfortunately, the crisis revealed the
true nature of the security environment facing the
Russian state. Internal instability and separatism were
much more immediate threats than external foes.
President Yeltsin saw in the events of October 1993 a
vacillation among some of the leadership of the armed
forces and began to put his trust in the troops of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs under the command of
General Anatoly Kulikov, who shortly went from commander of those forces to Minister of Internal Affairs.
Just a year after the crisis between the president and
parliament, the Yeltsin administration plunged Russia
into a civil war, seeking to bring about the subjugation
of Chechnya to Moscow’s rule. Grachev had predicted
an easy victory, but none was forthcoming. Initial military defeats in the Battle of Grozny undermined the
prestige of the Ministry of Defense. Command of Russian forces in Chechnya was given to General Anatoly
Kulikov. In July 1995 Kulikov became Minister of Internal Affairs. The disaster in Chechnya stirred calls
for a new military doctrine. Critics attacked Grachev
as a political actor without military qualifications,
questioned the role of the General Staff in planning
operations for the war and focused on the fact that
while the doctrine focused on the internal use of the
armed forces, it had not prepared them to deal with
the conflict they then faced and was less than worth-
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less. “An army like the one we have today is incapable
of operating successfully in present-day wars.”61
During the same year, General Makhmut Gareev
published a book on the changing character of armed
conflict. Gareev began by assessing the geopolitical
dominance of the United States in the post-Cold War
world. He did not see any great prospect of nuclear
war and considered the risk of general war between
major powers as quite reduced, but he did see the likelihood of local conflicts and regional wars that would
draw in other powers. The greatest risk with nuclear
weapons was not their use by states against other
states but “unsanctioned use or their employment as
terrorist provocations. . . . At present, and in the long
term, local wars and conflicts capable of growing into
large-scale military confrontations are becoming more
widespread and dangerous.”62 Considering the instability in the near abroad, Gareev spoke of the risks of
Russia being drawn into a conflict as a result of U.S.
and NATO intervention in the region. He was particularly concerned about the possibility of subversion
and ideological struggle as aspects of such intervention. Moreover, he did not see it as practical for Russia
to join the NATO alliance, given Russia’s size, nuclear
arsenal, and Eurasian dimensions. It was in Russia’s
interests to avoid conflict with NATO, but he warned
that the Alliance’s expansion to the east would bring
its own complications and contradictions, weakening
the Alliance over time while increasing risk of conflict
with Russia. Gareev addressed the changing nature of
conventional war brought about by precision-strike
systems that have made possible the destruction of
large formations throughout their depth of deployment, but the same means in the hands of the opponent could impose similar losses and demand rapid

91

resupply to sustain what would become a protracted
conflict. 63 This volume was the first publication of
the newly organized Academy of Military Sciences, a
private organization composed of retired senior officers and civilian specialists, of whom Gareev was the
President.
By March 1996, calls for the revision of Russia’s
military doctrine were coming from more than those
dissatisfied with the military’s performance in Chechnya. General-Lieutenant Reznichenko, Russian Army
(Retired) pointed to two key weaknesses in the existing document in light of current developments: the absence of attention to the problem of general war and the
failure to identify a probable opponent. Reznichenko
pointed to U.S. defense spending, opposition to a Russian sphere of influence in the near abroad, and U.S.
support for expansion of NATO to the east as signs
that the United States was that probable opponent.64
The article’s appearance in Voennaia mysl’, the chief
organ of the General Staff, gives credence to the idea
that such views had a significant following among senior military intellectuals. Given the continuing crisis
in Chechnya, calls for reform of military doctrine did
not receive much support by President Yeltsin as he
sought re-election on the basis of his partnership with
the West.
Grachev survived as Minister of Defense until the
summer of 1996, when retired General Aleksandr
Lebed demanded his replacement as part of a deal
to support Yeltsin’s re-election in the run-off election. On June 18, 1996, he was removed as Minister of
Defense. Yeltsin appointed Lebed as Secretary of the
Security Council and a month later on Lebed’s recommendation named General Igor Rodionov, the Director of the Academy of the General Staff, as Minister
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of Defense. By refusing to reinforce Russian troops in
Grozny when that city was under Chechen attack, the
Lebed-Rodionov team set the stage for the armistice
that ended the first Chechen War and set in motion a
political struggle between Lebed and Kulikov, which
ended with the removal of Lebed from the post of Secretary of the Security Council that autumn. Lebed’s
fall came as a result of his attempt to transform the
Security Council from a consultative arm of executive authority into another power ministry, with the
creation of its own crime-fighting legion under his
command. The context of that attempt was the sharp
decline in Yeltsin’ health between the first and runoff presidential elections in the summer of 1996 and
the ensuing power struggle, during which Lebed was
perceived as a dangerous outsider.65
Rodionov survived longer in office, but found his
efforts at military reform hamstrung. He was removed
as Minister of Defense in May 1997. For the Yeltsin administration, first priority was reducing the cost of the
military to the Russian state and it used military reform as a justification to reduce defense spending. To
counterbalance Lebed in the Security Council, Yeltsin
had created the Defense Council and appointed Yuri
Baturin, a civilian, as secretary. Charged with the coordination of the activities of the Army, Internal Troops,
and Border Guards, the Defense Council became a
major force in defining Russian military reform. With
Lebed’s removal, Rodionov found himself in a struggle with the Defense Council. Rodionov has described
his own frustrations as Minister of Defense when he
sought to reform the armed forces and carry out their
modernization. Yeltsin found the civilian leadership
willing to fund the troops under other ministries
while soldiers, sailors, and airmen went without pay
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for months and were reduce to begging on the streets.
The position of the General Staff was reduced from
being the General Staff of the Armed Forces to that of
the General Staff of the Army and Navy.66 His opponents accused Rodionov of trying to keep the Russian
armed forces Soviet, while he saw in his civilian opponents the desire to wreck everything Soviet without paying any attention to the need for working out
any concept of reform beyond reductions in numbers
and costs. During this period of struggle over military
reform, Baturin came forward with a proposal for a
“provisional military doctrine” in response to increasing external instability and internal problems associated with the Caucasus and Central Asia. He cited the
growing likelihood of NATO’s expansion to the east.
In defending his proposal, Baturin gave a third reason
for a new military doctrine:
. . . the socio-economic situation deteriorated, forcing
us to change the structure of our power ministries and
review their qualitative parameters. We had to reinforce interior forces, the border guards and the forces
of the Ministry for Emergency Situations. Combat
readiness and ability of the Armed Force dwindled
owing to insufficient financing.67

Baturin made reference to both the political and
military-technical dimensions of the proposed doctrine but did not mention any role for the General Staff
in its formulations. In this circumstance, Rodionov
doubted that without the leadership of the General
Staff to work out and approve concepts any sort of
military doctrine could be articulated or military reform undertaken at the state level. Rodionov left no
doubt that the primary problem here was Yeltsin as
commander-in-chief because he set policy goals with94

out reference to expert advice and seemed unconcerned with finding the means to achieve them and
at what cost. As an example, Rodionov cites Yeltsin’s
decree to have the Army based completely on contract
service by the year 2000.68 No provisional military
doctrine was forthcoming during Rodionov’s tenure.
When one was forthcoming, the Defense Council no
longer existed and the new doctrine was the product
of the Security Council, then under the leadership of
Vladimir Putin.
By 1997 Yeltsin’s Russia appeared to be moving
toward stability. The national economy finally appeared to have stopped shrinking. The Caucasus
were in a state of uneasy peace, and Russia seemed
to have worked out an understanding with NATO
via the NATO-Russia Charter. In the spring of 1997,
Yeltsin charged the Security Council with overseeing
the drafting of a national security concept for Russia.
Ivan Rybkin, the Secretary of the Security Council, described this document as the ideological foundation of
state construction and policy, which would provide
guidance to state policy in the areas of the military,
economy, ecology, technology, energy, and finance.69
In late December 1997, President Yeltsin approved
the Russian National Security Concept.70 This Concept,
when published, stressed economic instability as the
primary threat to Russia and spoke of international
issues primarily in terms of Russia’s place in a multipolar world. Internal sources of instability, i.e., ethnic
and religious contradictions, were seen as threats that
could lead to challenges to Russia’s territorial integrity, but no state or alliance was depicted as a probable opponent.71 This benign view of the international
environment did not endure.
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The economic crisis of August 1998 undermined
Russia’s economic position in the world and brought
new hardships to a population that had endured a decade of promises without results. The push for a new
military doctrine came in 1999 with the crisis of Russian foreign policy when NATO moved against Yugoslavia because of its repression in Kosovo. Yeltsin
and his Minister of Defense, Marshal Igor Sergeev,
the former commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces,
had assumed that Russia’s nuclear arsenal would give
Russia sufficient political leverage to obtain a hearing
for its interests in the Balkans. NATO embarked on
air operations on the assumption that a few days of
bombing would lead Yugoslavia into negotiations,
much like the process that had ended the conflict in
Bosnia, but this time President Milosevic did not cave
in, and the bombing went on. The impact on Russian relations with NATO was catastrophic. In Russia, President Yeltsin faced an unsuccessful attempt
at impeachment by the State Duma, the government
of Evegeny Primakov fell, and public opinion turned
against NATO. In April, NATO celebrated its 50th
anniversary by announcing the admission of Poland,
the Czech Republic, and Hungary. By the spring of
1999, Moscow was full of rumors about a new conflict
over Chechnya, and some wondered whether NATO
would seek to intervene there to secure Chechnya’s
independence. This was the context in which the discussion of a new military doctrine began—with the
march of 200 Russian paratroopers from their deployment as part of NATO’s Implementation Force
(IFOR) in Bosnia to Pristina, Kosovo—as a symbolic
act to ensure Russia was treated as one of the occupying powers in postwar Kosovo. Politically, the move
also expressed Moscow’s continuing support for the

96

maintenance of the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.
It came as NATO forces were about to begin their deployment into Kosovo behind the retreating Yugoslav
Army on June 12.
The General Staff planned the contingency operation in secret and only presented the plan to Yeltsin for
his approval as it was to be executed. Senior leaders
in the Government, Ministry of Defense, and Foreign
Ministry were simply not informed until after the plan
was approved by Yeltsin. General Anatoly Kvashnin,
who had assumed the post of Chief of the General Staff
after General Viktor Samsonov was fired along with
Minister Rodionov, presented the plan to Yeltsin for
his approval. The planning was conducted by the Main
Operations Director of the General Staff led by Colonel-General Yuri Baluevsky.72 The driver in the plan
had been the failure of talks between Strobe Talbot,
President Clinton’s intermediary, and Vladimir Putin
as Secretary of the Security Council over the Russian
zone of operations as part of the United Nations (UN)
peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. The June 11 meeting
failed to lead to an agreement, which put the Pristina
demarche into action.73 When rumors swept Moscow
and other capitals about a military coup against Yeltsin, it was Vladimir Putin who spoke to the public
about the President’s role in approving the operation.
“The Supreme Commander-in-Chief knew about everything that was planned and approved, let’s say, the
strategic plan of the developments. . . .”74 While critics
accused the military planners of improvisation and
failure to take into account the political and military
moves that would follow the deployment, public response to the action was overwhelmingly positive. It
was labeled ““the first appearance for many years of
Russia’s political will.”75 Putin had assumed a leading
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role in Russian defense and foreign policy, advising
President Yeltsin on the crisis in Kosovo following
the unilateral deployment of Russian paratroopers
and the dispute with NATO over the Russian zone of
peacekeeping operations there.76
A second such demonstration of military-political
will came only 10 days later. On June 21, the Ministry
of Defense announced Russia’s first, large-scale, postCold War exercise, Zapad 99. The scenario for that
exercise involved an attack on Belarus from the West,
Russian military intervention to protect its ally, and a
failure of conventional forces to stop the aggression,
leading to the use of nuclear weapons to “de-escalate”
the conflict. At the conclusion of the exercise, Marshall
Sergeev put the exercise in the context of events in Yugoslavia, saying that Russian forces were only there as
peacekeepers and that Russia’s objective was to secure
the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. Speaking about
Zapad 99, he invoked the deterrent function of the
Russian Armed Forces.
I would like to address those who wear officer’s insignia today, those who wore them yesterday, and those
will wear them tomorrow. Today the army and navy
occupy one of the most important places in the fate of
Russia. And in a changing world we need to have a
strong and combat-ready Armed Forces, which do not
frighten our neighbors, but serve as a warning to hot
heads. Those who seek to decide matters by taking up
arms against our country will lose.77

Over the next 8 months, Russia’s political and
strategic environment underwent significant changes,
which would profoundly affect Russia’s military doctrine. Vladimir Putin, the former KGB officer of the
external service from Leningrad, went from Chief
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of the FSB in July 1998 and Secretary of the Security
Council in March 1999, to Prime Minister, and then
President. Yeltsin’s trust in Putin was already evident
when in the midst of a growing political crisis, the
President appointed him to two positions combining
administrative supervision of Russian security policy
with control of a power ministry, the FSB. In these
two positions, Putin assumed a leading role in both
foreign and domestic policy during the political crisis
of May 1999, when Yeltsin faced the prospect of impeachment.78 Putin became the spokesman within the
Yeltsin administration for calls to respond forcefully
to NATO’s operations in Yugoslavia, which he labeled
not only a tragedy but also an explicit attempt to overturn the postwar order in Europe, which demanded
an adequate reaction from Russia, including the reformulation of its national security concept.79
With the increasing tensions in the Caucasus in the
summer of 1999, discussions of issues relating to military doctrine became more active. The NATO air campaign over Yugoslavia had raised military-technical
issues about the role of air power and precision strikes.
Even as NATO began the air campaign in late March
1999, Russian experts were analyzing the conduct of
the air war as a new example of what Vladimir Slipchenko had labeled “wars of the 6th generation,” by
which he meant wars involving precision strike systems, electronic warfare, and information warfare as
forms of applied coercion. Slipchenko stated that the
application of these new means would bring decisive
results without the deployment of large ground forces
in combat. He stated that these new means had made
conventional forces from the industrial age into target sets if they sought to mass. This “no-contact war”
was at the heart of U.S. military development. He also
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declared that nuclear weapons could deter the use of
nuclear weapons but not win a modern war. Russia
had to seek to answer these advanced conventional capabilities or find itself militarily vulnerable.80 Over the
next decade, Slipchenko’s concept of 6th-generation
warfare would be an integral part of all discussions
of future war and would have an impact upon other
Russian theorists of future war. In 2003, Admiral Ivan
M. Kapitanets used it to discuss naval developments
in the 21st century. A former Deputy Commander of
the Soviet Navy, Kapitanets in retirement joined the
Academy of Military Sciences.81
Without advanced precision weapons systems,
and faced with the prospect of conflict within its own
borders and in the near abroad, Russia’s national security elite sought to bring nuclear weapons into the
equation of such local wars to ensure that no intervening power could achieve strategic outcomes in a local
war against Russia. With the outbreak of the Second
Chechen War, Putin emerged as the most prominent
figure in the government, replacing Sergei Stepashin
as Prime Minister in August. At that time Yeltsin also
announced that he wished to see Putin as his successor to the Presidency. Under his direction, Russian
policy moved from trying to contain the conflict to
the repression of all Chechen demands for independence. This policy won him support from the nation’s
military leadership, many of whom had been humiliated by the outcome of the First Chechen War, which
they viewed as a defeat imposed upon the military by
weak civilian leaders. In October 1999, Putin chaired
the meeting of the Security Council, which addressed
changes in the National Security Doctrine to reflect
the military developments in the Caucasus. Voicing his support for the newly-organized Unity Party,
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Putin watched its triumph in December’s elections
to the Duma. Later in December, Yeltsin resigned as
President and appointed Putin as Acting President,
the post Putin held until elected President in March
2000. In the meantime, Putin had overseen the articulation of a new National Security Concept, which he
approved. The new National Security Concept, which
reflected the ongoing war in Chechnya, was to serve
as the basis for both military transformation and the
articulation of a new military doctrine in the immediate future.82 The new National Security Concept did
speak of external threats and placed NATO expansion
among them. On nuclear weapons, it spoke of their
deterrence function but defined it as the capability “to
prevent aggression on any scale and nuclear or otherwise, against Russia and its allies” by imposing upon
the aggressor “the desired extent of damage.”83
The Putin-Ivanov Military Doctrine of 2000.
A new military doctrine followed shortly thereafter. It appeared that under Putin the Security Council,
which he had led, would assume a more active role
in coordinating the formulation of Russia’s national
security concept and its military doctrine. In November 1999, as Prime Minister, Putin had secured the appointment of Sergei Ivanov as Secretary of the Security
Council. Ivanov, another KGB operative from Leningrad, had served as Putin’s deputy at the FSB. Ivanov's
relationship with Putin was close and enhanced the
role of the Security Council during his tenure in 1999
to 2001, when Putin appointed him Defense Minister.
The new military doctrine was signed by President
Putin on April 21. The document reflected the general
principles contained in the recently published nation-
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al security concept, but described it as a “document
of the transition period, a period of the development
of democratic statehood and a multiform economy, a
period of the reform of the military organization of the
state and a dynamic transformation of the system of
international relations.”84
However, in its discussion of the military-political
environment, the military doctrine gave much greater
attention to the threat posed by states having the capacity to engage in rapid, decisive no-contact operations, and states having as a goal the development of
political and military means to counter such threats.
The possibility of achieving military-political goals
through indirect, non-close-quarter operations predetermines the particular danger of modern wars and
armed conflicts for peoples and states and for preserving international stability and peace, and makes it vitally necessary to take exhaustive measures to prevent
them and to achieve a peaceful settlement of differences at early stages of their emergence and development.85

The new military doctrine addressed both external
and internal threats and called attention to the interconnections of the two. At a time of renewed conflict
in Chechnya, Russian leaders were concerned about
the extent to which internal instability would invite
external intervention and struggled with a formulation that would pay due attention to indirect means
of subversion. It stressed the importance of nuclear
deterrence to Russian national security and reformulated Russia’s stance on the use of nuclear weapons
to include the use of nuclear weapons in response to
“large-scale aggression with the use of conventional
weapons in situations critical for the national security
of the Russian Federation.”86
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The document reflected the maturation of Russia’s
national security apparatus, including the cooperation between the Ministry of Defense and the Security
Council in its formulation. The continuing stress upon
nuclear forces was clearly a product of the leadership
exerted by Marshall Sergeev as Minister of Defense.
Commenting on the formulation of the new military
Doctrine, General-Major Vladimir Dvorkin, one of the
authors of the section dealing with nuclear weapons,
underscored the importance of Marshal Sergeev’s input and leadership: “One can hardly overstate the role
Defense Minister Igor Sergeev played in elaboration
of the principal items of the new military doctrine.”
Dvorkin credited him with guiding the interagency
commission that had worked out the statement on
nuclear policy.87 At the same time, the growing role of
veterans of the security services within Putin’s emerging administration could be seen in shaping Russian
policy. One of major themes of the dawning Putin
era would be the assertion of the need to recentralize
state power in Russia to ensure domestic stability and
national security. The new military doctrine directly
addressed this by calling for “a combination of a strict
centralized command of the military organization of
the state with civilian control of its operation.”88 The
disruptive competition among Russia’s varied security services would no longer be tolerated. The Security Council with Putin’s support would serve as the
agency of administrative coordination for a strong
presidency. A year later, Aleksei Baier could assert
that Putin had put his stamp on Russian foreign and
security policy by putting an end to the “era of the
Prince and Pauper,” which had framed late Soviet and
Russian policy towards the United States. Russia was
and would be a great power with its own interests and
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allies, even if Washington disagreed. This was the very
heart of the Putin Doctrine.89 Following its publication,
General-Major A. F. Klimenko once again provided
the lead article on the new military doctrine for Voennaia mysl’.90 His task was to explain the significance of
the new doctrine to the Russian senior military leadership and to discuss what impact it would have on
Russian defense and security policy. His first point
was to stress the continuity involved in the new doctrine since it addressed the basic questions associated
with the military aspects of national security: interests
and threats. The chief difference in the document was
that it was designed to deal with a transition period
involving the evolution of Russia as an actor within a
changing international security system moving from
unipolarity toward multipolarity, an internal situation that included a shaky economy, weak national
government facing on-going ethnic strife, separatism,
and terrorism. Klimenko still pictured the global security situation dominated by the reductions in both
nuclear and conventional arms that came with the end
of the Cold War. The Putin administration was only
just beginning the process of reasserting Russia’s sovereignty within and without the country. Klimenko
defined Russia’s national interests as associated with
those goals and included in the list of vital national
interests those things that would ensure a climate favorable for development by maintaining Russia’s:
. . . sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of the Russian Federation; a peaceful environment
for a stable political, economic, and intellectual and
spiritual development of the country and society;
peace and stability in regions bordering Russia; freedom of operation in the world’s oceans and in space
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and free access to international economic zones and
communications that are critical to Russia; stability of
the constitutional system, legality, law and order, and
public security; protection of Russian citizens in zones
of armed conflicts and their protection in other situations arising from armed violence, posing a threat to
their lives.91

The challenge was to find a military doctrine in a
transition period when the threat environment proved
particularly dynamic. Klimenko listed four functions
of military doctrine: organizational to guide the development of military theory and practice; normative
as guidance for defense officials in making policy, informational for domestic and international audiences,
and reflexive as a form of warning to and influence
upon those considering the use of violence against
Russia.92
The 1990s had demonstrated that reflexive control was no longer a matter of just nuclear arsenals.
Changes in conventional forces associated with command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaisance (C4ISR) and
precision-strike capabilities had brought about the
“informationization” of warfare. Klimenko specifically addressed the challenge posed by the information
age for military research and development.
Present day conditions are such that the capabilities
of even the most sophisticated, state of the art weapon
systems can be fully tapped only when they are integrated into combat systems with highly developed
functional characteristics: intellect, organization, observation and surveillance, controllability, and concealment in the process of combat employment.93
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It remained to be seen if Russian defense industry
and military institutions had the capacity to meet the
challenge posed by such system of systems warfare.
Although a document of the transition period, the
military doctrine of 2000 officially survived Putin’s
tenure as President and was not subject to revision
until 2009. This was a remarkable achievement, given
the tectonic shifts in the international system over the
ensuing decade. Indeed, it could be argued that it survived for so long precisely because the Russian elite
could not decide when the dominant trends in the
international system were emerging or what threats
or promises the emerging system had for Russia. On
the one hand, renewed international concern over the
threat posed by global terrorism after September 11,
2001 (9/11) temporarily held out the hope that Russia might be able to join a de facto coalition of major
powers committed to a common struggle and receive
international legitimacy while still enjoying sufficient
autonomy to define its own terrorist threats and courses of action. That hope, which was part of the initial
response to U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, quickly vanished when the Bush administration pushed
armed intervention against Saddam Hussein’s regime
in Iraq on the grounds of the threat posed by weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) and in the absence of a
UN Security Council vote specifically authorizing an
ad hoc coalition’s armed intervention. That Germany
and France did not support the intervention was taken as further proof of the trend toward multipolarity,
even as the willingness to act in Washington was seen
as one of the proofs of unipolarity. In all of this, the
United States appeared to be the chief architect of a
global security system in crisis. If Russia’s economic
recovery fueled by higher energy prices was seen as
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confirmation of Russia’s great power status, then the
so-called “color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine,
which brought to power popular figures following
anti-Russian policies and seeking rapid membership
in NATO, led Moscow to the conclusion that its own
periphery in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia was in play. Here, the United States would
be following a particularly anti-Russian policy. There
were repeated discussions of rewriting Russia’s military doctrine during the period. They coincided with
internal and external events that forced a re-examination of the international security environment. It is
safe to say that not until August 2008 was Russia sure
that the basic trend lines were not leading to a possible
confrontation with a U.S.-led NATO.
The De Facto Doctrine of 2003.
Over the next decade, there was no official pronouncement of a new military doctrine. However,
there was at least one official document that embraced
all the elements that General-Major Klimenko had
enumerated as the functions of military doctrine. In
the early fall of 2003, President Putin issued an order
to the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff regarding certain questions that were to be addressed
relating to the “current tasks before the Armed Forces.”94 Ivanov responded to the order by drafting a general statement that addressed a number of issues associated with military doctrine but in the context of a
pronouncement from the Ministry on “Current Tasks
of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” which was presented on October 2,
2003.95 The response in its published form was de facto
military doctrine without the label. Indeed, in a criti-
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cal assessment of its content, Aleskandr Kramchikhin
labeled it a “pre-election doctrine” for the upcoming
presidential elections in 2004.96 At the same time, the
document was also an interim assessment of the impact of the U.S. Iraq campaign of March-April 2003 on
the further development of military art and its impact
upon the tasks facing the Russian Armed Forces. In
reviewing the document, President Putin saw it as the
basis for reasserting the General Staff’s leadership role
in military transformation.
The document proclaimed that Russia found itself in a new era of its own historic development. It
described the international security environment as
“shaped by the sharpest socio-economic conflicts and
political contradictions.” The clarity of the bipolar era
of the Cold War had given way to a much more complex environment where “political, financial-economic, ethno-national, demographic, and other questions”
impacted strategic stability. The document further
spoke in terms of geopolitical constants set by Russia’s engagement with the Euro-Atlantic world to its
west, the Islamic world to its south, and the Asia-Pacific world to its east. In this context, Russia’s Armed
Forces must have sufficient power to deal with the
challenges posed on each of these axes.97
To this end, the report addressed the current situation confronting the armed forces. The Minister of Defense declared that those forces had entered a new era
of development marked by the end of military reform,
which had been completed. These reforms included:
establishment of a legal basis for the armed forces
that established civilian control over them; creation
of a more open budget process; establishment of the
basic service structure of the forces to oversee the reduction in the size of the force; the carrying out of the
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adaptation of Russia’s military policy to new global
realities; the instituting of a mixed system of contract
and conscript manning of the force; establishment of
the preconditions for the deployment of a modern
system of social support for service members; formation of a new system of cooperation with other force
structures of Russia in which the armed forces of the
Russian Federation is the central part of the military
organization of Russia; construction of a new system
of military-political obligations of Russia with its allies on the basis of international law; and the setting
up of partnership relations with the United States
and NATO at the military level.98 Critics were quick
to question this optimistic portrayal of Russian military reform. Aleksandr Golts, the well-known defense
correspondent, published his own scathing analysis
of military reform as a failure because it had failed to
break the hold of Soviet experience and attitudes on
the Armed Forces. Golts spoke of 11 lost years.99
The success of military reform aside, Ivanov’s
report laid out a comprehensive vision of the future
transformation of the armed forces. The report addressed Russia in the system of military-political
relations in the world, which examined (1) Russia’s
relations with the UN and the UN Security Council,
(2) the CIS and the Organization of the Treaty of Collective Security States, (3) NATO and the EU, (4) the
strategic partnership of Russia and the United States,
and (5) the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
and analyzed those relations as they would impact the
Armed Forces.100
The document then addressed the assessment of
the threat to Russia, which it saw as mitigated to some
degree by the transparency evident in the foreign policy and defense planning of the major states. For Rus-
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sia, the primary security focus was upon the situation
in the CIS and among those states bordering the CIS.
The document addressed the possibilities of technical
advances creating a new generation of nuclear weapons that would optimize their specific effects while reducing their overall destruction. The Russian experts
pointed to the increase in local wars and the interest of
regional powers on relying upon nuclear weapons for
“guaranteed deterrence” against regional opponents.
“This lowering of the threshold for the employment
of nuclear weapons will demand the restructure of its
system of command and control of troops and its approaches to deterrence of threats of various levels.”101
Nuclear weapons alone will not deter the attack of a
power armed with advanced conventional weapons.
In that case, deterrence “will prove effective ONLY
when the deterring power will possess well-armed,
combat ready, conventional forces.”102
Looking at the trends affecting the evolution of
combat in the late 20th century and the early 21st
century, i.e., from the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 to
the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the paper drew a set of
conclusions regarding the further evolution of warfare over the next 3 decades of the 21st century or to
2030. That era had witnessed the end of industrial and
mechanized warfare and the dawning of information
warfare. This will include the further development of
weapons based on artificial intelligence and the appearance of more smart weapons, with a shift from
maneuvering fires to maneuvering effects and greater
depth of precision fires and strikes. Information attack
and defense will dominate combat. Logistics will have
to be more flexible and be focused on the demands of
combat units. Success in military operations will go to
the side that wins the struggle for the strategic initia-
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tive. Precision strikes will not be confined to just military objects and troops but will include “the country’s
economy, its entire infrastructure, civilian population,
and territory.”103 The paper stressed the informationization of warfare as profoundly shaping future conflicts with greater emphasis upon aero-space support
to deep precision strikes; command, control, communications, and reconnaissance; and target identification. Of primary importance will be the development
of redundant means of command and control and the
creation of a network of well-protected fusion centers
for the collection and analysis of intelligence from all
branches and services.104
On the basis of contemporary conflicts, the paper
stressed the political ends in defining the means of
conducting war. Operations and tactical combat will
be enablers to achieve the political end without the
complete annihilation of the opposing force. A decisive form of warfare to achieve limited political objectives without the annihilation of the opposing military
was described. The paper did not exclude the possibility that initial operations would not lead to decision
and spoke of the need to maintain a capacity to mobilize combat-ready reserves.105
The authors stressed nine major changes in operational art that would define future conflicts. These included:
1. Transformation of the concept of massing forces
and means to attain effects;
2. Changes in the correlation of strategy, operational art, and tactics, where each factor retained its
importance in achieving the defeat of the enemy;
3. The basic tasks for the destruction and defeat
of the enemy will be achieved not by the struggle of
massed infantry and tanks, but by long-range fire destruction;
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4. The drawing closer of the concepts of offense and
defense with the offensive in these conflicts involving
the grouping of fire and radio-electronic strikes;
5. Tactical combat will be dominated by deep
strikes of precision systems, with emphasis upon defensive protection from such strikes;
6. Taking out enemy command and control of the
economy and infrastructure, including communication and electronic warfare systems, will be the highest priority;
7. The decisive role of deception in air defense systems against cruise missiles and stealth aircraft with
air defense organized as strategic, point defense, and
air defense of ground forces;
8. Enemy preparing to attack will engage in an integrated set of measures to conceal his preparations
and intentions; and,
9. The reality of precision strikes and the struggle
for command of the air will be dominant features of
combat, but there will still be a role for ground forces
with no-contact warfare as a model for future evolution and beyond current capabilities—advanced states
may chose to use the ground forces of allies while
providing deep strike and electronic warfare capabilities.106
On the basis of these developments, the paper presented an expanded list of current tasks for the Russian Armed Forces organized around four basic functions: (1) deterrence of military and military political
threats to Russia’s security or interests; (2) protecting
the economic and political interests of Russia; (3) conducting military operations in peacetime; and (4) the
conduct of combat operations. The paper examined
a wide range of tasks supporting these functions in
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the context of armed conflicts, local wars, regional
wars, and general war. It paid special attention to the
development of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces and
addressed the development of conventional forces;
weapons research and development; troop training;
officer education; force manning, including the contract system and the development of force structure;
improvement in military morale by providing service
personnel with adequate housing; and the organization of military-patriotic education among the civilian
population. The discussion was both comprehensive
and detailed.107 Ivanov later described the paper as “a
concept for the further development of the national
armed forces.”108 The impression that the paper left
on the reader was one of Russia’s being involved
in a race to transform its military before the pace of
change simply doomed the Russian Armed Forces to a
qualitative inferiority. The tasks were ambitious, and
it remained to be seen whether the military and the
military-industrial complex could fulfill them.
Public responses to the de facto military doctrine
were immediate and varied. With 2 days of the appearance of the report, Vitaly Denisov invoked President Putin’s words, which called the report a matter of
“all-national tasks” of importance not just to military
specialists, but to the entire nation. Taken together,
the tasks embraced the military modernization of the
Russian Armed Forces, which was the foundation of
Russia’s national security. Improved fiscal conditions
were making possible greater investment in defense.109
N. Petrov followed this line, stating that the new doctrine was the “foundation of security” and repeating
President Putin’s claim that military reform was over
and that an era of military transformation had begun.
Petrov noted the lack of attention to the struggle against
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terrorism but put this to the fact that counterterrorism
was the primary business of the special services and
not the Ministry of Defense.110 Aleksandr Khramchkin was much more skeptical about the doctrine. He
saw no real successes in military reform, which had
left Russia with a smaller and under-funded version
of the Soviet Army. The document was to him both
“strange” and “ambivalent,” and reflected more the
desires of President Putin than reality. The doctrine
posited an end of military reform and a speedy transformation to an armed force that would reflect the
ambitions of a superpower. “So it appears that all is
now normal and we can with a confident step march
to a bright military future . . .when the Russian Armed
Forces can without any problems fight two local wars,
simultaneously defeat an aero-space attack, and even
launch preventive strikes against any point on the
globe.”111 This bright picture had more in common
with the electoral manifesto of a mediocre politician,
which proclaims that we are for everything good and
against anything bad. False assumptions about current conditions were a poor basis for good doctrine.
Oleg Odnokolenko saw the document as an attempt
by the Ministry of Defense to short circuit the national
security process by getting a military doctrine out before there was any official statement of a new national
security concept or foreign policy concept. Odnokolenko took the central point of Ivanov’s report to be
the emphasis upon preventive strikes against threats
to Russian national security. Asking Andrei Kokoshin, the former First Deputy Minister of Defense,
to comment on the naked declaration of the right to
preventive strikes without reference to international
sanctions for such strikes, Odnokolenko drew out this
comment: “From that point of view . . . this is a very
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strange document.”112 Kokoshin complained about the
over-emphasis upon the role of the armed forces in
national security policy, but found much of the discussion of the trends affecting military art to be of
value. He characterized the document not as military
doctrine, but a set of statements by the Ministry of
Defense and General Staff that would be the subject
of further debate. This position led Odnokolenko to
see the document as an exercise in bureaucratic firststrike in order to make certain that the final variant of
military doctrine would reflect those values and judgments. He characterized the document as “the science
of the strike (nauka udariat’), and a play on words attributed to Marshal Aleksandr Suvorov: “the science
of victory” (nauka pobezhdat’). In this case, however,
the first strike seems to have preempted any further
official discussion of military doctrine for the rest of
President Putin’s tenure.113
Over the next 6 years, there were discussions
about the need for new military doctrine, but no final draft doctrine appeared until after the 2008 presidential election. External events raised new anxieties
in Moscow’s official circles. The color revolutions in
Ukraine and Georgia brought to power regimes that
were openly anti-Russian and pushing hard to join
NATO. The United States, as part of its effort to counter the possible threats posed by nuclear weapons in
the hands of rogue states, was moving forward with
the development of a missile defense infrastructure in
Eastern Europe. Relations between Washington and
Moscow became increasingly hostile as Russia’s concerns over a permanent U.S. and NATO presence in
Afghanistan raised concerns over Russian interests in
Central Asia. All of these issues contributed to calls
for a new military doctrine. Military specialists might
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affirm the importance of military doctrine as the “path
to victory,” critique the “Ivanov Doctrine” as a good
report and bad doctrine, call for a new doctrine reflecting a system of priorities based on the theory and
praxis of “military security,” and even provide a model doctrine as worked out by the faculty of the Frunze
Military Academy.114 There were public debates about
the nature of future war highlighting the continuing
dispute over the nature of 6th generation warfare and
the applicability of no-contact warfare at this stage of
the revolution in military affairs.115 Specialists continued to discuss what a new military doctrine should
contain on the basis of military-political and military
technical changes in the world.
Baluevsky and the Ghost-Writing of the Putin
Doctrine.
In 2004, President Putin removed Chief of the General Staff General Anatoly Kvashnin after the general
had clashed openly and frequently with Minister of
Defense Ivanov. He was replaced by Colonel-General
Yurii Baluevsky, the former Chief of the Operations
Directorate of the General Staff. Over the next 2 years,
Baluevsky established himself as a powerful advocate
for the position of the General Staff in making Russian
defense and security policy. In June 2005, he assumed
the post of Chief of Staff for the Collective Security
Organization, thus re-establishing a Soviet tradition
of the Chief of the General Staff also serving as chief
of staff in alliance organizations. That same month
at a session of the Security Council, President Putin
ordered work to begin on formulating a new draft
military doctrine.116 The General Staff and the Academy of Military Sciences assigned working groups to
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develop parts of the proposed document. In September 2006, the press reported that secret work was underway in the Ministry of Defense on a new military
doctrine, which would be forwarded to the President
for his consideration by early October. One article reported that the secret draft included key provisions
that would authorize Russian military intervention
in conflicts with neighboring states, close its eyes to
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and identify as
probable enemies “the US, NATO, and terrorists.”117
The Ministry of Defense quickly denied that any such
work was under way, and Minister of Defense Sergei
Ivanov denied that he had received any such order to
work on a new military doctrine. Press speculation focused on a presidential directive to the General Staff
that had by-passed his official boss, the Minister of
Defense.118 Public commentary by civilian defense experts on the possibility of a new military doctrine was
interesting because it universally asserted that there
had been no revision of doctrine since 2000, thereby
ignoring the de facto doctrine of 2003. No draft military
doctrine appeared in October.
Three months later, well-known defense analyst
and commentator Viktor Miasnikov called attention
to a conference being organized by the Academy of
Military Sciences and the Ministry of Defense for midJanuary 2007 on the topic, “The Structure and Content
of the new Military Doctrine.” Miasnikov recalled the
Defense Ministry’s denials of press reports that work
was going forward on a new military doctrine. Four
months later, the MOD was cosponsoring a conference on just that topic. Miasnikov reported that one of
the major reports would be delivered by a senor GRU
officer of the General Staff on the topic, “Doctrinal
Views of NATO on the Nature of Wars and the Main-
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tenance of Security.” From this, he concluded that as
in the past, so in the future, NATO and the United
States were assumed to be the primary potential enemies. Miasnikov identified the General Staff as the
primary driver in the working out of the new military
doctrine and identified Colonel-General Aleksandr
Rushkin, the Chief of the Operations Directorate of
the General Staff, as the party tasked with addressing Russian force structure and the employment of
the Armed Forces. The meeting would also include
a report on the “Role and Place of Strategic Nuclear
forces in Military Doctrine,” confirming the continued
importance of these forces as not only the primary instrument of deterrence but also the very foundation
of Russian military power. Reviewing the other major
topics, Miasnikov found terrorism, a serious national
concern after the massacre at Beslan, given lower priority than economic security, which he took to mean
Russia’s energy diplomacy as practiced by President
Putin. He concluded that, once again, the military was
driving policy when logically policy should dictate
defense posture, and he characterized the anticipated
discussion as bringing old concepts to new doctrine as
if nothing had changed in the past 30 years.119
On the eve of the January conference, General Gareev, the President of the Academy of Military Sciences, made the case for a new military doctrine based on
changes in the international and domestic situation.
The necessity to formulate a new edition of Russia’s
military doctrine arose because after the adoption
of the current doctrine, which was in 2000, there occurred significant changes in the geopolitical and military-political situation, and in the nature of the threats
to the defensive security of the state. . . . There have
been changes in the system of state management and
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the level of economic development of the country and
in its demographic potential.120

Gareev spoke specifically of changes in the international system adversely affecting Russia and calling
into question the territorial integrity of that nation: “.
. . the Baltic states have already become members of
NATO and Ukraine and Georgia have been invited to
join. . . . This is hardly a loyal approach, and after the
adoption of the new doctrine it will certainly stir up
sharp debates in Russia and beyond its borders.”121
The conference itself took place as planned on
January 20, with attendance by senior government
officials, military officers, and members of the Duma
and the Federal Assembly. General Gareev delivered
the opening remarks, which outlined the major parts
of the draft doctrine and outlined the case for the need
for a new version. Chief of the General Staff General Yurii Baluevsky delivered the keynote address
in which he defended the success of military reform
to date and set the charge for a new doctrine as “a
powerful Army means a powerful Russia.”122 Following the conference, the press was full of reports on the
content of the draft doctrine and on speculation about
its imminent adoption. General Gareev was particularly prominent in pushing the case for adoption. He
emphasized that new conditions dictated a new doctrine.123 But none was forthcoming. Not noted in the
immediate press accounts of the conference was the
conspicuous absence of Minister of Defense Ivanov
from the proceedings. Ivanov had not attended and
had not commented publicly on the event. At the end
of the month, Anatoly Tsyganok, the Director of the
Center for Military Forecasting and a corresponding
member of the Academy of Military Sciences, cast a
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cloud over the enthusiasm for the likely progress of a
new draft military doctrine when he noted that Minister Ivanov had not even attended the conference. The
preliminary program had listed him as the keynote
speaker. Tyganok speculated about tensions between
Ivanov and the General Staff as the reason for his absence. Ivanov had played a leading role in the drafting of the 2000 military doctrine and in the de facto
doctrine of 2003, but he had also had serious conflict
with former Chief of the General Staff General Anatoly Kvashnin, which contributed to the latter’s dismissal by President Putin in 2004.124 Within 2 weeks,
President Putin dismissed his Minister of Defense and
replaced him with Anatoly Serdyukov, a business
man and official with ties to Leningrad-St. Petersburg.
While he had served in the Soviet Army in the 1980s,
he was considered more of an expert on tax policy
than defense policy. Speculation about the causes of
Ivanov’s removal focused on the burning question of
Putin’s successor as President and the fact that Ivanov
had become too prominent a candidate for those in the
presidential administration.125
At the same time, President Putin put his own
stamp on the actual content of Russian national security policy and thereby radically reshaped the debate
about the new military doctrine. When speaking to the
leaders of the Euro-Atlantic community at the Munich
Security Conference in February 2007, President Putin
put a chill on Russia’s relations with the West, saying that Russia viewed the United States and NATO
as engaged in policies threatening Russian national
interests and creating a global security environment
that increased conflicts and showed no way to resolve
them.126 He particularly called attention to NATO’s expansion and warned that the deployment of a U.S. an-
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tiballistic missile (ABM) system into Eastern Europe
would be a precipitous step towards a new arms race.
Putin informed Western leaders that they had two
choices: continue on the path toward confrontation,
or seek to revive a partnership with Russia. While the
Western press spoke of a new cold war, the Russian
press generally applauded “Putin’s doctrine.”127 Viktor Lennik wrote that Russia had spoken its piece in
Munich, Germany, in a language that had not been
heard for years, a language that clearly expressed
Russian interests.
Following Putin’s speech, the momentum towards
military reform seemed to decline. Gareev’s and Baluevsky’s presentations to the January conference
were published by Voennaia mysl’.128 But the entire
bureaucratic context for doctrinal reform changed
after February 15, when Putin appointed as Minister
of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov, an official who had
made his reputation in the furniture business and for
his work as Tax Minister in the second Putin administration, where he had successfully reorganized the
tax service.129 Serdyukov in his first press conference
announced his intention to continue Ivanov’s course
on military reform but did not mention a new military doctrine.130 As to the logic of appointing a civilian minister of defense, experts speculated that Putin
was most concerned about getting control of the expenditure of defense funds.131 Krasnaia zvezda reported
on March 15 that the preparation of a new military
doctrine had been placed in the hands of the Security
Council and that it was busy with getting the opinions
of various departments and experts on the content of
the doctrine.132 The invitation for public discussions
brought forth some sharp criticism of the draft military doctrine as presented at the January conference.
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Georgii Kolyvanov, a retired colonel, took the opportunity to critique the proposed military doctrine beyond criticism of the draft to state that a new military
doctrine was not needed. What Russia needed was a
clear statement of its national interests, and this was a
question beyond the competence of military specialists and a matter for the whole of government, political parties, and society. A new military doctrine in the
absence of a new national security concept was a case
of putting the horse before the cart.133 A week later,
Kolyvanov criticized the views on the employment
expressed by Colonel-General Aleksandr’ Rushkin,
the head of the Operations Directorate of the General
Staff, at the January conference for being obscure, confused, and downright banal. Kolyvanov found one
capital weakness in Rushkin’s presentation: it did not
name the main threat to Russia or what sort of conflict
the Armed Forces should expect to fight.“ “There is no
answer to the main questions: with what enemy and
in what means should the Russian Army prepare to
fight today (in the extreme case, tomorrow, and not in
the “foreseeable future”)? 134 Shortly after the appearance of Kolyvanov’s two-part criticism of the draft
military doctrine, the same publication that had carried his articles invited foreign specialists to comment
on the draft military doctrine so that Russian readers
might find out what these foreign experts might know
about the presentations of the Russian military leaders involved in the debate.
Colonel Marcel de Haas of the Dutch Army made
the first and quite informed contribution. A student
of Russian military affairs, de Haas viewed the debate
on military doctrine as a case of bureaucratic politics
with the military under the leadership of the General
Staff seeking to shape the entire debate on security

122

policy by a preemptive strike in formulating a new
military doctrine. He stated that the future of doctrine
and Russian military policy in general would depend
on the success of this effort.135 The Security Council did
not approve any new military doctrine in 2007 or in
early 2008. The future of military doctrine would depend on the next presidential administration, which
would emerge after the 2008 presidential elections.
What did happen was a change of leadership in the Security Council. In mid-July 2007 Igor Ivanov resigned
from his post as Secretary of the Security Council and
was replaced by Valentin Sobolev.136 While the Security Council had enjoyed increased influence during
the tenures of Putin and Sergei Ivanov as Secretary,
its influence had declined under Ivanov’s successors.
Vladimir Rushailo, a former Minister of Internal Affairs, had been badly hurt in an automobile accident
while visiting Kamchatka. His successor, Igor Ivanov,
a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, did not dominate the interagency process. Neither did members
of Putin’s inner circle of St. Petersburg apparatchiks.
Sobolev, a former Deputy Head of the FSB and former
deputy secretary of the Security Council, brought the
Security Council into the competent hands of a former KGB officer.137 Sobolev remained Secretary of the
Security Council until after the 2008 presidential election. He would be replaced by another veteran of the
security services.
The Medvedev-Putin Tandem and Military
Doctrine.
As Putin approached the end of his second consecutive term as president, the issue of succession
began to dominate the rumor mill in Moscow, across
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Russia, and in other world capitals. Putin repeatedly
announced that he would finish his term in office, and
speculation about his successor turned first to Sergei
Ivanov, who had close ties to Putin from service in the
KGB and was part of the cadres from St. Petersburg
who made up much of Putin’s inner circle. Instead,
Putin selected another Leningrader but of a younger
generation, Dmitri Medvedev. Medvedev, like Putin,
was a graduate of the law school at St. Petersburg
University, and received his doctorate in law from
the same institution in 1990. As a former student of
Anatoly Sobchak, he was recruited into the Leningrad
municipal government when Sobchak was mayor. He
worked in the International Relations Committee of
the city government, which at that time was headed
by Vladimir Putin. When Putin became Prime Minister in November 1999, he brought Medvedev from
St. Petersburg to Moscow, where he became chief of
staff to the president and then Putin’s campaign manager during the 2000 elections. After the election, Putin appointed Medvedev Chairman of Gazprom and
charged him with ensuring that the company paid its
taxes. He seems to have played no role in Putin’s campaign against hostile oligarchs, which culminated in
the break-up of the Yukos oil corporation and the arrest
and imprisonment of its president, Vladimir Khodorkovsky. In 2003, Putin brought Medvedev back into
his presidential administration as chief of staff and in
2005 appointed him First Deputy Prime Minister. In
the fall of 2007, Putin stage managed Medvedev’s candidacy for president and then announced his support
in December, all but ensuring Medvedev’s election in
2008. In his first campaign speech as an official candidate, Medvedev announced that his first official act, if
elected, would be to appoint Putin as Prime Minister.
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Medvedev was sworn in as President of the Russian
Federation on May 7, 2008. On May 8, Putin moved
from the presidential offices on Staryi Ploshchad’ to the
office of the Prime Minister in the Belyi Dom (White
House), confirming the legal foundation of what political commentators called the Medvedev-Putin Tandem.
Medvedev arrived in the presidency with extensive experience in the presidential administration but
almost none in the area of national security policy.
How the Medvedev-Putin tandem would approach
international relations and national security and function in a crisis became apparent over the summer of
2008. Some observers expected Putin to play the role
of Sophia Alekseevna, the daughter of Tsar Aleksei,
and power behind the throne during the minority of
the Tsarevichi Ivan Aleksevich and Petr Aleksevich,
with the competent organs playing the role of the
streltsy to ensure Sophia’s hand on power. However,
Medvedev was not a family rival but part of the network of operatives that supported Putin in power.
The capital issue was not the hand behind the throne
but the functioning of a governmental tandem, or Tandemokatiia, given the President’s role as head of state
and commander-in-chief.
Changes in national security leadership followed
the presidential election of 2008. Putin joined the
meetings of the Security Council as Prime Minister.
Nikolai Patrushev retired from his post as head of the
FSB to become Secretary of the Security Council.138 Patrushev had served as head of the FSB from August
1999 and had directed counterterrorist operations during the Second Chechen War. Patrushev’s ties to Putin extended back to service in the KGB, and his long
tenure as head of the FSB made him an evident Putin
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loyalist. His first days as head of the FSB in AugustSeptember 1999 coincided with the outbreak of the
Second Chechen War. Patrushev had the responsibility for investigating a series of bombings across Russia
in early September. The blasts in Buynaksk, Moscow,
and Volgodonsk killed 293 persons and left another
651 wounded, turning the Second Chechen War from
a contest for control of Dagestan and Chechnya into a
threat to all of Russian society. On September 22, 1999,
a fourth major bomb plot was discovered in Ryazan.
However, a day later, Patrushev informed the Russian public that there had been no bomb plot, only an
anti-terrorist training exercise.139 The murky events at
Ryazan and the regime’s use of the bombings to rally
national support for the Second Chechen War by creating mass psychosis among the population fueled rumors of the FSB being agent-provocateurs who staged
the bombing to forge national support. Such accusations have been at the basis for depicting the Putin
administration as a criminal enterprise willing to use
any means to gain and hold power.140 The issue of the
influence of the intelligence services in Putin’s Russia,
which had been a concern to champions of a civil society, got renewed attention with the Putin-Medvedev
tandem.141
Those concerns received a major boost in early
June when there was more talk about strengthening
the position of the Security Council as an agency of the
government with its own budget. The Security Council had evolved as an instrument for interagency cooperation. Now it appeared to be taking a policy formulation role.142 One sign of the possible new role for the
Security Council was the departure of General Yuri
Baluevsky from the post of Chief of the General Staff
to that of Deputy Secretary of the Security Council,
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with the responsibility for military-political forecasting. The press speculated about conflict between Baluevsky and Minister of Defense Serdiukov. It is worth
noting that Baluevsky had been appointed a member
of the Security Council on May 25, resigning from the
post of Chief of the General Staff on June 4, after he
was appointed to the staff of the Security Council.143
The new Chief of the General Staff, General Nikolai
Makarov, had worked closely with Minister Serdyukov as Chief of Armaments for the Russian Armed
Forces. Baluevsky had been the chief senior military
booster of a new military doctrine, and as a member of
the staff of the Security Council for military-political
forecasting, he was in a very strong position to influence the articulation of a new military doctrine.144
However, the first security document coming from
the Medvedev-Putin Tandem was not devoted to military doctrine but instead addressed the Foreign Policy
Concept of the Russian Federation, a matter that was
considered to be primarily a document formulated
under the leadership of the Foreign Ministry. On June
4, Medvedev visited his first Western capital, Berlin,
Germany, as President. His tone seemed to raise expectations of change in Russian foreign policy even as
his content reflected continuity with Putin’s policies.
Bilateral cooperation with Germany was stressed in
the area of energy policy, at the same time he warned
against the negative consequences of NATO expansion and the deployment of ABM system components in Poland and the Czech Republic. Medvedev
offered a vision of a united European civilization at
the same time he warned against efforts to isolate Russia.145 Shortly after his return to Moscow, Medvedev
signed the foreign policy concept on July 12 and then
announced its approval at a conference of senior offi-
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cials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The document
contained no surprises. The document began by outlining the place of Russia in the international system
and articulated various objectives of Russian foreign
policy in the 21st century. The concept then described
the “modern world” and discussed Russia’s role in
that world as a great power. The document addressed
Russia’s relations with various international organizations from the UN, the EU, NATO, the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the
CIS, the Cooperative Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO), the Eurasian Economic Community, and the
SCO. Taking a global overview of Russia’s relations,
the concept focused first upon relations with the EuroAtlantic world and then the Asian Pacific. The harshest criticisms were directed at the United States and
NATO. The concept followed the foreign policy line
set by Putin. It did discuss the existing threat environment, where it pointed to the lowered risks of nuclear
and general war, and addressed the emerging transnational problems of international terrorism, narcotrafficking, organized crime, and the proliferation of
WMD. 146 The concept also stipulated the process by
which official challenges and threats would be assessed within the Russian state:
The Security Council of the Russian Federation assesses the challenges and threats to the national interests and security of Russia in the international sphere,
submits proposals to the President of the Russian
Federation for his decision as the Head of State on issues of foreign policy of the Russian Federation in the
field of national security, as well as on coordination
of activities of federal executive bodies and executive
bodies of the Subjects of the Russian Federation in the
process of the implementation of the decisions taken
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in the area of ensuring national security, and evaluates
the efficiency of those decisions.147

The inclusion of this announcement was a clear
reflection of the dominant position that the reformed
Security Council was expected to play in articulating,
not just coordinating, national security policy.148
Some commentators found the document traditional in content and form. Sergei Karaganov, the
head of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy,
labeled it as a statement of the Russian foreign policy
establishment and criticized it for being too long and
too nuanced. It reflected too much hope for the role
of the UN and put too much emphasis upon the CIS,
when the real actors of importance were China, India,
Europe, or the United States.149 Others questioned the
basic assumption in the concept and speculated on its
timing and purpose. Aleksandr’ Konovalov, the President of the think-tank, Institute of Strategic Assessments, provided an in depth critique of the document,
noting serious disconnects between what the document articulated as policy and what was the current
reality of Russian foreign policy. He was particularly
critical of the concept’s emphasis on multipolarity as
a source of stability in the international system and
pointed to numerous international security objectives,
including the struggle with terrorism that depended
upon cooperation with the West. Finally, he asked
two basic questions: why had this document appeared
now, and what was the subtext of the document? He
concluded that either policy would shift to fit the new
document, or the document would be forgotten. Since
the President had both signed the concept and given
it public attention, Konovalov concluded that the concept was an attempt by the President to put his own
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stamp on Russian foreign policy. Another observer
noted that the concept contained another change in
keeping with the Medvedev-Putin tandem. The document granted the Prime Minister powers in the conduct of foreign relations, a matter that had been the
exclusive province of Russia’s presidents.150
Shortly after the appearance of the foreign policy
concept, another document began to circulate in the
Russian mass media, New Look of the Armed Forces: Being a Concept of the development of Military Force Structure
to 2030. If the first document had been clearly an official state policy associated with the Foreign Ministry
and approved by the President, the second was leaked
by unidentified sources in the Ministry of Defense in
order to develop a public debate about it and get support outside the Ministry of Defense. Critics generally
applauded its content for being forward-looking and
acknowledged the need for such a document. But they
were critical of the fact that it had been drafted by the
Ministry of Defense alone. The document touched on
political matters that were the province of the military.
Critics admitted that the draft could have been the
work of either unnamed generals, civilian specialists
working for the Ministry, or a combination of both.
But the issue of civilian control was not just a matter
of appointing a civilian to the post of minister, it also
involved subordination of the military establishment
to the civil power. Here critics pointed to a capital
problem, the concept took on the task of defining the
threat to which the new military would respond. The
political leadership had the responsibility of defining
such threats. The concept of the “New Look” could be
seen as a not too subtle attempt to lobby the government itself.151 On the emerging military threat to Russia, the concept stressed technological progress in the
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West and declining capacity of the Russian militaryindustrial complex to provide the advanced weapons systems needed to support an “Army of Innovation.”152 The primary source of the threat from military
backwardness allegedly came from the United States
over the period in question because it would be struggling to retain its dominance of the international system against emerging regional powers, to continue its
global deployments and would seek that, in part, by
military-technological innovation. Critics questioned
both these assumptions, some pointing to the growing
power of China, while others were not so sure about
the United States retaining its global basing over the
period in question.153 The public debate of the concept
came at a particularly critical moment for Russian national security policy.
The Foreign Policy Concept and the Ministry of Defense concept of the New Look can be seen as indications of just how the Medvedev-Putin tandem would
function in the articulation of national security policy.
Medvedev might leave his mark on foreign policy, but
would share responsibility with his Prime Minister.
The serious business of defining threats would be in
the hands of the Security Council. Other powerful bureaucratic actors could be busy shaping public opinion before there was any official state policy outside
the institution promoting new policy. But such analysis applied to a conventional policy process and not a
crisis situation. Crises have their dynamics and often
affect the character of conventional policy formulation
in their aftermath.
By early August Russia found itself in just such
a crisis situation in the Caucasus as the military confrontation on the border between Georgia and the
breakaway province of South Ossetia escalated. Rus-
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sia not only had peacekeepers deployed in South Ossetia but was also overtly committed to the protection
of the South Ossetian population, many of whom had
dual citizenship in Russia. The Georgian government
under President Mikheil Saakashvili had promised a
democratic Georgia that would reunite all its territories lost in the civil conflicts of the early 1990s, and
move to the West through membership in NATO.
The United States had supported Saakashvilli’s efforts and had lobbied hard for a membership action
plan for Georgia’s admission without immediate success. Speculation that Russia provoked a crisis over
the summer followed the onset of armed conflict between Georgian and Russian forces. Such speculation
viewed the Georgian-Russian conflict as the beginning
of a new cold war with Russia willing to use military
power to impose changes on the boundaries of states
within Europe. Such critics linked together the Russian objections to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of
independence without a UN mandate and subsequent
recognition of that independence by the United States
and most EU member states in the winter of 2008. International lawyers might argue over whether such an
event set a precedent for other territories seeking independence from other national governments, specifically Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia. Ronald Asmus, the head of the German Marshall Fund,
has provided the most cogent exposition of this case
in his recent book.154
Others were not so sure that Russia had engineered the entire crisis. They pointed to the failure to
get approval of the membership action plan at the Bucharest NATO Summit in April 2008 as raising anxiety in Tbilisi. This anxiety increased as the American
presidential election campaign moved into full swing.
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The Bush administration had shown its commitment
to Georgian interests, even as it counseled restraint
towards the summer crisis. Saakashvilli faced the
prospect of the election bringing to power an administration that would not be so committed to Georgia’s
cause. On that basis, he gambled on the use of force for
a military-political coup de main that would put Georgian forces in control of the South Ossetian capital of
Tskhinvali. The military operation did not achieve its
objective before Russian re-enforcements reached the
area. In 5 days, the Georgian military faced the prospect of total defeat and a Russian occupation of large
areas of the country. No foreign military support for
Tbilisi was forthcoming outside of the redeployment
of one Georgian brigade from Iraq, where it had been
supporting coalition operations. After that, Russia followed a strategy of talk and fight while it imposed a
military defeat upon the Georgian Armed Forces and
advanced into part of Georgia. Russia avoided threatening the existence of the Georgian state, even as its
forces defeated the Georgian Armed Forces and humiliated its government. Moreover, Russia used the
conflict to recognize the independence of both South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, even as France’s President
Nicolas Sarkozy, on behalf of the EU, negotiated a
cease fire between the sides. Russia did not find many
other states that would recognize the independence of
the two break-away states, but Russian media treated
the Georgian-Russian War as a just war and great
victory in which Russia imposed peace.155 The events
in Georgia did impact the U.S. presidential election,
pushing Republican candidate John McCain towards
advocating stronger support for Georgia in the face
of Russian aggression. The United States and Poland
also signed the agreement covering the deployment
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of ABM interceptors in Poland in the aftermath of
the Georgia War. Barrack Obama, the Democratic
nominee, seemed at first reluctant to comment on the
crisis beyond supporting Sarkozy’s peace efforts. As
Stephen Blank observed in the immediate aftermath
of the war, Russia had won on the ground and lost
internationally, increasing Moscow’s isolation. Not
even the members of the SCO would recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.156
Moscow’s response was to stress its willingness to
protect its own vital national interests by force if necessary. On September 1, President Medvedev articulated five foreign policy principles: (1) the supremacy
of international law in relations among nations; (2)
preference for a multipolar world order over a unipolar one dominated by the United States; (3) commitment not to seek confrontation with any state and
desire to avoid isolation; (4) defense of Russian citizens wherever they may be as a high national security
priority; and (5) Russia’s support to friendly states in
regions considered to be of special interest.157 In late
September and October, the Russian Armed Forces
conducted a large-scale strategic command and staff
exercise, “Stability-2008,” which was designed to test
interagency responses to an emerging crisis, the liquidation of any resulting armed conflicts, and the reestablishment of strategic stability.158
In the fall of 2008, economic events were not only
reshaping American politics but also the international
system. International security concerns took second
place to seeking to stop a crisis in capital markets that
spread from the United States across the globe. This
not only ensured the election of Barrack Obama, but
it also made it clear that the United States would have
to engage in strategic disengagement from its two
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foreign wars, even as it sought to create stability to
manage both states and regions as it withdrew.159 On
coming into office, the Obama administration quickly
adopted a policy of “Reset” in U.S.-Russian relations, seeking to set a new atmosphere of cooperation
without addressing key areas of conflict until Russia
had made its own position clear on such prospects.160
Russia as a market economy suffered from the global
economic crisis, and its next major national security
document reflected both a response to the economic
crisis and to the possibility of improved relations with
the United States.
Having been tasked with formulating a new national security strategy in the summer of 2008, the
Security Council had used its research staff to formulate a draft document and then arranged a series of
conferences for discussions of its main features. The
largest of these conferences took place in March 2009,
and the Security Council used the inputs from it to
refine the document and had a draft for presentation
to the members of the Security Council in April. The
document was signed by President Medvedev on May
12.161 The document’s chief point of departure was to
play down military security and emphasize economic
aspects of security in a time of global crisis. Energy diplomacy, a major component of Putin’s foreign policy,
was addressed as a major strength and received priority attention. National security would be enhanced
by improving Russia’s position in the global economy.
The document lays out goals to be achieved in stages
over the next decade.
At the time of the signing, Nikolai Patrushev, the
Secretary to the Council, confirmed that the underlying
principle of Russian security policy would be pragmatism. This meant that Russia would seek to establish an
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equal and full-fledged strategic partnership with the
United States on the basis of mutual interests. In the
measures leading to such a full partnership, Patrushev listed: arms control and disarmament negotiations,
confidence-building measures and counterproliferation efforts to stop the spread of WMD, counterterrorism, and the resolution of regional conflicts. At the
same time, he asserted that Russia would maintain its
strategic nuclear deterrence in the face of U.S. efforts
to field a global missile defense system and to develop
global strike systems capable of attacking with nuclear and precision-guided conventional means. Russia
would remain opposed to ABM deployments in the
Czech Republic and Poland, would oppose NATO
expansion into former Soviet space, and express its
concern over the deployment of NATO infrastructure
up to Russia’s borders. He expressed concern about
NATO’s out-of-area interventions in the absence of
approval by the UN Security Council.162
Russia’s National Security Strategy published in
May 2009 set the stage for the Security Council to address Russia’s Military Doctrine. That process moved
forward through 2009 and was completed in early
2010. And so we return to the initial point of departure
of this chapter. Russia’s military doctrine has deep
historical roots, it has compelling importance to the
Russian military and the General Staff, and it reflects
post-Cold War assumptions about the primary challenges and threats as coming from the West, even as
it recognizes the need for cooperation with the West
to deal with a whole range of security challenges that
have emerged since the Cold War and are a part of
very different global dynamics. As we have noted
above, the final draft approved by President Medvedev contained some major changes from the proposi-
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tions discussed by members of the Security Council
in the fall of 2009. That final approved doctrine did
not contain proposals on nuclear first use that had
been mentioned by both Patrushev and General Baluevsky, but it did continue to treat NATO expansion
as a primary challenge to Russia’s national security.
This gives us some hope that military doctrine is not
only not a matter for the Armed Forces to define, but
that the interagency process can lead to modifications reflecting new international circumstances and
opportunities. The Medvedev-Putin Tandem has not
collapsed or degenerated into open conflict, but the
policy process, if we judge by the new Military Doctrine, has become more regular, transparent, and dependable, which will serve Russian interests and global security. The new military doctrine was remarkably
silent on the “new look” for the Russian Armed forces,
which the Ministry of Defense Serdiukov and the new
Chief of the General Staff, General Makarov, had been
pushing forward since the summer of 2008.163 It is
as if the RMA, which had been a great focus for the
Soviet General Staff in the early 1980s had suddenly
ceased to be an element of military doctrine just as
the Ministry of defense was devoting every effort to
make the Russian Armed Forces competitive in what
has become a high-tech Sino-U.S. arms race driven by
the informationization of warfare, shaped by C4ISR,
employing multi-mission unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) and robotic systems, and embracing networkcentric warfare.164
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CHAPTER 3
RUSSIAN DEFENSE DOCTRINE
Alexander G. Savelyev
After President Vladimir Putin of Russian Federation (RF) approved the Military Doctrine in April
2000, experts and observers started to propose improvements to this document since they considered it
as only a “transitional” and a “temporary” vision of
the role of armed forces in promoting the security of
the state. In 2002, official representatives of the Security Council and the Defense Ministry of the RF first
informed the government that the new draft of the
Doctrine would soon be presented for the President’s
approval. Similar information about the preparatory
work on a new Military Doctrine was also distributed
in 2006 and in 2007. The latest “news” on this issue
came from the Security Council of the Russian Federation in 2009. It promised that the document would
be ready by September 2009 and approved by the end
of the same year. However, the doctrine was only approved on February 5, 2010 (after presentation of this
paper—Editor).
THE NATURE OF THE MILITARY DOCTRINE
According to the official definition, Military Doctrine is the combination of official views (directives)
that defines the military-political, military-strategic,
and military-economic bases for promoting of the
military security of the RF. The 2000 Military Doctrine
(Doctrine-2000) is defined as “a document of the transitional period” and as “defensive.”1
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The document itself consists of several parts: One
part titled, “Military-Political Basis,” including subchapters on the military-political situation with the description of possible wars and military conflicts; main
provisions of promotion of military security; military
organization of the state; and the state’s governance
of the military organization. Another, “Military-economic basis,” gives the priorities of military-industrial
preparations, mobilization, military cooperation, and
some other provisions.
The legal nature of the Doctrine is not quite clear.
It is not a law, which is obligatory for the implementation for any state body, because the document is
not subject to approval by the Russian Parliament. At
the same time, it is not a pure declaration, since the
document is approved by a Presidential Decree. The
document states that its success will be achieved by
the state governance of the military and by implementation of a complex of political, diplomatic, economic,
social, informational legal, military, and other measures aimed at promoting the military security of the
RF and its allies.
In any case, the military and political leadership of
Russia, as well as the majority of experts, consider the
Military Doctrine to be a very important document.
Therefore, such state structures as the Security Council, Defense Ministry, the General Staff, and some other state bodies, as well as the Russian Academy of Sciences, many nongovernmental organizations (NGOS)
and groups of experts were busy for a long time with
drafting this document and proposing their views on
the issues it raises.
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THE PROBLEMS WITH THE NEW DRAFT OF
THE DOCTRINE
Before starting the analysis of the main provisions
of a new draft of the Military Doctrine, it is important
to pay attention to several points. Thus, according to
the not-very-clearly-explainable Russian “tradition,”
the draft of the Doctrine was developed by the Security Council, not by the Defense Ministry or by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the RF. It was not
an initiative of the above-mentioned agencies, but the
direct order of the President. One can consider this
fact not to be very important, but under the present
situation, it would be a mistake to completely ignore
it.
The problem is that military reform, which is now
in progress in Russia, produced strong dissatisfaction among many high-ranking generals, including
former Chief of the General Staff General Yuri Baluyevsky. Much evidence shows that this dissatisfaction was one of the main reasons for his retirement.
General Baluyevsky now occupies the position of the
Under Secretary of the Security Council, and led the
group that is responsible for drafting a new Military
Doctrine. Of course, it does not mean that the draft
presented by the Security Council could completely
reject the military reform, but it is difficult to imagine
that it would reflect all the new beginnings in military
modernization, which must be implemented into the
armed forces of the RF according to the reform. (In
fact, it did not even mention the reform—Editor.)
This problem is not the only one that accompanies
the development of a new Military Doctrine. It only
opens the list of relatively “strange” points in this
sphere. Thus, the very fact that the President ordered
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the Security Council and not the Defense Ministry to
draft the Doctrine does not mean that it was his initial
decision. It was the Ministry and the General Staff
who proposed to put this responsibility on this presidential agency. Ironically, when General Baluyevsky
occupied the position of the Chief of the General Staff,
he also proposed that the Military Doctrine had to be
drafted by the Security Council. There is no clear answer to the question of why the acting military does
not want to work out a document that must be number one from the point of their responsibility and dayto-day life and activities. One of the answers is that
they do not consider the Military Doctrine to be a very
important document at all.
It is difficult to imagine that Military Doctrine
could be directly presented to the President of Russia
without preliminary approval of this document by the
Defense Minister and the Chief of the General Staff.
But in open statements of the representatives of the
Security Council, there is nothing about such a very
natural mechanism of decisionmaking. In this connection, one can come to a conclusion that the present delay in accepting the Doctrine can also be explained by
the need to achieve an agreement between the reformers (Defense Ministry) and the conservators (Security
Council). At the same time, according to the statement of the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian
Armed Forces General Nikolai Makarov, the process
of discussions and achieving of an agreement between
different agencies was underway by February 2009,
and might even have been started earlier.2
One of the aspects of the existing disagreements
became public in autumn 2009. Thus, on October 8,
2009, during a press-conference, Secretary of the Security Council of the RF Nikolai Patrushev said that
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his Council wanted “to make this Military Doctrine
open in order that everybody here and abroad knew
what we had developed and how we wanted to work.
We will put forward certain aims and define the ways
how to achieve them.”3 But in August before that
conference, Deputy Chief of the General Staff General
Anatoly Nogovytsin stated that the new Military Doctrine would consist of two parts—an open one with
the military political aspects, and a closed one that
would contain strategic aspects, including the conditions and possible ways of use of nuclear weapons.4
The “closed” method of working-out the Doctrine,
as well as the idea to have a “secret” part of it, produced strong dissatisfaction within the expert community of Russia. The Security Council declared that
it was open to any proposals and ideas concerning all
the aspects of a new draft of this document. It is quite
well known that the Academy of Sciences of Russia
and the Academy of Military Sciences of the RF, as
well as many other organizations, tried to make their
proposals in this connection. But they could hardly
find any trace of their ideas in the preliminary draft of
the Doctrine during the process of discussions organized by the Security Council.
As for the “secret” part of the Doctrine, President
of the Academy of Military Science General Makhmut
Gareyev made a straightforward statement against
the very idea to have it. He said that Military Doctrine
was an open declaration about the policy of the state
in the field of defense. This statement is to be made
openly to its own people as well as to the all the world.
Some of the aspects of this policy are presented directly and others, indirectly. But the Doctrine must not
contain any closed parts.5 This point of view is shared
by many Russian experts.
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Another “strange” question is why it took so long
to draft a new version of a military doctrine. As mentioned above, it was already 2002 when Russian authorities started to speak about the necessity to adjust
the acting military doctrine to new realities. After
September 11, 2001, these realities became absolutely
clear to all the states and political and military leaders of the world, including Russian authorities. But
for whatever reasons, for about 7 years they failed to
reflect it in such documents as the Security Concept
and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.6
WHAT IS NEW IN THE DOCTRINE
In spite of the “closed” character of the development of the new Military Doctrine of the RF, some
details of the new draft of this document became
known through the press, mostly with reference to
the “unidentified sources.” As usual, these sources
explain that the document under development should
not be considered as a completely new one. All the
main provisions of the acting doctrine will remain the
same. But some details and positions of it will be corrected according to a new strategic situation. At the
same time, they state that unlike the previous (acting)
doctrine, the new one is designed as a document that
will “work” for a relatively long time (probably until
2020). The doctrine approved in 2000 is called a “temporary” or “transitional” document. Nevertheless,
there are no specific details that prove the difference
between these two doctrines from this point of view,
and it is not clear why the document, which remained
in force for 10 years (2000-10), is a “temporary” one,
and the document that will “work” for the following
10 years (2010-20) is not.
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The doctrine will remain as a defensive doctrine,
but it will contain a new provision which calls for the
use of force to protect the interests of Russian citizens
abroad in case their lives are in danger. The experts
unanimously link this new point with the RussianGeorgian conflict of August 2008. They also see the
influence of this conflict in another new provision
of the 2010 Doctrine that justifies the use of Russian
Armed Forces in border conflicts along the perimeter
of Russia in case of “violations of the principles of international law which could be defined as an aggression.”7 The third difference between the two doctrines
is contained in the chapter, “Promotion of Military
Security.” It provides a joint military policy not only
together with Belarus as it is defined in the 2000 doctrine, but together with the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).8
Finally, in the “nuclear” part of the Doctrine, there
will be a new provision about the possibility of a delivery of preemptive strikes against the aggressor. The
list of potential or probable enemies of Russia remains
the same. They are international terrorism, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United
States. Many experts think that the United States and
NATO were included in this list automatically, following the traditions of the Cold War and Soviet-type
thinking. As for the most probable and important
threats to Russian national security—the primary one
is called interference of foreign states into Russian internal affairs—whether direct or indirect, through the
structures that have their support. Another threat is
described as anti-constitutional violence in the postSoviet states, which could lead to instability at the
Russian borders.9 The new doctrine also proclaims
the principle of civilian control over the armed forces.
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But it gives no details about such control or its mechanism.
THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
As we mentioned above, some important details
of the new draft of the Military Doctrine were openly presented to the public. The most sensational one
was a new provision of the document that defines the
spectrum of options for the first use of nuclear weapons by Russia. According to the statements of Secretary of the Security Council of Russia N.Patrushev,
this spectrum would include, alongside the others, a
preemptive strike option.10 It is quite obvious that this
“leakage” was specially made to check the publics’
and experts’ reactions to such an innovation.
One should remember that in 1993 Russia for the
first time abandoned Leonid Brezhnev’s proclaimed
principle of no first use of nuclear weapons.11 This was
done after it became clear that NATO would remain in
force, that a number of former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) allies would join this militarypolitical organization and, most importantly, that the
conditions of heavy economic crisis and the continued
weakening of the capabilities of the general purpose
forces of Russia and Russian conventional potential
would restrict Russian military capabilities. It was
a long-standing tradition for the Soviet Union to pay
major attention to a military buildup, very often at the
expense of the level of the welfare of the population
of the country. The military always enjoyed a privileged position in the society, which is true at least for
high-ranking officers. This situation started to change
during the Mikhail Gorbachev period and accelerated
during Boris Yeltsin’s rule. But the priority to promote
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security of the country remained in place. And for the
new leadership of Russia, it was simply impossible to
ignore the growing dissatisfaction of the military and
the “concerned” part of the public with the level of
capabilities of the armed forces. So, a first use option
became a sort of a compromise to prove to the skeptics
that the security of Russia, in any case, would be promoted whether by conventional or by nuclear forces.
In the 2000 military doctrine, Russia preserved the
right to use nuclear weapons only in retaliation and in
case of the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) against it and its allies, as well in
case of a “critical situation” for its national security
that occurred as the result of a large-scale aggression
with the use of conventional weapons. Now it is proposed to preserve the right to start nuclear war not as
retaliation, but in case of suspicions of possible attack
against Russia. It is interesting to mention that such
an “idea” was openly declared not by acting or retired
military representatives, but by the Secretary of the
Security Council of the RF and an ex-Federal Security
Service (FSB) chief.12 The military tried to avoid the
comments on nuclear issues of the new doctrine and
the proposal to have a “closed” part of this document
can probably be explained by their unwillingness to
openly present their views on this very sensitive subject.
But at the same time, if the main goal of the state is
to avoid war in general and nuclear war in particular,
it must follow the strategy of deterrence. One of the
most important postulates of this strategy was formulated 2,500 years ago by the great Chinese military authority, Sun Tzu. It states that if you want to prevent
an attack of your enemy, you must show him all the
disadvantages of such a decision.13 The key words here
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are “to show.” So, the idea to “hide” this most important element of deterrence strategy would be unlikely
to contribute to the general security of Russia. One
should also take into account the fact that, while presenting general provisions of Russian nuclear strategy
openly, there is no need to go deeply into the details
if these details are considered to be very sensitive and
classified. For the purpose of the military doctrine, it
would be quite enough to make general statements,
leaving the classified information for the war plans to
be developed by the General Staff.
But in any case, the statement that Russia under certain conditions will be ready to deliver a first nuclear
strike sounds extremely provocative, and it is very unlikely that this provision of the military doctrine could
contribute to the security of the RF or to the security of
any other state. That point of view was expressed by
many experts, mostly retired military. Probably, the
strongest dissatisfaction with the idea of preemptive
use of force (not only nuclear, but also conventional)
was presented by retired General Yuli Kirshin. Making a reference to the statement of General Baluyevsky
of January 2008 that the Russian Federation could use
its forces preemptively, he completely disagreed with
it. Moreover, he put the blame on General Baluyevsky
by saying that he was going “to completely break the
content” of the doctrine and was going to transfer it
“from peaceful and defensive” into “adventures, illegal and aggressive.”14 Of course, not all the experts
share such a radical point of view. As usual, the spectrum of positions is very wide. And as soon as the new
draft of Military Doctrine is approved by the President
of the RF, one can expect a new wave of publications,
statements, etc., on the subject.
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MILITARY DOCTRINE AND THE PROBLEM
OF INFORMATION AND OPENNESS
In one of the preliminary drafts of the military doctrine, there was a provision that this document must
implement an informational function along with the
others. But much evidence shows that the new doctrine, as well as all the previous variations of this document, can hardly be described as informative. Russian
military doctrine never contained such information
as the number of military districts and the number of
the fleets and the flotillas. The reader of the document
will never find information about the branches of the
armed forces and the overall numbers of military and
civilian staff of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Strategic
Rocket, and other forces. There is nothing about the
numbers of the main weapon systems, etc. This information is not classified and is available in many,
including official, open documents. But for whatever
reasons, the authors of the doctrine decided not to
“weigh down” the document with this data.
If the interested reader cannot “fill the gap” in the
information concerning the aforementioned positions,
it is quite difficult to understand other very important
provisions of the document. One such provision is the
question about the general method of warfare. More
concretely, in case of war are we going to attack the
enemy from the very beginning of the conflict, or will
our general preparations be for defense and, probably,
for counterattack?
Back in the 1930s, after very intensive discussions,
Soviet military and political leaders came to a decision
that the Red Army must have become the most offensive army in the world. They rejected defense as one
of the important methods of warfare and put forward
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a slogan “to destroy the enemy at its territory by small
blood” (i.e., few casualties—Editor). It was a quite
clear and straightforward strategy that was worked
out in open discussions. It is another story that this
offensive strategy became the cause for a terrible tragedy of the Red Army after German troops attacked
Soviet forces who were not prepared for or trained for
defense.
After World War II and until the Gorbachev period, there were no open debates on the offence and
defense problem. The USSR’s military strategy then
was obviously and clearly offensive. But in the second half of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s,
the debates on this issue started again. Military leaders tried to defend their offensive position by putting
forward the standard statement that it was impossible
to achieve victory without decisive offensive operations and strategy in general. But the opponents did
not accept this argument, arguing that the new character of contemporary war meant that there is no need
to completely destroy the enemy.15 Moreover, in case
of a conflict with a strong and nuclear enemy, Russia
must seek an early termination of the conflict and not
let it become nuclear and global. In other words, they
proposed a strategy of de-escalation.
The political leadership of the USSR tried to avoid
direct statements on the problem, but it obviously
preferred a non-offensive option, or more correctly,
a nonmilitary option. Gorbachev’s famous statement
that security was a political matter and could only be
solved by political means disappointed the military
and their supporters, which resulted in termination of
the dispute since the offenders preferred to keep silent.
Of course, it does not mean that the military accepted
their defeat. But further on, they simply tried to avoid
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making direct statements on this problem and tried
(not without success) to shift the attention of the political leadership of Russia (starting from Yeltsin and
finishing with Dmitry Medvedev) to the questions of
strategic stability.
Maybe the aforementioned debates on offense and
defense became the turning point after which military
and pro-military officials in their open presentations
and documents, like the military doctrine, try to avoid
straightforward statements so as to give as little information as possible. For example, in one of the drafts
of the new Military Doctrine there were a number of
such expressions as “increase in the effectiveness,”
“improvements,” “neutralization of the aggressor,”
and “bringing in accordance with the tasks.” But there
is nothing about the methods of “neutralization of the
aggressor,” i.e., by offensive or defensive operation,
or by a combination of these two methods. Moreover,
in speaking about “bringing in accordance with the
tasks,” the authors of the document do not call anything tasks. So again, we have another unresolved issue. Taking this into consideration, one can conclude
that new Military Doctrine failed to implement the
“informative task” that was declared by its authors.
MILITARY REFORM AND THE REDUCTION
AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE OFFICERS’
CORPS
The most contradictory problem in contemporary
Russian military life is military reform, implemented
by Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov with a relatively small group of his supporters, including Chief
of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov. Serdyukov obviously enjoys support from the Kremlin, but, at the
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same time, his attempts to make general improvements
in the Army meet growing dissatisfaction among top
level military officials (many of whom were retired
during the period of reform—i.e., since 2008), as well
as within military experts’ groups and from individuals.
One should remember that in October 2008
Serdyukov announced the main provisions of military
reform. They concerned practically all the spheres
of military activities of Russia—from the quantity of
soldiers and officers, to the quality of military units,
including the installation of a new system of military
command and control. Thus, it was decided to reduce
the overall number of the armed forces from 1.13 million in 2008 to 1 million troops by 2012. Originally
it was decided to have 1 million troops in the armed
forces by 2016, but Serdyukov proposed to implement
this plan ahead of schedule.
The most painful reductions concern the officer
corps. The number of officers’ positions will be reduced from 355,000 to 150,000, which means the actual
retirement of 117,500 officers within 3 years.16 Part of
this number of military positions will not be reduced,
but substituted with civilian positions—physicians,
journalists, lawyers, and others. Another part will be
substituted with sergeants. The ratio between senior
and junior officers’ positions will also be changed. The
armed forces will have many fewer colonels and many
more lieutenants.
Very serious reductions will affect the central apparatus of the armed forces. It will be reduced from
22,000 to 8,500 positions. It also concerns the General
Staff, the number of whose departments must be reduced by half. More details of the planned reductions
of military personnel are presented in Table 3-1.
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Category
General
Colonel
Lieutenant-Colonel
Major
Captain
First Lieutenant
Lieutenant
All officers
Ensign (Army)
Warrant Officer
(Navy)

Sept. 2008
1,107
15,365
19,300
99,550
90,000
30,000
20,000
365,000
90,000
50,000

by 2012
Changes (%)
866
- 22
3,114
- 80
7,500
- 61
30,000
- 70
40,000
- 56
35,000
+ 17
26,000
+ 30
142,000
- 61
0
- 100
0
- 100

Source: The Reform of the Armed Forces of Russia 2008-2009,
available from ru.wikipedia.org.

Table 3-1. The Planned Reductions of Military
Personnel of the Russian Armed Forces.
Of course, the reductions of officers and generals
(it is planned to reduce the number of generals’ positions in the armed forces from about 1,100 to less than
900—see Table 3-1) resulted in the most serious dissatisfaction and produced the strongest critiques of
the reform in general and of Serdyukov in particular.
Some of the critiques do it quite openly. Among them,
one can mention the Chairman of the Communist
Party of RF Gennady Zyuganov and retired generals
Leonid Ivashov, Aleksandr’ Vladimirov, and others.
Another group of those who oppose the reform prefer to express their views mostly through the internet
and without mentioning their names. However, tak-
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ing into account their level of knowledge, it is possible
to conclude that some of these “incognitos” are highranking and, probably still active military.
For example, one of these sources gives the information that the number of staff members of the Main
Department of Operations (Glavnoye Operativnoye
Upravleniye [GOU]) of the General Staff was reduced
from 550 to 260 persons during 1 year, and subsequently to 150 persons. But the tasks for these personnel remained the same, which forced the department
to establish a working time from 8 a.m. until 8 p.m.,
in violation of acting Russian legislation.17 This source
also states that the Department of Military Communications was reduced by more than three times and the
department responsible for command centers by four
times.
These critiques compare the scale of the present
reform with the repressions of the late 1930s. They
say that the majority of high ranking military were
dismissed from their positions or given mandatory retirement. This concerns the Chief of the General Staff
and all the chiefs of its main departments. All three of
the commanders in chief of the military branches were
dismissed, as well as all three of the commanders in
chief of different troop branches. Also, all six commanders of military districts were dismissed. They
present other figures to support their position.
Other very serious changes are expected at the
lower levels of military command. It is planned to
have (within 2-3 years) a completely new, “professional” sergeants’ corps which must substitute for the
existing “semi-professional” staff of the armed forces.
This idea of Defense Minister Serdyukov attracts far
less criticism than the reductions of officers, but the
skeptics cannot believe that this goal can be achieved

168

in such a short period of time. In this connection, they
predict not less than 10-15 years for its implementation, during which transitional period they expect
very serious weaknesses to appear in this lower level
of command.
As for the doctrine, it is quite obvious that such
big changes in the numbers and the structure of the
armed forces of Russia, including dramatic changes in
the officers’ and sergeants’ corps, must find at least
some (if not very serious) reflection in this document,
since the corresponding decisions have been already
taken. Moreover, concrete actions in this field have
been undertaken by the leadership of the armed forces. But there is some evidence that in the intermediate variants of the draft of the Doctrine, the Security
Council and General Baluyevsky managed to avoid
both the concrete figures as well as even mentioning
the reductions and the restructuring of military personal of the Russian Army (and even in the final version published in February 2010, we find no mention
of the reform—Editor).
Changes of the Structure.
Other changes as the result of the reform that obviously must find their reflection in the military doctrine
are the structural changes in the armed forces and in
the command system. The last time the structure of
the Russian Army remained the same as during the
Soviet time. The main unit was the division—motorized and tank—consisting of four regiments—three
motorized and one tank for the motorized division
and three tank regiments and one motorized for a
tank division. Usually, three or four divisions constituted an army, which was under the command of
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the military district authorities. Only in 1990 were a
number of “reduced” (due to economic reasons) divisions transformed into brigades.18 But generally, the
command system remained the same: military district—army—division—regiment.
Now the idea is to have a reduced, three—stage,
command system: military district—operational command—brigade. The level of division will be abandoned, as will the divisions themselves. According to
Serdyukov, this system will improve operational efficiency in military command. The transformation from
divisions to brigades also presents a subject of critique
on the part of Russian experts. Those who oppose the
reform try to prove that this transition will dramatically weaken the armed forces and will make it impossible to wage a large-scale war against a strong enemy.
As a result, the Russian Army will be able to fight and
probably win only in limited military conflicts, like the
conflict with Georgia in the summer of 2008. Moreover, say the critics, in the long term the consequences
of such a transformation will result in the dramatic
weakness of the level of military professionalism and
experience of Russian generals, because such a very
important position as commander of division will be
absent. According to such critics, only after having the
experience as a division commander can a general obtain real operational and strategic skill.
Another innovation in the armed forces of Russia
is the practically complete elimination of noncombat
ready units. The most serious changes will take place
in the Army, but all the rest of the services will also
become subject to planned restructuring. The planned
reductions in the number of military units are presented in Table 3-2.
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Military Service
Army
Air Force
Navy
Strategic Rocket
Forces
Space Forces

2008
1890
340
240
12
7

2012
172
180
123
8

Changes (%)
- 90
- 48
- 49
- 33

6

- 15

Source: The Reform of the Armed Forces of Russia 2008-2009,
available from ru.wikipedia.org.

Table 3-2. The Number of Military Units in
Russian Armed Forces
(Planned Reductions and Changes).
Chief of the General Staff Makarov stated that, as
a result of modernization of the armed forces, including the restructuring and delivery of new weapon systems, all the combat ready units will be 100 percent
equipped with new systems and other units by not less
than 70 percent by the year 2020.19 The skeptics say
that these new systems cannot be called “new” from
the point of view of their characteristics. They are
“new” only in comparison with the existing weapons,
which are mostly obsolete. At the same time, there is
no information on the cost of the modernization declared by the General Staff. But it is clear that Russia
will pay very serious attention to these modernization
issues, which will result in quite reasonable re-arming
of the armed forces.
There is no official information about the future
structure of the Russian Armed Forces. Moreover, in
November 2008 General Makarov signed a directive
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that prohibited the military from openly presenting
any information about the state of the reform of the
armed forces, as well as about the problems occurring
due to the reform.20 But according to some estimates,
by the year 2015 the Russian Army may have about 60
combat-ready brigades with the total number of tanks
(due to different estimates) from 2000 to 3000 (instead
of 23,000 for today).
Once again, one should mention that the Russian
Security Council, responsible for drafting the military
doctrine, for whatever reasons does not want to reflect
these dramatic changes in this document. It is impossible to imagine that any Russian officials—whether
military or civilian—can consider these reforms as a
not so important event that does not deserve the right
to find its reflection in the Military Doctrine. At the
same time, if they chose a variant with the “secret”
part of this document, it is also difficult to imagine
what kind of “secrets” concerning the military reform
can be presented there, since practically all the information is available through open sources, including
mass media.
Mobilization Issues.
Traditionally, the Russian military doctrine contains a rather big and important military—economic
section that calls for preparations and improvements
in the activities of the country’s military-industrial
complex. It also contains general demands for the
readiness of the economy of the state (both military
and civilian) for mobilization efforts in case mobilization is declared by the supreme command (the President). As usual, his part of the Doctrine does not attract the general attention of the commentators on this
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document, including critics as well as the supporters.
The necessity of military mobilization was almost
never a subject of questions and serious discussions
in Russia as well as in the Soviet Union. All the Soviet
and Russian experience demanded a very strong potential for mobilization of the Army and industry in
order to supply the huge armed forces in case of war.
The very notion of war was unanimously viewed as
signifying a massive and more or less prolonged one.
The one exception was a nuclear war, which may have
a relatively shorter period than a war using only conventional weapons.
Soviet and Russian military thought never rejected the participation of the country in local conflicts
and limited wars (like the Afghan war) that do not
demand massive mobilization. But general preparations of the country always had in mind the possibility of a central war with a military and economically
strong enemy that will demand the concentration of
all efforts to achieve a victory. The influence of the experience of the country in World War II, or the Great
Patriotic War as it is usually called in Russia, is very
strong even now, although it is nearly 65 years after
its end. The book, The Recollections and the Thoughts
by Marshal Georgy Zhukov is still very popular. It
remains the most recommended book for young Russian officers.
But the very problem is not in the book, of course.
It is much more serious. One can find the sources of
this problem back in the 1920s and 1930s, when the
Soviet Union started the so-called “Stalin’s industrialization.” The goal (and the result) of this industrialization was the creation of a Soviet economic system
that was generally based on heavy and military industry. During World War II, this industry was partially
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destroyed, partially relocated (to the Urals), and partially newly built. This allowed the state to increase
dramatically the production of the entire spectrum of
weapons during the war, which created a basis for victory.
After World War II, military construction in the
Soviet Union continued at an even larger scale than
before. Huge army and military reserves demanded
unprecedented efforts in military production at the
expense of the living standards of the population.
Military demands were never cut by the USSR political leadership, since the majority of the leaders of
the country had high military ranks and war experience. During the Gorbachev period, several attempts
to transform the military economy into a civilian one
were undertaken, but all failed. As a result, Russia
inherited a rather weakened (due to practical termination of the arms race), but still enormous industry,
which may be called mostly military. For example,
practically all Soviet-made technical consumer goods
(radio and TV sets, refrigerators, tape and video recorders, kitchen equipment, etc.) were produced by
military enterprises, which received special orders defining the percentage of civilian goods to be produced
by this or that military branch of the industry. During
the period when there were practically no competitive
foreign goods in the markets, these products of the Soviet military industrial complex had their consumers.
But it is not surprising that civil production of technical consumer goods practically stopped or the volume
of production was drastically reduced when the country became open to the world.
A huge military industrial complex is not the
only problem for Russia. Another part is the civilian
branches of Soviet economy, which were viewed by
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the leadership as a sort of reserve that can contribute
to military production in case of mobilization. The majority of civilian enterprises had special programs for
such a transformation, including the reserves of special equipment, raw materials, etc. The Soviet Union
had substantial experience in transferring civilian to
military production, but there was practically no experience for how to do the opposite—to convert the
military economy into a civilian one.
The nature and the scale of the Soviet, and now
Russian, military economy is a special problem, which
deserves separate research. But from the perspective
of military doctrine, it is obvious that this issue must
play a very important role in justifying the existence
of such a monstrous part of the country’s economy.
The necessity to keep mobilization capacity is one of
the most important arguments for it, which always
found its reflection in the Doctrine.
Now the problem is that military reform and
planned transformation of the armed forces of Russia
obviously contradict the standard demand to keep tremendous reserves and military-industrial potential.
The mobilization issue is becoming more and more
obsolete from the perspective of the reform. Some of
the critics managed to detect this contradiction. Thus
General (Ret.) Vladimirov states that the idea to start
and to finish war without reserves is nonsense from
the point of strategy and theory of war. According to
this expert (and to the standard Soviet military thinking), the main task of the Army of a peaceful period
is to fight during the initial period of war to give time
for the state to undertake mobilization procedures. He
also states, that “as usual” this “initial” Army perishes,
and the victorious results of the war can be achieved
only by the Army of the “war period”—the Army that
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is built up as the result of mobilization. His conclusion
is as follows: since the reform practically destroys the
mobilization potential, the country is preparing “not
to wage but to lose the war.”21
As for the official point of view on this problem,
at present it still remains at the periphery of the attention of the military leadership, which is busy with the
transformation of the Army. As a result, it would not
be very surprising if the new military doctrine would
contain a section on the necessity to make preparations for military and industrial mobilization, which
is absolutely contradictory to the essence of the reform
(and this is exactly what happened—Editor).
CONCLUSION
The analysis of Russian military doctrine shows
that this document is quite controversial on many
points. Thus, there is not even a joint position on the
question of whether or not this document is important
for the security of Russia. The nature of Military Doctrine is also questionable. While declaring its “defensive character,” it calls for preemptive military actions
(including a preemptive use of nuclear weapons), as
well as mostly offensive military strategy. The doctrine will probably state that its provisions are obligatory for the implementation by all the state bodies.
At the same time, the document does not contain any
straightforward directives that can be treated as direct
orders for this or that action. Moreover, if the doctrine
by its nature is a complex of official views on the role
of military instruments in preserving the security of
the country, it is not clear how the views can be implemented by the state bodies.
There also are a number of other not very clear
and explainable positions in the document. But what
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is most important, the present variant of military doctrine does not reflect the overwhelming military reform under way in Russia. One can say more: the
doctrine, due to a number of its positions, contradicts
the reform. Leaving aside the absence of information
about planned changes in the armed forces, the document has a number of positions (like the demands
for preparations for a large-scale mobilization of the
Army, as well as the military and civilian industry)
that can be considered as being inconsistent with the
reform.
If there were no such deep contradictions between
the reformers and opponents of such rapid and deep
transformation in the Russian Armed Forces, a compromise could be achieved in the military doctrine.
But now this document has become a focal point of
the struggle between the two parties. More correctly,
the anti-reformist group obviously tries to use the
doctrine as the proof of the rightness of their position.
And if the President, for whatever reasons, approves
the doctrine in the wording proposed by the Security Council, one can expect further difficulties in the
implementation of the reforms of the armed forces as
they were initially designed.
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